Political Identification in Europe

Community in Crisis?

Edited by

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Emerald Publishing Limited
Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK

First edition 2021

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-83982-125-7 (Print)
ISBN: 978-1-83982-124-0 (Online)
ISBN: 978-1-83982-126-4 (Epub)

ISOQAR certified Management System, awarded to Emerald for adherence to Environmental standard ISO 14001:2004.

Certificate Number 1985
ISO 14001

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List of Abbreviations

ACP	Africa, Caribbean, Pacific
AfD	Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)
ALFA	Allianz für Fortschritt und Aufbruch (Alliance for Progress and Awakening)
BTO	Brussels Treaty Organisation
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDU	Christian Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
DG	Directorate-Generals of the European Commission
DRP	Deutsche Reichspartei (German Empire Party)
EC	European Community
ECHR	European Convention of Human Rights
ECI	European Citizen Initiative
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EEA	European Economic Area
END	European Nuclear Disarmament
EP	European Parliament
EPP	European People's Party
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FCN	First Country National
FrP	Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party, Norway)
GAL/TAN	Green, Alternative, Libertarian versus Tradition, Authority, Nation
GDR	German Democratic Republic
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOs	International Organisations
KI	Kreisau Initiative
LKR	Liberal-Konservative Reformer (Liberal-Conservative Reformers Party, Germany)
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MS	Member State of the European Union
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOK	Norwegian Krone
NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party Germany)
NSU	National Socialist Underground
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OST	Ontological Security Theory
PEGIDA	Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident)
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy
PICUM	Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants
PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice Party, Poland)
SCN	Second Country National
sECI	Self-Organized ECI
SECR	Supranational European Citizenship Regime
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TCN	Third Country Nationals
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TFEU	Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UKIP	UK Independence Party
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Preface

Yannis Stavrakakis

This collective volume comes at a crucial conjuncture. Both the European Union and our national and local communities seem to have entered a very delicate and bumpy phase with no obvious resolution in sight. It follows a series of consecutive crises (from the global economic crisis of 2008 to the global pandemic of 2020, just to mention the most recent ones) and persistent dynamics (such as increasing inequality and the erosion of democratic decision-making) that undermine any effective and timely response to the aforementioned crises. Brexit may be the most visible symptom, but the *malaise* goes far deeper. How can we assess the historical trajectory and the current predicament of Europe and its people(s) in this moment?

The title of this book alone challenges certain intuitions, because extraordinary times demand challenging displacements and reorientations in our conceptual and analytical frameworks. Mere complacency and the continuous reproduction of obsolete perspectives and stereotypes will not do. Let me provide a few examples that demonstrate the innovative profile of the volume that Machin and Meidert have put together.

First, why talk about 'identification' and not 'identity', as is usually the case? Arguably, in pre-modern societies identity issues did not emerge in the same way as in ours, simply because it was largely taken for granted. Identity was usually seen as determined by a rigid social topography guaranteed by mythical dynamics and religious forces. Identity, in other words, was something assigned by what the community defined and obeyed as its undisputed unifying principle. Modernity, in contrast, by proclaiming the 'death of God' and by advancing individualisation and capitalism, radically disrupted this long-term stability. It involved a multitude of dislocations of traditional practices and types of behaviour, and initiated a period of constant disruption and change. If, as a result of social transformations taking place in modernity, identity is not considered as given any more, then it can only be seen as the result of social processes of construction and sedimentation. Hence the expression 'social identity'. Furthermore, if identity is understood as the result of social processes then this also opens up the possibility of a political contestation and re-articulation of identity. Hence the expression 'political identity'. This was the secondary radical implication put forward by the establishment of the modern horizon.

And this was not limited within the field of social and political reflection. Crucially, it extended into political action. As a result of this transformation, a multitude of groups began to question their traditionally established 'identities'.

Women, for example, contested their location within patriarchal representations of the social, which had been previously taken as given, and they entered the political arena in Western democracies and then globally.[1] Furthermore, this contestation, initially unsettling the *hierarchy* between the sexes, ultimately generated a self-critical questioning of the idea of the two sexes themselves, on the basis of a queer sensibility.

This process has allowed both the development of a reflexive intellectual ethos and the continuous radicalisation of democracy through the extension of rights, redressing inequalities, etc. But it is a process of intellectual enlightenment that has been stalled. A political radicalisation that has been arrested. Our intellectual horizon increasingly suffers from the re-emergence and sedimentation of biased *orthodoxies*. In our post-democratic public spheres and institutional settings as well, with the firm establishment of ideological horizons like the 'end of history' or the so-called TINA (There Is No Alternative) dogma, no alternative identifications can flourish while power asymmetries lead to what can only be described as a political short-circuit. Here, beyond Brexit, the way that European institutions dealt with the Syriza experiment in Greece is rather instructive. No wonder that, given the crisis-ridden framing of our lives, we seem to be experiencing what Gramsci described as the *interregnum*: crisis partly 'consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 276).

This is because our institutions (both intellectual and political) have declared war on the new, on the heterodox. Thus, when new perspectives and political identifications emerge they are immediately treated with suspicion and summarily discredited. And this is not only a political issue, but also something plaguing the social-scientific domain. On both levels, Europe has become the name of a *malaise* and a *cul-de-sac*. Intellectual projects like the one represented by this book demand our attention, because the rigorous investigation of the current – and often conflicting – meaning(s) of class, citizenship, the people, the nation and the EU itself could reveal the different dynamics and the multiple possibilities at play.

Of course, the problem affecting our (late) modern intellectual horizon is far from new and has been documented long ago. Going back to debates within German sociology in mid-twentieth century, we could give it a Blumenbergian emphasis: it concerns the legitimacy of modernity.[2] In short, has modernity been worthy of its name and promise? Or has it eventually reoccupied pre-modern patterns of questioning – around ultimate foundations – that undermine its potential and trap its development within secularised political and economic theologies? Here, the fragment by Walter Benjamin on the operation of capitalism itself as a religion acquires an eerie relevance (notice, in this respect, the marginalisation of critical economics). To use Bruno Latour's well-known formulation, what if 'we have never been modern' enough (Latour, 1993)? What if we have managed to develop and sanctify new orthodoxies that severely limit the scope for true

[1]For a full elaboration of this argument, see Stavrakakis (2000).
[2]See, in this respect, Blumenberg (1985).

intellectual and academic fermentation and disallow the mapping of new alternatives when these are most needed, at times of crisis? The ongoing pandemic provides a good example:

Economic orthodoxy supports the narrative that this pandemic is a unique disaster no one could have prepared for, and with no wider lessons for economics and politics. This story suits some of the world's billionaires, but it's not true. There is an alternative: the pandemic provides further evidence that to tackle the climate emergency, inequality and any emerging crises, we must re-think our economics from the bottom up. (Aldred, 2020)[3]

If this is the case, then the *politicisation* (and pluralisation) of identity cannot take place any more; it cannot acquire any (or even partial) permanence or long-term efficacy. In order for the political character of identity to emerge, the obviousness of social identities (which replaced religious foundations, replicating their constraints and reintroducing aristocratic privilege in the guise of meritocracy, technocracy, etc.) has to be called into question. This radical questioning is surely one of the defining characteristics of democratic societies which a contemporary move to post-democracy seems to threaten. In societies that cannot ultimately rely on any kind of naturalist, theological or essentialist social foundation, the construction and continuous reconstruction of identity can only be acknowledged as a radical institution, an institution *constitutive* of social practices; in other words a truly *political* institution. The political dimension of identity becomes fully visible only when it is recognised that there is no such a thing as a natural, essential or intrinsic social identity, when neoliberal capitalism and its intellectual apologists are not recognised as the ultimate limit of what is sayable and doable.

What would have been the crucial conceptual implication of embracing our modernity, in fact our 'multiple modernities' (Eisenstadt, 2000)? How would it affect our intellectual horizon? Let us assume then that identities are socially and politically constructed, that they are not guaranteed by any essential ground. Here the collapse of any essentialist grounding would make possible the radical questioning of any identity. Yet doesn't this entail that identity itself – as a fully guaranteed order, an order established beyond contestation – becomes impossible? The answer can only be affirmative in the sense that the continuous political construction of social identities never results in a closed, self-contained and absolute identity (no matter where this totalisation would rest; on left or right-wing utopia). Identity, at both the personal and political levels, is only the name of what we desire but can never fully attain.

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[3]All in all, as far as universities are concerned, 'university faculty are less and less likely to threaten any aspect of the existing social or political system. Their jobs are constantly on the line, so there's a professional risk in upsetting the status quo. But even if their jobs were safe, the corporatized university would still produce mostly banal ideas, thanks to the sycophancy-generating structure of the academic meritocracy. But even if truly novel and consequential ideas were being produced, they would be locked away behind extortionate paywalls' (Nair, 2017) Also see, Stavrakakis (2012).

Such a conclusion is obviously disorienting, but not detrimental for human subjects and social life – it involves a certain loss of certainty, an absence of guarantees, but it is what renders possible disagreement, argument and the gradual emergence of the new under conditions of reflexive deliberation, hegemonic struggle and democratic debate. Living with it certainly requires a shift of perspective: from end-points to practices; from blueprint and eschatological utopias to co-existing (post-fantasmatic) radical projects registering their ontological limits.[4] Indeed, what is the name of this practice which, although it always fails to produce a full identity, plays a crucial role in structuring our lives? The name of this practice is *identification*.

The paradoxical nature of identity revealed in the role of identification is something constitutive of our subjective and political predicament: 'Life without the drive to identity is an impossibility but the claim to a natural or true identity is always an exaggeration' (Connolly, 1991, p. 67). In addition, it has become gradually evident that identity cannot be defined without reference to what stands outside its field. What creates my identity, what defines sameness, is that I differ from the identities of others. Identities are relational and differential.[5] As William Connolly has cogently put it, 'difference requires identity and identity difference' (Connolly, 1991, p. ix). Alas, our contemporary intellectual horizon marginalises such views. It is a crucial accomplishment of this collection that it enlists the conceptual apparatus to bring back to the limelight such a refreshing rationale.

Yet, as we have already seen, this is not merely an epistemological or theoretical issue: it is, crucially, a political issue as well. During recent decades, however, the ideological hegemony of the neoliberal consensus has attempted to naturalise the fiction – the empty grand narrative – of a non-antagonistic 'third way', beyond left and right. Both conservative and social-democratic forces have followed this course, which has undermined the *agonistic* registering of division entailed in democratic institutions. It is in this meta-political orientation that one encounters the roots of the emerging post-democratic imaginary. Indeed, post-democracy is founded on an attempt to exclude the awareness of lack, contingency and negativity from the political domain, which leads to a political order that retains the token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralises the centrality of political antagonism. Jacques Rancière is among to the political theorists who have utilised this term:

From an allegedly defunct Marxism, the supposedly reigning liberalism borrows the theme of objective necessity, identified with the constraints and caprices of the world market. Marx's once scandalous thesis that governments are simple business agents for international capital is today an obvious fact on which

[4]See, in this respect, Stavrakakis (1999) and Stavrakakis (2007).

[5]It is possible to ground this observation in a variety of ways. Take structural linguistics and semiology, for example. Here, we know from de Saussure (2011) and from the whole structuralist and poststructuralist tradition that the meaning of a particular element within a system of signification can only arise via its differentiation from other elements within the same system.

'liberals' and 'socialists' agree. The absolute identification of politics with the management of capital is no longer the shameful secret hidden behind the 'forms' of democracy; it is the openly declared truth by which our governments acquire legitimacy. (Rancière, 1998, p. 113)

Difference as antagonism is banished and political alternatives proscribed. The first casualty here is the value of dissent. In addition, unable to understand and reluctant to legitimise the centrality of antagonism in democratic politics, the post-political, post-democratic *Zeitgeist* forces the expression of this dissent – when it manages to articulate itself – through channels bound to fuel a spiral of increasingly uncontrolled violence. Whereas a recognition of the adversarial nature of the political permits the transformation of antagonism into *agonism*, the taming of raw violence, a post-political approach by contrast leads to violent expressions of polarisation and hatred which, upon entering the depoliticised public sphere, can only be identified and opposed in moral or cultural (and eventually military) terms. Indeed, as Chantal Mouffe has put it, when opponents are defined in an 'extrapolitical' manner,

> they cannot be envisaged as 'adversary' but only as 'enemy'. With the 'evil them' no agonistic debate is possible, they must be eradicated. Moreover, as they are often considered to be the expression of some kind of 'moral disease,' one should not even try to provide an explanation for their emergence and success. (Mouffe, 2005, p. 76)

Notice how the re-emergence of populist movements and the concomitant development of a whole field of populism research – another crucial topic debated in this volume – demonstrate the dual *malaise* we have already indicated. Isn't it astonishing that both mainstream politics and institutions as well as mainstream socio-political research share the same instinctual *anti-populism* (irrespective, in fact, of the particular movements and ideologies under examination)? On both levels, then, contemporary Europe emerges as the name of a dangerous premodern regression – politically, as a failure to openly and democratically reflect on its aristocratic, post-democratic mutation and to honour its enlightenment commitment to registering heterogeneity through popular sovereignty; and intellectually, as a failure to move beyond anti-democratic stereotypes that underlie an *a priori* pejorative take on any kind of popular demand, movement and government (summarily denounced as *evil populism*).

Indeed, a multitude of heterogeneous and even antithetical phenomena are currently being discussed under the rubric of populism: from the European Far Right in France, Austria and the Netherlands, and illiberal governments in Hungary and Poland, on the one hand; to Bernie Sanders, the so-called Pink Tide of left-wing populist governments in Latin America and inclusionary populisms in the European South triggered by the brutal *ordoliberal* management of the European crisis, on the other. Very often, the movements, parties, leaders and discourses under examination seem to have nothing or very little in common as they range from the radical left to the radical right of the political spectrum and

from egalitarian to authoritarian orientations. Yet, one thing is obviously certain. They seem to cause surprise. Mainstream media, established political forces and academics are quick to denounce their *scandalous* nature: all of a sudden, the unthinkable seems to be happening. Populism is seen as violating or transgressing an established order of how politics is *properly, rationally* and *professionally* done. It emerges *where* it should not *when* it should not; it disrupts a supposed 'normal' course of events and could only be the index of an anomaly.[6]

However, there should be no cause for surprise here. It is already many decades since the historian Comer Vann Woodward summarised the lessons from the long and bloody debate on American populism between the 1950s and the 1970s: 'The study of populism is instructive about the consequences of condescension, *arrogance*, and *ignorance* on the part of elites and intellectuals' (Vann Woodward, 1981, p. 32). In fact, our understanding of 'populism' as an incarnation of whatever violates the (naturalised) established order of things has been shared by political and academic elites and popularised through mainstream media since the 1950s. During this period, commencing with the publication of the true diachronic matrix of academic anti-populism, namely Richard Hofstadter's revisionist attack on the US People's Party (Hofstadter, 1995), *normality* was generally embodied by a unidirectional, universal *modernisation* process supposed to embody and materialise the only version of modernity feasible and desirable (the one associated with the USA and the Western paradigm, blending capitalism with representative government in the form of so-called *Democratic Elitism*). Populism, by contrast, was often seen as an indication of 'asynchronism', of its local exceptions/anomalies. In particular, it was, more or less, denounced as an *abnormal* political formation articulated by *abnormal* leaders and addressed to *abnormal* constituencies.

Such grand narratives and stereotypes continue to influence, if not dominate, public debate in a variety of contexts. Of course, the disciplinary, normalising function of modernisation has been taken over largely by narratives concerning the 'end of history' and 'globalisation'. In this sense, modernisation can be seen as the matrix of what later came to be known as the TINA dogma (There Is No Alternative).

By un-reflexively adopting an exclusively pejorative definition of populism, a large part of populism research has also adopted the normative, if not axiomatic and stereotypical fallacies of Hofstadter, and has, by default, placed itself in the service of a normalising, disciplinary technology of domination defending at all cost the post-democratic mutations of the established order (Crouch, 2004; Habermas, 2013), against all challengers irrespective of their ideological belonging, democratic credentials, discursive genealogies and political agendas. In a bid to justify these choices, *arrogance* and *ignorance* have become, once more, defining characteristics of Euro-centric approaches to populism. Sometimes the picture painted is of something so irrational, unthinkable, abnormal, even monstrous, that it could not possibly be appealing to real people.

[6]I develop this argument in a more detailed way in Stavrakakis (2017).

This does not mean, of course, that populism research should not encompass situations in which 'the people' itself is invested with a reified mystique in the style of political theology, or that it should not examine the ambivalent relationship between populism and nationalism (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). Yet the first step forward for contemporary populism research would be to move beyond obsolete pejorative stereotypes and try to approach populism anew, beyond any demonisation or idealisation, escaping the tight grip of the galloping (a priori anti-populist) economics and politics of privilege – even when the latter utilise a populist grammar and/or imaginary. Only then does it become possible to examine in detail a variety of challenging issues that highlight different facets of populism revealing important points about politics and identification more generally – emotion, memory, security, communication – as discussed in many chapters of the book.

More broadly, especially given that populism is not the only theme of this collection, the need to restore critical reflection within the social sciences and the potential of dissent and the value of the alternative within politics, to be able to assess the different risks and possibilities every contingency brings to us (whether we call it a 'crisis' or not), may be the foremost challenge of our age. The chapters in this daring volume encircle and highlight this challenge in a thoroughly productive way, conceptually – thematically – politically!

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Acknowledgements

This book is the outcome of a workshop held at Zeppelin University in the early Autumn of 2018. The workshop itself as well as the subsequent project of collecting and connecting together the chapters has demanded efforts from a large number of people, whom we would like to acknowledge here: Yannis Stavarakakis for his valuable support throughout, Hazel Goodes for her patient editorial guidance, Elise Bilger for her adept editorial assistance, Martin Beckford for his masterly copy editing, Ute Lucarelli for her help in securing funding, the Heinrich Böll Foundation Baden-Wuerttemberg and Zeppelin University for their financial backing of the workshop, Claire Perrot-Minot for her tremendous organisational skills, and Alexander Ruser for his continuous advice and encouragement. We are particularly grateful, of course, to the authors themselves who bore our numerous requests and suggestions with great patience and affability and also to the participants of the workshop who have not contributed to the book but supported the project with their contributions to the fruitful discussions.

AM and NM

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Introduction: Moments of Crisis, Decision and Critique

Amanda Machin and Nadine Meidert

'Crisis' is as old as European history. The origin of the term is the classical Greek word κρίσις (krisis), which meant 'fight' and 'divorce', but also 'decision'. Krisis was used in politics to refer to a decisive moment that occurred in 'the reaching of a crucial point that would tip the scales' (Koselleck & Richter, 2006, p. 358). It also was used by Greek physicians to refer to the point at which it will be determined whether the patient will live or die (Starn 1971, p. 4). Since then, throughout its long usage, the term retained its connection to 'life-deciding alternatives' (Koselleck & Richter, 2006, p. 361). A crisis is a turning point, a time that might precipitate drastic structural reorganisation or a rupture that demands a decisive response (Redfield, 2005, p. 336). It indicates the 'transition towards something better or worse or towards something altogether different' (Koselleck & Richter, 2006, p. 358). Perhaps it might even mark a moment of truth (Starn, 1971, p. 4).

So, although crisis is commonly understood today as a purely negative phase of suffering, disagreement or confusion, this overlooks the potential it contains for radical change. Yet precisely because of its urgent and drastic implications, this potential is often effaced. Janet Roitman calls crisis 'an enabling blind spot for the production of knowledge' (2013, p. 14). Crisis empowers certain voices and demands: 'accession to crisis engenders certain narrations… the term enables and forecloses various kinds of questions' (2013, p. 10). It could be argued, counter-intuitively, that the diagnosis of crisis reinforces existing power relations and heightens the demand for the reinstatement of 'normality'.

Indeed, Joseph Masco argues that crisis has become a 'counterrevolutionary idiom in the twenty-first century' (2017, p. 67) and is symptomatic of a tendency in governance to distribute images of looming catastrophe while failing to address present sources of insecurity. Crisis demands 'an emergency response' that will simply repair the status quo rather than require transformation of the social structure (2017, p. 73). He points out that the term has been overused in the mass media to become a 'near permanent negative surround' that has ultimately reduced its impact. 'The power of crisis to shock and thus mobilize is diminishing because of narrative saturation, overuse, and a lack of well-articulated positive futurities to balance stories of end-times' (2017, p. 67).

Masco is referring particularly to the appearance of crisis in the United States. But Europe has been no less buffeted by numerous crises over the past 12 years

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 1–4
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211001

(see Stråth & Wodak, 2009). The economic shocks of 2008 ('the financial crisis') were followed by an apparent 'flood' of migrants across European borders ('the refugee crisis') and the political chaos precipitated by the British referendum on membership of the EU alongside an apparently intractable trend towards populism and nationalism ('the democratic crisis'). Partly understood as causes of these events are the weaknesses of the international economic and political systems ('the institutional crisis'). In the background to all these crises is the concentration of wealth into fewer and fewer pockets ('the inequality crisis') and rising environmental concerns ('the climate crisis'). As we are finalising the manuscript of this book, we are witnessing another crisis unfold: the spread of the Covid-19 virus (the 'pandemic crisis').

Just contemplating this list of various crises provokes important questions. Does it really make sense to talk about manifold crises today, or is it actually more constructive to ask if there is a root cause, a fundamental underlying socio-ecological instability that makes a diagnosis of crisis more likely? Is crisis-speak a political tactic for framing a social concern? Does the word crisis work to draw attention to a serious problem and to provoke serious critical reflection? Or is it used to construct a hazardous situation in a particular way, to streamline the return to 'normality' and to reify rather than reject what has hitherto been understood as common sense? Is crisis a turning point or a blind spot?

We follow Bo Stråth and Ruth Wodak here, in their argument that 'crises has no predictable end' (2009, p. 27). They write that 'dominant discourses and narratives tend to relativize, deny or even reformulate dramatic events and to bury them under a cloak of silence.' And yet they continue by pointing out that this is not necessarily the case: 'certain events are foregrounded and, indeed, acquire iconic status… as a starting point of a new history' (2009, p. 16). A crisis can paralyse but it can also provoke; it can expose hegemonic discourses, values and identities and provide a moment for their transformation. It can implicate a burden of responsibility and resonate as a call for action (Redfield, 2005, p. 337).

The question mark in the title of our book is therefore important. It indicates that part of our perceived task is to open up the critical potential in crisis, to query what it means to say that Europe is in crisis and to ask if it is a chance to re-imagine Europe and our connection to it. Does crisis result in irrevocable breakdown? Will it result in socio-political paralysis? Or might a crisis indicate a tear in the social structure through which radical transformation is engendered? Is crisis a turning point that might result in the construction of new imaginaries, discourses and identifications? Can it propel us to rethink the distinction between 'us' and 'them'?

Starting from the observation that collective identities play an important role in both the impact of and response to crisis, the book as a whole reflects upon the possibilities and challenges of political identifications in a context of crisis. We invited social scientists from different disciplines and from various locations across Europe for their perspective on specific crises and identities, each highlighting a distinct aspect of identification.

The first four chapters provide a broad overview. In his chapter 'Identity and Europe: Integration Through Crisis and Crises of Integration', William

Outhwaite takes a historical perspective, examining many European crises – both real and perceived – and their impact on European identification and integration in the EU. He asks if 'what we now call the EU has emerged through crises' and suggests that the EU is more crisis-prone today precisely because of success in integration. In the second chapter 'Identity and Migration: From the "Refugee Crisis" to a Crisis of European Identity', Myriam Fotou also offers a broad overview on European identity and unpacks the links between the refugee crisis and European identity. Fotou argues that the securitisation of migration management, with its dehumanising tendencies, has threatened European values, contradicting and ultimately endangering European identity.

The third and fourth chapters focus specifically on European citizenship, although they offer very different perspectives on what this entails. In his chapter 'Identity and Citizenship: The Search for a Supranational Social Contract', Evrim Tan critiques the existing EU citizenship regime, suggesting that it is itself a source of crisis. Tan focuses on the 'active citizens' who suffer because EU citizenship is only offered through the nation state, and he explores the possibility of a different regime that could offer a 'supranational citizenship'. In contrast to this 'top-down' approach, in her chapter 'Identity and Protest: Towards a Multiplicity of European Citizenship', Nora Sophie Schröder considers the formation of citizenship from the 'bottom up'. Conducting a field study of the Anti-TTIP protests, she notices that citizens are politicised through this conflict; protestors identify themselves as European citizens, but in very different ways.

The next five chapters offer analyses of more specific examples of crisis and collective identifications, in Germany, Poland and Hungary, Greece, Norway and the UK. The manifestation of populism as indicative of crisis is a common theme here. In their chapter 'Identity and the Far-Right: People Talking About "the People"', Tim Kucharzewski and Silvia Nicola strongly argue that populism poses a threat to the European project. Challenging analysis that only looks at the level of politicians, parties and institutions, they undertake qualitative research of the voters themselves and explain how identifications can become polarised.

In the sixth chapter 'Identity and Security: The Affective Ontology of Populism', Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz considers the populist policies and discourses in Poland and Hungary. Rejecting rationalist and behaviourist approaches, she suggests that populism works by invoking and responding to the emotions in the formation of collective identities. In contrast, in the seventh chapter 'Identity and Emotion: Resented and Resentful in Crisis-Ridden Greece' Fani Giannousi considers the role of emotions in both populist and anti-populist discourses around what has been come to be known as 'the Greek crisis'. Both Bartoszewicz and Giannousi discuss the demarcation of 'us/them' which can be understood as an inevitable political construction that might be sharpened or transformed in times of crisis. The us/them distinction is also a theme of the eighth chapter 'Identity and Class: Boundary Drawing in Norway' by Ove Skarpenes, which discusses specifically the collective identification of class and the specific ways that the Norwegian working class draw 'symbolic boundaries'.

In the ninth chapter 'Identity and Brexit: Five Readings of the Referendum?' Benjamin Abrams, Sebastian Büttner and Amanda Machin focus on the

UK and show that the British vote to leave the EU can be interpreted in different ways; some might see it as a crisis that is indicative of a degenerative tendency or disorder, others as an opportunity to reinvent and re-imagine collective identifications.

While the first nine chapters all consider identification of citizens, in the tenth chapter 'Identity and Representation: Representative Bureaucracy in the European Union – Promise and Pitfalls?' Maximilian Nagel and B. Guy Peters take a different perspective, focussing on the identifications of European representatives in the context of crisis. Finally, the conclusion raises the question of how Europe itself is represented at the centre of the world map, and how this might be changing in a context of crisis. The conclusion also suggests paths of future research.

Crises, for these chapters, can all be understood as 'decisive moments' for collective identification. It does not matter whether this crisis is imagined or real, whether it is constructive or disruptive, it indicates a point of potential transformation in our imagined communities. Although we might believe that conflict and division may engender crisis, we can see it conversely: that crises are particularly opportune moments for the exaggeration of social and political divisions (Katsambekis & Stavrakakis, 2020). Whether the boundaries between 'us' and 'them' are redrawn or reinforced during periods of (real or perceived) crisis, it is at these times that we should most fiercely analyse our conventions and identifications that are taken for granted. We hope the collected chapters of this book will help us with that onerous task.

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Chapter 1

Identity and Europe: Integration Through Crisis and Crises of Integration

William Outhwaite

Abstract

The themes of crisis and identity have been discussed endlessly in relation to European unification since 1950, but generally not in their interrelation. After looking briefly at the literature on the notion that integration has often proceeded through crises, and on the relation between European and national and regional identities, the author examines some real or perceived crises and suggests how they may have impacted the issue of identity. These crises include that of the immediate post-war years, the slow emergence of serious reflection on the Holocaust, the imposition of communist rule across half of Europe and the Cold War, the crises of decolonisation and the persistence of European racism, European divisions in relation to crises in the Middle East, Europe's (non-)response to environmental crisis, the crises of the 1968 years, the crises of post-communist transition and the Yugoslav wars, the Eurozone and refugee crises, the Brexit crisis and finally the current coronavirus crisis. These persistent and often recurring crises (Dauerkrisen) have confronted European political elites with what have been called crises of crisis management, and European populations with different ways of conceptualising their relation to Europe.

Keywords: Crisis; identity; Europe; integration; geopolitics; nationalism

Introduction

The themes of crisis and identity have been discussed endlessly in relation to European unification since 1950, but generally not in their interrelation.[1]

[1]See however Vobruba (2017), especially part 2. On the theme of integration through crisis, see, for example, the characteristically brilliant articles by Philippe Schmitter

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 5–20
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211003

The past 70 years of European integration, the emergence of a political structure covering most of the continent, have, obviously enough, been shaped by the tension between the European and the national. This tension has been both aggravated and assuaged by various 'crises' affecting Europe, which have had an impact on integration processes. Some national political leaders, some of the time, have attached equal importance to a perceived European interest along with their national interests, and some European citizens, especially in (West) Germany, have identified more with Europe, out of revulsion at the effects of European (and particularly German) nationalism in the decade before 1945.

To pose the issue in terms of an opposition between a national and a European identification, however,[2] obscures the fact that it has also been possible to see them as complementing and reinforcing one another. This has been a persisting theme of French policy, and there was a weaker version of the same idea in the UK, illustrated by the slogan that 'we've got to be in to get on'. In the 1975 UK referendum on whether or not the country should remain in the European Communities, which it had joined in 1973, a 'Britain in Europe' leaflet quoted the former Prime Minister Edward Heath, in a speech in April 1975: 'Are we going to stay on the centre of the stage where we belong, or are we going to shuffle off into the dusty wings of history?'[3] Heath's question has now been answered, at least for the moment.

In a more analytical vein, Milward (1992) argued persuasively that the postwar integration of (part of Western) Europe 'rescued' the European nation state. We might expand the title of his classic book to read The European Rescue of the Nation State *from itself*. A cynical view of what we now know as the European Union would be that, like generals fighting the previous war rather than the current one, or the UK blindly following an anti-flu strategy when faced by C-19, the EU has worked to prevent the Second World War. Its publicity material has certainly focussed on that theme, typically beginning with aerial views of the ruins of Berlin. In West Germany itself, though hardly elsewhere, 'national' was a dirty word except on the hard right.

Crises and Integration

I am using the term crisis as an etic (external) rather than an emic (actors') category, to refer to two dimensions of the recent history of Europe. One is that of ongoing and unresolved issues, as captured in the German term Dauerkrisen; the other that of what can be seen in retrospect as the critical points in Europe's history, whether or not they were perceived as such at the time. Conversely, many of

(1970, 2012) and, more sceptically, Parsons and Matthijs (2015), who define crisis more narrowly. The literature on European identity is vast; see, for example, Soler, Tasheva and Welz (forthcoming).

[2]For a rather different approach to this issue, see Leca (2009).

[3]See https://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2015/08/the-1975-common-market-referendum-campaign-documents.html.

what were termed crises in contemporary discourse, and especially in the initially rather self-centred discourse bubble of 'Common Market Studies',[4] have turned out to be more momentary shocks, more or less rapidly overtaken by subsequent events or by, to use another category from the German-language discussion, crises of crisis management.[5] I have deliberately avoided focussing on the temporary internal crises of what became the European Union, such as De Gaulle's 'empty chair' in 1965–1966, except when they indicate more lasting problems and tensions.

There is, however, much to be said for the view that what we now call the EU has emerged through crises and what has come to be called 'not letting a crisis go to waste'. Rosamond (2001, p. 168) has pointed to the characteristic way in which responses are formulated by the EU, navigating towards 'European-level solutions', as opposed to separate national-level strategies. I have written elsewhere (Outhwaite, 2020b) about a particular example of this: the gradual emergence of a coherent European-level policy of territorial planning shaped around the model of overlapping transnational 'macro-regions' (the Baltic area, the Danube region, the Alpine-Adriatic region, and so on). Here, the challenges addressed have typically concerned environmental threats and the preservation and cultivation of natural and cultural heritage, but also the improvement of cross-border transport links, which may of course contribute to European identification – not least for transnational commuters.[6] The administrative authorities involved include both Member States and regional bodies, and sometimes existing transnational NGOs. This is an example of a relatively focussed European-level response to particular challenges; I now turn to look at the more diffuse way in which European integration has taken place against the background of, and been shaped by, broader regional and global crises. These crises are often interrelated and overlapping. As Vobruba (2017, pp. 121–122) has pointed out, borrowing the Swiss historian Burckhardt's concept of intersecting crises (Krisenkreuzung), crises may reinforce one another or neutralise one another, as when the Schengen crisis in 2015 made the management of the eurocrisis "less hysterical'.

Building on the Ruins

The original crisis of post-war Europe, the aftermath of the Second World War, was perceived largely in national terms, rather than the result of a Europe-wide subordination to fascist rule from which Europe had been saved largely by the

[4]This term has been largely displaced by 'contemporary European studies' or 'Europawissenschaft(en)', though the earlier term has been retained by the *Journal of Common Market Studies*.

[5]On rhetorical uses of the term crisis, see Koselleck (1988), Föllmer and Graf (2005), Pischon (2015), and Harrington (2016).

[6]These of course have both positive and negative environmental implications. Upgrading a rail service may have environmental benefits; large-scale road projects are less likely to do so.

United States and USSR – both of course entering the war only after being attacked. A fixation on the specifically German contribution to the war and what came to be called the Holocaust, and on the person of Hitler, still persists. As Judt wrote, 'the decision to blame everything on Germany was one of the few matters on which all sides, within each country and among the Allied powers, could readily agree'[7] (2002, p. 160). Only in Soviet-occupied Europe, where there were local reasons for stressing and instrumentalising the more global anti-fascist character of the war, was anti-fascism the dominant interpretative frame.

In West Germany, despite the efforts of Adorno and others, there was a reluctance to confront the issue of war guilt, classically documented by the Mitscherlichs in 1967 in *The Inability to Mourn* (Mitscherlich & Mitscherlich, 1975). As Horst Wächter, the son of a leading Nazi, wrote rather chillingly to Philippe Sands (2020, p. 17), during the period of Nazi rule. The 'deplorable situation of the Jews was generally accepted as *Schicksal*', fate. Even several years after the end of the war, a majority of West German respondents still agreed with the statement that 'national socialism had been a good idea, just badly carried out' (Merritt & Merritt, 1970, pp. 171–172). The historian Dan Diner (1999; 2007) has reflected for a lifetime on the timescale of West German and European memory.[8]

The economic aspect of the post-war crisis in Western Europe was largely resolved by Marshall Aid transfers from the United States, made conditional on moves towards unification embodied in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later OECD). From a US perspective, this was essential not just to preserve the peace but to furnish a meaningful economic structure for a cluster of entities often smaller than states of the United States. Taking a long view, we should focus not so much on the immediate post-war economic crises but on the exceptional period of prosperity which followed in Western Europe, the 'trente glorieuses'[9] beginning with the West German 'Wirtschaftswunder' up to the oil shock of 1973.

Western Europe's Geopolitical Predicament

A second lasting crisis was the extension of communist control over half of Europe, marked by Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech, and what came to be called the Cold War. Once both sides had nuclear missiles, the prospect of the complete obliteration of human life in Europe became a real one. The West, soon including Greece and Turkey as well as the United States and Canada, responded in 1949 with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), incorporating the European initiative of the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO)

[7]See also Clifford (2013).

[8]Diner echoes the idea formulated a century ago by the founder of the sociology of knowledge, Wilhelm Jerusalem, of soziale Verdichtung (social condensation), the gradual reinforcement of beliefs and memories (Huebner, 2013, p. 436).

[9]The term was used by the French demographer Jean Fourastié to refer to the '30 glorious years' of post-war prosperity in Western Europe.

or Western Union, formed a year earlier and linking the Benelux states, the UK and France. The successor to the BTO, the Western European Union, formed in 1954 and including Italy and West Germany, had a shadowy existence against the background of the failure of the European Defence Community, ostensibly formed in 1952 but abandoned two years later when the French National Assembly failed to ratify the treaty. As a result, the defence of Western Europe was put in the hands of NATO, a transatlantic rather than European organisation which was therefore tainted by its domination by the United States. De Gaulle's unsuccessful Fouchet Plan of 1961 had the dual aim of Europeanising defence and foreign policy and replacing the European Communities with a more intergovernmental structure, including the UK. In 1966, France withdrew from the joint military command of NATO, while retaining its membership of the organisation as well as its own rather laughable nuclear defence capability, the 'force de frappe'. (That of the UK, the other nuclear power, was more credible but increasingly dependent, like its foreign policy, on the United States.)

Public opposition to nuclear weapons was largely national in character. In France, it barely existed, though there was substantial opposition to nuclear *power* programmes (to which the EU was a party, in the form of the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM]). In the UK, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed in 1957 and had strong support for a few years afterwards and again in the 1980s during what has been called the Second Cold War. European Nuclear Disarmament (END) was formed in 1980 in the UK but also involved other West European peace movements, who were confronted by the deployment of euromissiles and the prospect of the United States and USSR choosing to fight in Europe. It was more even-handed than CND in condemning militarism on *both* sides and supported independent peace movements and other dissidents in the East.

The process of European integration was shaped by the intersection of the economic and geopolitical predicaments of post-war Western Europe, reflected in the economic benefits of a transnational market and regulatory system and the situation of Europe in a world dominated by the United States and USSR. A crude rule of thumb was that the pace of integration was determined by the vector sum of the rate of growth (making the compromises entailed by further integration more palatable) and the perceived intensity of the Soviet threat (which encouraged cooperation at a European level as well as in NATO).[10] At the same time, the very partial scope of integration meant that Europe-level institutions were pretty much at the margins of the main identity-shaping crises faced by European citizens. European integration was for a long time a specialised area of political, economic and legal concern, reflected in the academic specialisms that studied it.

For European citizens, the dominant reality was national. Opposition to the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Suez in 1956, for example, was far stronger in

[10]An interesting recent paper (Gehring, 2020) examines the strengthening of European identity after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

Britain than in France and there seems to have been little coordination between the two countries, nor much response from the rest of Europe. The Swedish ambassador to the UK wrote, however:

> I don't think there is any part of the world where the sympathies for England are greater than in Scandinavia. But Scandinavian opinion has never been more shocked by a British government's action – not even by the British-German Naval Agreement of 1935 – than by the Suez intervention. (Adamthwaite, 1988, p. 456)

Out of Africa etc.

The crises of European decolonisation were also addressed separately, even though Algeria until its independence was formally part of a member state of the European Communities and Europe's overseas territories had been an important focus of attention in the early years of the post-war integration process. The Hague Congress of Europe in 1948 had roundly stated that the European Union 'must, of course, include in its orbit the extensions, dependencies and associated territories of the European Powers in Africa and elsewhere' while Guy Mollet, French Prime Minister in 1957, saluted the emergence of 'EURAFRICA', now that 'the unity of Europe (…) is now a fact' (Hansen & Johnsson, 2015, p. 209). In the neo-colonial world, Europe's well-meaning policies towards the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) countries were outweighed by the damage done to non-European producers by its high agricultural prices and external tariffs.

It was probably not until the Vietnam War, following the expulsion of France from Indo-China in 1954, that there was a global protest movement, beginning in the United States in 1964. Europe was not directly involved, with even the UK failing to adopt its usually supine support for US policy and refusing to send even a symbolic contingent of troops. On the other hand, most of Western Europe had substantial numbers of US bases and troops with an occupation and/or NATO mandate.

The anti-war protests blurred into the student protests of the '1968 years', most dramatically in France, where De Gaulle resorted to a flight to a French military base in Germany to reassure himself of the support of the army. There was also however something like a pan-(Western)-European protest movement, expressed in the slogan 'We shall fight and we shall win: London, Paris, Rome, Berlin' and the prominent role of the German–French activist Daniel Cohn-Bendit.[11] All this left a persisting European and global counter-culture supporting environmental, gender and other forms of 'new politics'. What came to be called the GAL/TAN opposition (Green, Alternative, Libertarian versus Tradition, Authority, Nation) fundamentally reshaped the religious and left–right polarisations which had previously dominated the politics of democratic Europe.

[11]For an analysis of recent Europe wide protests and European identification, see Schroder's chapter in this volume.

The European Community's role here was again a passive one, though by 1976 it was preparing for direct elections to the European Parliament, implemented in 1979. Here, one might have thought, was the opportunity for a European identity to express itself, but despite the Parliament's efforts, including substantial outreach campaigns,[12] elections remained substantially national in character and there were very few transnational members.

The End of the 'trente glorieuses'

The year 1973, by coincidence also the date of the EC first enlargement to include the UK, Ireland and Denmark, is now seen as a major economic turning-point after around 30 years of post-war growth, with Western European states ever since essentially 'buying time' (Streeck, 2014) in the face of ongoing economic threats. Europe's response to the oil crisis was uncoordinated, with the Netherlands left to fend for itself; the UK, also targeted by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo on states that had supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1967, was less severely affected, along with France, and protected by its own oil supplies. In a later crisis, preceding the US–UK attack on Iraq in 2003, the US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld contrasted the 'old Europe', led by Germany and France and critical of US policy, with the 'new Europe' of more pro-American states. The term 'old Europe' was adopted in Germany as 'word of the year'.

Europe's identity in the world has been an ongoing but largely subterranean theme since the 1950s. Questions of a common European foreign policy were debated by the member states from 1970 in the framework of the European Political Cooperation, long before the official inauguration in 1993, in the Treaty of European Union, of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP may have been in part a response to the Yugoslav wars, but it took another decade and a half before it was set up on a more substantial basis with a High Representative and a diplomatic service that was called, with a modesty chosen to avoid clashes with hostile Member States like the UK, the European External Action Service.

Domestic policy and social policy were also secondary in Europe, though the Delors presidency of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995 gave a new impetus to integration. He was sympathetic to the idea of a social Europe and addressed, for example, the UK's Trades Union Congress in 1988, with the result that the Labour Party largely became reconciled to UK membership and the Conservatives increasingly suspicious of it. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, there is again talk of a European social policy, though this would involve, as usual, an uphill struggle (Hantrais, 2019; Vobruba, 2017). One positive sign is the growth of European comparisons of wealth and other social indicators, where statistical agencies had previously existed on an almost entirely national basis, apart from those of the OECD and United Nations (UN). Eurostat and its public opinion counterpart Eurobarometer have strengthened a sense of Europe as a

[12]Student groups from all over Europe were welcomed from the late 1970s onwards.

common space, while also highlighting diversities and discrepancies. Although talk of a European civil society has been somewhat overblown, it makes sense to think of a European public sphere and public opinion, the latter often defined negatively in relation to the United States, while also nested in an increasingly global public sphere. The EU's attempts to position itself in this space have however had mixed results (Banús, 2002; Shore, 2000).

After Communism

In 1989, there was what we might call the second crisis of communism: its extinction as a form of rule in most of Europe. It was some time before the process was complete, but by the end of the year the main trends were set and the 40-year division of Europe was over (Auer, 2010; Outhwaite, 2020a). This is also the point at which we come to focus on crises *of integration*.

For the EC, one of the most immediate challenges resulting from the 1989 revolutions was the incorporation of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), via its accession to the Federal Republic. The disruption that resulted in the new Germany was mitigated by transfers from the West, but lessons were not learned for the eventual accession to the Union of other states in the region. For the moment, the EC confined itself to modest aid programmes under the Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE) and Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) schemes. Nothing came of the more obvious suggestion that what was needed was an equivalent of the Marshall Plan, and the new regimes in the region confronted massive crises with a wealth of more or less helpful advice but without substantial help. NATO, with its original raison d'être gone, missed the chance to secure an appropriate accommodation with Russia and eventually opened itself, like the EU, to new members from central and eastern Europe, including the ex-Soviet Baltic states. Compared to the pains of post-communist transition, the accession process happened remarkably smoothly, in what became the enlargements of 2004, 2007, 2013 and those currently pending in the Western Balkans.

The early 1990s were also the time when globalisation became a pervasive theme in analysis (Albrow & King, 1990; Giddens, 2002). This is better described as a challenge and an opportunity rather than a crisis, but it certainly took the form of a crisis in post-communist Europe, where local producers were bought up or driven out of business by foreign competition. Even shops in Russian cities were flooded with German sliced meat and eggs. The single market was one appropriate response; although it had been planned much earlier, globalisation gave a sharper focus to this. As Helen Wallace (1996) wrote:

> European integration can be seen as a distinct west European effort to contain the consequences of globalization. Rather than be forced to choose between the national polity for developing policies and the relative anarchy of the globe, west Europeans invented a form of regional governance with polity-like features

> to extend the state and harden the boundary between themselves and the rest of the world. (p. 16)

If the European quasi-state was extended, it was in an increasingly neoliberal form (Rosamond, 2001). Another response was the single currency, again long planned but now with a clearer rationale. The broader lesson was that the EU was competing on a global scale with the United States and other major global economies. The idea of a standpoint became prominent: *Standort Deutschland* (Schneider, 2006) was a local version in Germany; *Standort Europa* (Leibfried & Pierson, 1998) a European one, though more focussed on social policy.

A Little Local Crisis

The EU had its own mini-crisis in 1992–1993 with the delayed ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and Ireland. The reasons for this opposition were diverse and often confused, but there was a substantial critique on the European left formulated around the slogan 'Oui à l'Europe, non à Maastricht'. In France, for example, 40% of respondents cited as their reason for opposing the treaty that it was 'too liberal in economic terms'.[13] In Ireland, a similar result occurred in 2001 with the Nice Treaty. The same fate befell the European Constitution, initially rejected in France and the Netherlands, and the consolation prize of the Lisbon Treaty, rejected by Ireland because of fears that it might affect the country's ban on abortion and its representation on the Commission. These referendums may be taken to reinforce a European identity in the countries which hold them, but also to mobilise antagonistic attitudes towards the rest of Europe, to national governments, or both. It is rare for a Member State government to call a referendum on a European issue when not constitutionally required to do so, though even the catastrophic example of the UK since 2016 will not guarantee that this does not occur in the future. In the UK case, the result substantially reflected hostility to the government and its austerity policies rather than attitudes to the EU, which were often indifferent rather than actively hostile.[14]

Despite the failure of the Constitutional Convention to produce an acceptable constitution, it was at least a substantial expression of an EU identity in the process of reconfiguring itself to include the first tranche of new members, who were also represented in the discussions (Krzyżanowski & Oberhuber, 2007). The outcome has, however, led the Union to fight shy of further constitutional innovation and to maintain an unstable status quo. One element of this is the shift towards what has been called 'executive federalism', especially in relation to the crises of the eurozone and the 2015 refugee crisis. European populations and their parliamentary representatives, and often even input from the European Commission, are excluded from

[13]See https://wallu.pagesperso-orange.fr/refe.htm#04.

[14]See, for example, Outhwaite (2017). For more on the possible connection between austerity and the UK vote to leave, see the chapter on Identity and Brexit by Abrams, Büttner and Machin in this volume.

these high-level intergovernmental 'deals'. The 'open method of coordination' is another way of securing a compromise in the absence of agreement.

One counter-example to this trend is the initiative seized by the European Parliament with the Spitzenkandidat mechanism. The Parliament, realising that its consent was required to appoint the Commission President, declared that it would only support the lead candidate or candidates in the 2014 European Parliament election from the largest political group in the new Parliament, thus confronting the Council with a *fait accompli*. The candidates nominated by their political groups competed at televised hustings around (Western) Europe, chartering buses and planes where required, much as if they were candidates in national politics. Thus, a vote in the European Parliament elections was not just a vote for local or, in the smaller countries and regions, national representatives, but also for the likely Commission president. How many voters saw it this way is another matter, but it can be assumed to have had some impact in reviving a sense of Europeanness in addition to the more nationally focussed electoral campaigns.[15]

This process secured the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker, but not, five years later, of the next European People's Party (EPP) Spitzenkandidat Manfred Weber. The Parliament was divided and the Council was able to reassert its role in the process. The compromise outcome was a weak Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, and an until recently somewhat invisible President of the Council, the former Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel. Whether the Spitzenkandidat process will be revived in future elections is uncertain (Fotopoulos, 2019; Gattermann & Marquart, 2020). If it is, it would be a promising sign that the Union has recognised the need to prioritise its public presence over the details of its internal political mechanisms.

A Lasting Crisis of Monetary Integration

Named in 1995, the euro was formally introduced as an accounting currency at the beginning of 1999. The new notes and coins replaced the national currencies of the member states from the beginning of 2002 with the minimum of disruption (mainly involving surreptitious price increases). Despite a failure to back the currency with coordination measures, leaving it prone to recurrent crises and half-baked remedies, it has been a massive success as an identity-forming measure, a constant reminder of the reality of the Union.[16] If the UK had joined the eurozone at the appropriate time, it is unlikely that the option of secession would have seemed as apparently painless as it did to many voters. The crises remain, currently exacerbated by the economic disaster resulting from the coronavirus pandemic, but the loss of the common currency would be devastating for Europe's identity.

[15]Nagel and Peters discuss the issue of representation in the European Commission in their chapter in this volume.

[16]Cf. Vobruba (2017, p. 86). I once showed some English banknotes to a French child who said to his parents 'hey, take a look at these British euros'.

The Migration Panic

Even without the dead weight of the UK, which had tended to resist integration, several of the remaining Member States are adopting positions which might politely be called Gaullist, if they were not also adopting much more sinister policies domestically. The refugee crisis of 2015 is the latest phase of an ongoing problem of attaining a consensus around migration and free movement as well as a focus of nationalistic agitation by political extremists in and out of government. Member States largely resisted a common approach, instead erecting barriers and imposing restrictions on movement in a haphazard and uncoordinated way. The loss of the UK was due in large part to an exaggerated panic whipped up around this issue (King, 2020; Menjívar, Ruiz, & Ness, 2019). This panic has now subsided but the Union is left with a permanent source of disruption and controversy, an untrustworthy ex-member now outside but dangerously close. European racism has extended to northern Europeans such as Poles and Lithuanians, and impacts directly on the issue of European identity. A researcher based in Manchester has documented the reluctance of black and Asian Britons in her focus groups to identify with Europe, even though they massively supported remaining in the EU. As Neema Begum (2020) puts it: 'Black and Asian Britons, even those who voted Remain, didn't identify as European. They saw being European as a white identity and felt it didn't include them' (para. 3).[17]

Conclusion

I have argued here that the tension between perceived national self-interest and a European interest has always been with us; the historian Keith Middlemass (1995), among many others, has described the way it has played out. At present, however, it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that the balance has shifted dramatically towards the national and even towards an ethnic nationalism, as in Poland and Hungary.[18] France, too, is not immune from this, and is free of the economic discipline which to some extent restrains the Eastern states, dependent as they are on EU funding. Nor is this just a problem of authoritarian populism in rogue states; constitutional courts in Germany and elsewhere, following their local protocols, have issued judgements and opinions that contradict EU law.

The coronavirus pandemic beginning in 2020 is the most striking instance of the national default in operation. As Pinos and Radil (2020) point out, Europe's 'rebordering' has exposed the weakness of the Schengen principle of a borderless Europe. Many states closed their borders without reference to the EU, as they were entitled to do under Schengen regulations. President Macron was almost alone in insisting from the beginning on the need for a European approach; in the early

[17]As Myriam Fotou writes: 'deliberations and theorizations of European identity and integration have repeatedly failed to engage with Europe's imperial past' (see Fotou in this volume: p. 34).

[18]For further analysis of populism and nationalism in Poland and Hungary, see Bartoszewicz (this volume).

summer, France denounced unilateral restrictions imposed on inward travel, even from the rest of Europe, by Spain and the UK.[19] As Chancellor Merkel noted in a speech on June 18th, the first reactions were national rather than European. The EU was largely absent from all this, apart from a not very successful coordinated procurement policy for medical equipment. At the time of writing, there are the beginnings of a coordinated economic response to the long-term economic crisis resulting from the pandemic, thanks to a Franco-German initiative.

Another global crisis is that of climate change and environmental degradation, an area in which European-level policy makers initially played a prominent part (Weale & Williams, 1992, p. 47) and have begun to do again in the present century, after a long period in which short-term economic pressures were prioritised. There is now an increasing realisation that it is a mistake to set economic priorities against environmental ones, and that action has to be taken on a global or at least macro-regional scale. The environmental crisis is, however, a prime example of the way in which crises may or may not crystallise a reshaping of priorities and identities; the prospect of the loss of polar ice was known in the 1970s but serious discussion of it was for a long time confined to 'green' activists on the margins of politics, for reasons identified by the British sociologist Anthony Giddens (2015, p. 158).

In the case of the EU, a recent overview concluded:

> Experience with European energy and climate policy since 2007 shows that (…) the EU does not consistently make decisions or adopt measures that correspond to its own political programme of a low-carbon energy system transformation. (Fischer & Geden, 2015, p. 6)

The European Green Deal launched in 2019 seems unlikely to be sufficient (Buth, 2020).

In addition to these two global crises, both the result of dangerous human interventions in nature, the Union confronts a specific crisis and a long-term crisis, and the question of identity is central to both. The specific crisis (the need for a *relance* after the 2020 pandemic) requires a European solution, if for no other reason than that (most of) Europe has a single currency. The current crisis has exacerbated the north-south line of division between traditionally creditor and debtor states. Although *all* of Europe has now accumulated massive state debts, this may either create a sense of solidarity or reinforce a go-it-alone or beggar-my-neighbour mentality. The experience of the eurocrisis and the time it took before European Central Bank President Mario Draghi provided the necessary guarantee for the euro suggests that any solution will take some time to emerge. The absence (for the foreseeable future) of the UK from these deliberations will help, but it is not sufficient to guarantee success. The related issue of territorial

[19]The UK, although it had formally left the EU, was treated as a Member State during the "transitional period".

planning has at last come to be seriously addressed at a European level, with coordinated environmental and transport programmes set in a structure of overlapping macro-regions (Gänzle & Kern, 2016; Outhwaite, 2020b).

It would be too neat to label the more lasting counterpart to the north–south crisis an east–west one. Although the *political* pandemic of authoritarian nationalism and state subversion of the rule of law is currently most acute in Hungary and Poland, it is not confined to them. Vobruba (2017) suggested that in addition to the north–south and east–west divisions, what he called 'third countries' have also emerged: 'EU members who were barely affected by the eurocrisis and who struggled with all conceivable means to avoid participating in common solutions to the refugee problem' (p. 124). He cited Poland, Hungary and Slovakia in the east and the UK in the west. When even the Nordic countries are not immune to authoritarian nativism, let alone Austria, Italy and France, it becomes clear that national borders are no obstacle. Right-wing populism of this kind thrives on crises, real or imagined, and states of emergency as theorised by Carl Schmitt. Generally rejecting a European identity in the name of a fetishised national and/or racial identity, it degrades and denatures the national politics in whose name it opposes Europeanisation.[20]

So far, the Union's response has been extremely cautious, for fear of precipitating an even more extreme reaction and potentially the loss of two important member states at the heart of geographical, if not yet political, Europe. What Vobruba (2005) called the European dynamic, the impetus to enlargement resulting from the logic of the integration process, may yet turn out to have a reverse gear, though the example of the UK struggling chaotically to reverse 40 years of integration and reversing over a cliff may continue to discourage any temptation to imitate it (Foster & Grzymski, 2019; Usherwood, 2020). As an act of suicide, the UK's departure has had the effect of strengthening a common identity among the remaining members.

What cannot be denied is that the EU now seems much more crisis-prone than in the past. This is in part the result of its own successes in widening and deepening the integration process, but also illustrates a second dynamic identified by Vobruba since 2005: its tendency to adopt short-term and partial solutions to long-term problems, in a context where the power of national vetos predominates, even where decisions are formally taken by majority voting, and the national default is stronger. A more pessimistic analysis would escalate this diagnosis into one of a crisis of imperial overstretch. Although there are certainly examples of this in Europe's recent history – the botched constitutional convention, the foolish inclusion of Greece from the beginning in the eurozone inauguration and the clumsy handling of the Ukrainian issue – the overall pattern seems rather to illustrate the dangers of easy compromise solutions which work for a time but must then be re-engineered. And if Europe is fragile, as Merkel put it, this is because its Member States are also fragile – even those apparently strongest and most resilient.

[20]For more on far right populism in Germany, see Kucharzewski & Nicola (this volume).

Acknowledgements

My thanks to Amanda Machin and Ruth Wodak for encouragement and helpful advice.

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Chapter 2

Identity and Migration: From the 'Refugee Crisis' to a Crisis of European Identity

Myriam Fotou

Abstract

Migration has a strong political significance and a crucial constitutive role for identity. The liminal status and exclusion of migrants delimits the inside/outside of political communities and allows for the constitution and coherence of identity. Migration is also a challenge: while it is often presented as a managerial issue related to states' economic and labour considerations, it essentially challenges and undermines their national and cultural self-image. Migration management also reflects the values and qualities communities identify in themselves; thus immigration policies put communities and states to the test for the way such values are upheld. This contribution explores migration's constitutive role for European identity and the challenges it presents it with. Explaining the securitisation of migration management in Europe and its racial and dehumanising characteristics, it argues that the two-tier human rights system created in the European space affecting migrants undermines European identity value claims and threatens to undo them. It claims that the time has come to acknowledge European identity's historical constitution in colonialism, and to envisage it as a fluid, open-ended project accommodating in earnest racial and cultural diversity, pluralism and difference.

Keywords: Migration; securitisation; European identity; scapegoating; crisis; crimmigration

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 21–40
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211004

Introduction

> The concept of identity in Europe is in transition: it is a space within which many competing interests and actors are seeking dominance, recognition, acceptance or validation. Immigration, European integration and globalisation, to name just a few forces, are challenging established concepts of identity but at the same time providing new solutions to the question of belonging. (Guild, 2004, pp. 7–8)

Migration has a strong political significance and a crucial constitutive role for identity theorisation. While it is often presented as a managerial issue related to economic and labour considerations, it challenges and undermines nationally, culturally, and otherwise constructed identities. It raises issues of belonging, culture and cultural homogeneity, partaking in public goods and welfare provision that are key to identity configuration and citizenship. The liminal status and exclusion of migrants delimits the inside/outside of political communities and allows for the constitution and coherence of identity. States' stance on migration management is also indicative of how communities understand their duties and responsibilities in providing protection to foreign others and respecting their rights. To whom we, as states and citizens, owe what and to what extent constitute narratives that also contribute to self-identification.

In the European space, the post-war focus on labour migration has, since the mid-1980s and the Schengen Agreement, gradually acquired security characteristics, or been *securitised* according to the literature (Wæver, 1995): that is, migration is presented as a security and existential threat challenging internal stability and cultural homogeneity, and undermining European identity claims.[1] With the 'Europeanisation' of migration (i.e. relocation of migration policy in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam from the intergovernmental framework of the third pillar to the first, community pillar) comes transnationalisation (i.e. the development of a transnational complex network of curtailing migration, ranging from border control and policing to welfare entitlements) (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2001).

This is the focus of this contribution. Its leading argument is that securitisation and European migration management policies aimed at exclusion are not only related to a business-as-usual policy-making process, aiming at effective action in dealing with an economic and social problem for Europe. They also constitute processes that, while often formed under the influence of a mythical European identity and the need for its preservation, simultaneously function as 'anchoring points for political (self-) identification, that is, they mark a battlefield of identity politics' (Huysmans, 2000, p. 150). They manipulate the 'refugee crisis' trope to reify immigration as an inimical, hence constitutive, threat to European identity and they allow politicians and other public sphere actors to deflect from

[1]Monika Gabriela Bartoszewitz uses the Ontological Security Theory to analyse the construction of migrants and foreigners as a threat to collective identity (see Bartoszewitz, this volume).

the political and ontological crisis currently plaguing Europe as a result of the rise of far-right populism and nationalism and the repercussions of economic recession. In doing so, however, they have resulted in Member States abandoning basic obligations under international law (Gowlland-Debbas, 2001; UNHCR, 2018) and undermining the respect for human rights of migrants, as the well-documented incidents of migrant dehumanisation, excessive violence and even death attest (ECRE, 2014; SRHRM, 2013).

Their denial in upholding the respect of human rights and rule of law – values intrinsic in European identity for Third Country Nationals who seek entry as well as European citizens – is irreconcilable with the European project and actually endangers European identity. The ensuing creation of a two-tier system of human rights and respect for the rule of law, I argue, positions migration at the centre of a double move: while its management appears to strengthen European identity against an external threat, it simultaneously undermines its key characteristics. This move underlines the way in which the securitisation of migration and the European crisis are linked, and how the so-called 'refugee crisis' reflects Europe's ambivalence and uncertainty about its own identity and relevance at the regional and global level.

To address this, this contribution argues, European identity needs to be envisaged as an open-ended project, undecidable and in flux through the examination of multiple and overlapping identities/subjectivities (Walker, 2000) beyond a white civilisational canon. For this, relevant scholarship needs to delve further in Europe's colonial past, acknowledging its importance for European identity formation and its resonance in European citizenship and migration law and management (Ponzanesi, 2016; Zhang, 2014). To this effect, this contribution briefly introduces the concept of hybridity (Bhabha, 1990) as a conceptual approach to considering the possibility that the stability of identity may not result from the identifiability of a centre, or a solid foundation, 'but rather in the continual movement of meaning' (Doty, 1996, p. 255).

In the following, I briefly engage first with the role of migration in the constitution of identity in general and then with the tense relationship between migration and European identity more specifically. I discuss the securitisation of migration as it has gradually been established from the mid-1980s to date, and what its impact on human rights and rule of law may mean for European identity.

Identity and Migration

Discussing the theoretical foundations of nations, nationalism and by extension national identity, scholars have repeatedly observed that such foundations are lacking, not fixed and are more often than not socially, politically and discursively constructed according to communities' needs and imaginations. From Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1991) to Hobsbawm's *Nations and Nationalism from 1780* (1992), national identity is considered (at least partly) a product of invention with both objective (ethnicity, language) and subjective elements (feelings of belonging) making it 'fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous' (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 6). Identity, as we have come to understand it in modern times, that is in the

context of the nation-state, is given meaning and formed by boundaries and borders, and the relationship between the inside and the outside of political entities. Exclusion and an antagonistic relationship with the 'other', that is the subjects residing in the 'outside', are at the heart of this assigning of sense and form where the simultaneous construction of spatial identities and spatial formations takes place. Through boundaries and exclusion, the inside/outside opposition both serves as the limit of the political imagination and identity and the source of its coherence (Walker, 1993, as cited in Bigo, 2006, p. 13).[2]

Migration, as the locus of meeting with otherness and the practice of exclusion par excellence, has thus traditionally been crucial in the theorisation of identity, with countless scholarly treatises on its role in community and state formation, its relation with democracy and citizenship, its impact on understanding of institutional and individual responsibility but also on understandings of subjectivity and ethics among other theoretical quandaries (Walker, 1993; Honig, 2001; Anderson, 2013; Derrida, 1999, to name only a few). The establishment of an 'us-versus-them' narrative, the liminality of the migrant subject and subsequent threat of her expulsion constitute key elements in this relation with theorisations of identity: the presence of migrants in a political community where they do not fully belong is a paradox that undermines but also helps construct the national, cultural and other aspects of identity that rely on homogeneity and unanimous agreement.

In contemporary political theory, Bonnie Honig identifies this tension in the liminal figure of the foreigner, in her book *Democracy and the Foreigner* (2001). 'How should we solve the problem of foreignness?' has for a long time been for Honig the main question of political theory. It continues to motivate contemporary discussions of democracy and citizenship, with experts trying to find the 'correct balance' between social unity and democracy. From experts in migration and economists to legal scholars and philosophers, Honig argues that foreignness is reiterated as a 'problem' that needs solving (Honig, 2001, p. 2). The same goes for the different answers to the problem: from xenophobia and strict regulation to multicultural arguments for broader inclusion of the foreign other and inquiries into diversity, the various debates 'treat foreignness as a necessary evil and assume that we would be better off if only there were enough land for every group to have its own nation-state', differing only in their estimate of this evil and threat (Honig, 2001, p. 2).

Of course, liminality and exclusion are not new: German sociologist Niklas Luhmann notes in his work on inclusion and exclusion that:

> since the late Middle Ages and especially the early modern world, there is a growing trend toward politics of explicit exclusion (which is thus accessible through historical sources) (…) [as] part and parcel of the politics of professional organizations and territorial states. (Luhmann, 1994, p. 24, as cited in Cederman, 2001, pp. 7–8, *his translation*)

[2] For a related discussion of the construction of symbolic boundaries, see the chapter by Ove Skarpenes in this volume.

Exclusion is destined for subjects that are 'other', different, envisaged in the ideal-type of the stranger or foreigner. For early twentieth century sociological theories of strangerhood, the stranger or foreigner other is defined as a distinct category, which counter-intuitively does not outline the entirely unknown other but instead the non-integrated or non-assimilated in a society or community.

The ideal type of this stranger or foreigner is the immigrant, according to scholarship (Schütz, 1944). The migrant is a problem to be solved while at the same time we use her instrumentally to define ourselves and to re-found, constitute and demarcate our democracies (Honig, 2001). Identity construction of the community is based on the ability to explain its lack of fullness and completeness; and the migrant thus operates as an agent of this lack. Exclusion strategies that are constitutive of identity use the figure of the migrant as a scapegoat. 'Scapegoating, the sinister type of difference as exclusion and demonisation, always remains a real possibility inscribed at the core of any identity claim' (Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 195). Girard also considers scapegoating as a mechanism for strengthening the community through identity formation, but also though the alleviation of internal strife and violence (Girard, 1986). As a result, and contrary to theories that assert that the social contract puts an end to communal violence and internal antagonism, Girard argues that, paradoxically, the solution is instead found in the displacement of this violence. Communal violence exerted on excluded others (migrants for our analysis) brings the community together and strengthens it (Girard, 1977, pp. 79–80, 259).

The paradox created by migrants' presence and migration in general cannot (and should not) just be reduced to 'a simple self-other dialectic in which migrants become the other who essentially belongs elsewhere and from which "we" can distance ourselves easily' (Huysmans, 2000, p. 151). Neither are they reducible to their legal status (non-citizen or asylum seeker etc.). Migrant categorisations are also normative, value-laden and negative (Anderson, 2013, pp. 3–4), raising questions of identity not only because migrants are of a different nationality but because they embody the impossible position of simultaneously belonging and not belonging.

The framework of European identity and integration presents all of these characteristics: a culturally constructed, imagined character of collective identity; a 'classification of "European" that stands juxtaposed to an increasingly polarised category of the non-European "other"; migration policy-making privileging a static, bounded and exclusivist definition of "European identity'; and a failure to give adequate attention to the inherent political bias, the influence of the colonial past or the violence afflicted to migrant others (Shore, 1993, p. 781). All of these are explored in the following sections.

European Identity and Migration

> The very old subject of European identity indeed has the venerable air of an old, exhausted theme. But perhaps this 'subject' retains a virgin body. (Derrida, 1992, p. 5)

What is European identity? An impossible concept to define, it has been the subject of numerous debates for many years, which acquired an added urgency in the 1990s alongside the progressive transformation of a large single market into a political space (Kastoryano, 1997). With an emphasis on the way citizenship, nationality and identity interrelate, a great part of this scholarly debate seemed to focus on overcoming the nation-state obstacles to the formation of a European identity: issues of national belonging, patriotism and allegiance to country of birth. While the various approaches differ in their details, the underlying commonalities are clear: from Ferry's post-national model (1991) to Habermas' 'constitutional patriotism' (1992), the European identity envisaged is one that leaves behind a 'nationalist' principle and ushers in a differentiation 'between the feeling of belonging that national citizenship implies and its legal practice in spheres beyond the nation-state' (Kastoryano, 2009, p. 13). These approaches are cosmopolitan in nature and in the European identity framework they envisage. As for the varying demands and challenges to the community deriving from the presence of immigrants, these will be accommodated by the post-national order's commitment to international standards of hospitality and rights of the individual (in this case the migrant), rather than by a European legal citizenship (Kastoryano, 2009).[3]

In these approaches, the cultural aspect of the post-national is not discussed in detail, not because it is considered unimportant or controversial because of its link with ethnicity or state belonging, but because its essence is taken for granted. Contrary to the commonly held belief that at least until 1973, the 'European Community did not perceive or describe itself as a cultural entity' because 'culture remained the affair of nation-states, who jealously guard it' (Hersant, 2009, p. 61), culture has from very early been a cohesive aspect of European self-identification. Embedded in the long history of pan-Europeanism of the early twentieth century, it perhaps has not fit the bill of the official European, 'unity in diversity' cultural formula. But it has still upheld the narrative of a '"family of cultures" made up of a syndrome of partially shared historical traditions and cultural heritages' (Smith, 1992, p. 70) to the point of becoming an aspiration for its counterpart being found on the political level (Smith, 1992, p. 56). The adoption at the Copenhagen Summit of 1973 of a Declaration on European Identity, where the heads of state or government of the then nine Member States of the enlarged European Community (EC) affirmed their determination to introduce the concept of European identity into their common foreign relations, attests to this. European identity was defined by an 'attachment to common values and principles', the 'rapprochement of conceptions of living' and the 'consciousness of possessing specific interests in common' (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1973).

[3]Evrim Tan considers the possibility of a new 'supranational' European citizenship regime that might underpin European identification and safeguard the rights of mobile individuals and migrants (see Tan, this volume).

What are these values and principles? For some scholars, they are to be found in the partially shared traditions of Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions and Judeo-Christian ethics, as well as cultural heritages including Renaissance humanism, rationalism and empiricism, and romanticism and classicism (Smith, 1992, p. 70). For the nine member states of the Copenhagen declaration, 'the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress – and of respect for human rights' are to be defended as the foundations of Europe's identity and 'legal, political and moral order' (Bulletin of the European Communities, 1973). These same values are also recognised in the European Union (EU) constitution's preamble and opening articles, which, 'drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe', recognise 'the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law' (EU, 2004, p. 3). In a later section, the establishment of citizenship and an area of security and justice are also mentioned (EU, 2004, p. 41). European identity claims, thus, seem to be identical with the European commitment to the rule of law, human rights and democracy, to which has been added 'prosperity through economic liberty and justice', underlying all institutional development in the region from the preamble to the 1949 statute of the Council of Europe, to the 1990 charter of Paris for a new Europe by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the treaties of the EU (Gowlland-Debbas, 2001, pp. 221–222).

Yet recent years have seen national governments increasingly taking exclusionary measures towards migrants, paying only lip service to European and international legal obligations – often with tragic results. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its interpretation and application by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have played an often controversial role in this balance. The rights of the convention are secured for all persons within the jurisdiction of the signatory states irrespective of nationality and status, while Article Three (providing protection from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) has been interpreted by the ECtHR in ways that limit the power of states to deport and extradite foreigners. This has often caused serious tensions between Member States' judiciaries and governments, as can be seen with UK prime ministers calling for the country to withdraw from the ECHR as far back as January 2003 (Guild, 2004, p. 16; Wintour, 2003) and the more recent similar calls from Hungarian parliamentarians (European Parliament, 2017). This ECHR and ECtHR partial protection notwithstanding, migrants still remain juxtaposed to European identity as an increasingly threatening non-European 'other' and exposed to often violent and exclusionary EU migration management practices.

Securitising the European Border

> Hope, fear, and trembling are commensurate with the signs that are coming to us from everywhere in Europe, where, precisely in the name of identity, be it cultural or not, the worst violences, those that we recognise all to well without yet having thought

> them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism, are being unleashed. (Derrida, 1992, p. 6)

Scholars agree that it was only in the 1960s and in the light of European economic decline that migration started to be seen by European states as a distinct issue from labour recruitment (see, e.g. Castles, 2012; Hansen, 2003; Huysmans, 2001). A hostile stance towards migration at state level began then 'with a number of very inelegant and frankly racially discriminatory measures' (Guild, 2004, p. 4, footnote 16) and other restrictive laws, with a noted convergence in status between guest workers and immigrants from former colonies in some countries. The 1973 oil crisis precipitated the end of labour recruitment in north-western Europe (Castles, 2012, p. 206) while a common position on migration within the EC was formed for the first time in the mid-1970s. Family reunification became important at this stage as it was the main source of immigration for the majority of European countries and allowed for established immigrant groups to acquire more normal demographic patterns (Castles, 2012, p. 207; also see OECD International Migration Outlook Annual Reports).

The 1980s saw great activity around immigration both at the national and EC level. A series of intergovernmental forums and para-Communitarian bodies in Europe (TREVI in 1976, the Schengen Group in 1985, and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration in 1986) assumed competence over immigration and asylum, contributing to the development of a cooperative migration management policy network with a double aim:

> to restrict the entry of foreigners and achieve a much more stringent policing of Europe's outer frontiers and to police migrant communities via various forms of internal control, such as security service co-operation, identity checks, the creation of a police and intelligence database on irregular aliens, 'subversives' and 'aliens considered likely to compromise public order'. (TREVI, 1990, as cited in Kostakopoulou, 2001, p. 50)

National policy developments of the same time included plans to consider housing, education and community relations issues for immigrants. Studies were also commissioned to explore 'the foreigner problem' (as it was called in Germany), 'race relations' (Britain), 'minority issues' (Netherlands) or 'insertion' (France) (Castles, 2012, p. 208). Despite this, European states remained hesitant when it came to acknowledging the long-term presence of immigrant communities and their demands for identarian and cultural accommodation. Teulières notes how at least until the 1980s 'France's only vision of itself is as a country of political asylum', failing to recognise 'the role of mass migration in its own right' (Teulières, 2007, p. 65) while Germany's much-repeated dogma until 1998 was 'die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland' (the German Federal Republic is not a country of immigration) (Castles, 2012, p. 208).

The results of these activities solidified in the 1990s, a decade during which migration and asylum were highly contentious at all EU intergovernmental conferences (Guild, 2004, p. 7). The Treaty on EU signed in Maastricht in 1992 introduced a third pillar on Justice and Home Affairs, by which migration became an explicit subject of intergovernmental regulation within the EU. It was later moved by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam to the first pillar, which handles economic, social and environmental policies, highlighting its importance. All these developments reflected the tendency for increasing restrictions and controls on migration, and its institutionalisation. While this period is widely seen as the turning point leading to what is now called Fortress Europe, Mehmet Ugur (1995, pp. 967–977, as cited in Huysmans, 2001, pp. 191–192) argues that its foundations were actually laid much earlier when a 1968 European Council regulation (1612/68) established the difference between the right of free movement of nationals of member states and the right of free movement of nationals of third countries, with the former being favoured and accorded an exclusive right. Ugur's argument points to a longer and sustained problematisation of immigration within the European space, which accelerated and became more politicised after the 1980s. Whichever development is considered as foundational, we see a European-wide consensus being slowly established on the threat of non-EC immigrants and refugees as 'unwelcome intruders' to be excluded. This is

> at odds with the citizenship *problematique* on the Community's agenda in this period. Whereas intra-Community migration [is] regarded as a fundamental freedom and the cornerstone of European citizenship, non-EC immigration [is] portrayed by official discourse and policy as 'invasion' to be feared and resisted. (Kostakopoulou, 2001, p. 52)

During this period there was a gradual move to seeing immigration as a security issue, a challenge to the region's stability and an existential threat. This was a double move for European identity: while not clearly defined, it was simultaneously reified and strengthened by being presented as repeatedly under attack. 'Waves', 'floods' and other dehumanising metaphors of foreign others purportedly put European achievements and privileges in peril and needed to be controlled and curtailed. To this effect, the socioeconomic approach previously followed, with migrants mainly considered as guest workers, was to a certain extent abandoned in favour of a security-centred one, which established the regulation of immigration 'through a complex network of controls, ranging from border control and policing to welfare entitlements' (Huysmans, 2001, pp. 204–205). Politicians and media, both at national and European level, embraced this approach and contributed to its establishment and propagation. At stake was not just the European or national cultural aspects of identity in danger of dilution by the presence of migrants; issues of rule of law and public order went hand in hand with challenges to the welfare system. Immigration as a whole was conceptualised

> in a specific way with connotations drawn from 'security': as a threat against which to defend, a role for the state [or here the nascent European Union], the problem is outside ourselves. (Wæver, 1996, p. 106)

Described as securitising move in the literature (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, among others; Wæver, 1995),[4] this crossover was crucial for adding coherence to the formation of a European (and national) identity. With the progressive securitisation of migration, 'the terms "non-EC nationals", "third countries" and "non-European" are being defined with increasing precision and thus, as if by default, an "official" definition of European [identity] is being constructed' (Shore, 1993, p. 786). Creating a problematic syncretism of the traditional European cosmopolitan values of humanitarianism and rule of law with often heavy-handed exclusionary migration management practices, securitisation gave European identity a new lease of life by presenting immigration as the absolute dangerous other in a constitutive move. Policies in the same period followed suit. The Dublin Convention that came into force in 1997 is an excellent case in point. Presented initially as a humanitarian instrument dealing with determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum and therefore easing the process according to Europe's human rights and refugee conventions, it soon proved to be a restrictive mechanism

> that tries to limit the number of applications (…) replete with negative connotations of the term asylum, implying it is an illegitimate way of seeking immigration and emphasizing the member states' interest in 'discouraging' refugees who apply for asylum in Europe. (Huysmans, 2001, p. 193)

Its negative impact on immigrants' fundamental rights to liberty, private and family life, and non-refoulement has been widely debated in academic and advocacy circles (see, i.e. Noll 2000; Guild 2006; ECRE 2008, 2013) and has caused judicial interventions at the European level.[5]

Professional debates about migration control that would be more constructive in an ethical or economic context (Wæver, 1996) were displaced by narratives

[4]Developed by Wæver (1995) and Buzan et al. (1998), securitisation is considered the process of state actors transforming subjects into matters of 'security' and an extreme version of politicisation that enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of security (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). Balzacq further defines it as 'a set of interrelated practices, and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation that brings threats into being' (2011, p. 3). It is used mostly by International Relations scholars as a tool to interpret the techniques deployed in the security discourse of EU migration policy among other issues.

[5]For instance, the *European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in MSS* vs *Belgium and Greece (2011) 53 EHRR 2* and the *Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in NS* vs *Secretary of State for the Home Department (2012)*. For an overview, see Mouzourakis (2014).

of migration as a threat to European values and life and by *deservingness* as a characteristic of aspirational Europeanness (Jones et al., 2017), transforming immigration in countries like Germany into 'a meta-issue, that is, a phenomenon that can be referred to as a cause of many problems' (Faist, 1994, as cited in Huysmans, 2001, pp. 196–197). The political actors in this transformation were not, as commonly believed, only far-right parties or anti-immigrant movements. Mainstream European and Member State politicians, political parties and governments across the spectrum, along with the media and even migration management bureaucrats, acquired political legitimacy by securitising immigration. Using migrants as scapegoats, they allowed attention to be diverted from internal political issues. Putting asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants under the all-encompassing and opaque label of the migrant allowed 'the agents struggling over power, resources, and knowledge in the field to interrelate a range of disparate political issues' (Huysmans, 2001, p. 203). As a result, the threat of a culturally, but also often racially, inimical other was construed against whom the European 'we' can be formed and further strengthened.

Three aspects of securitisation are important to note here. Firstly, it engenders serious violence against and dehumanisation of migrants, as judicial, UNHCR, NGO, journalistic and even European Commission interventions have said. It essentially leads to the criminalisation of migration or 'crimmigration' (see Stumpf, 2006; Chacón, 2009, among others): this involves discursive criminalisation, the use of criminal law for migration management and immigrant detention, 'focusing both on developments in domestic legislation of EU member states but also the increasing conflation of mobility, crime and security which has accompanied EU integration' (Parkin, 2013). Criminalisation of migration has been condemned as 'a method of controlling international movement [that] corrodes established international law principles [and] also causes many human tragedies without achieving its purpose of genuine control' by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights himself (Council of Europe: Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010). Secondly, recent critical scholarship has established the racialised nature of the securitisation of migration (Gray & Franck, 2019; Ibrahim, 2005 Moffette & Vadasaria, 2016). It has also traced how imperialist ways of thinking, Eurocentric stereotypes and colonial mentalities still persist in securitised representations of immigration (Savarese, 2000; Teulières, 2007) and in the regulation of inclusion and exclusion of migrants where, for instance, EU borders are more real for most non-OECD nationals than for members of OECD countries. The final and most problematic aspect of securitisation is that 'once a debate is pulled into the security field, there is a real difficulty in taking it out again or showing the arbitrary and ideological dimensions of the securitisation' (Huysmans, 2001, p. 196, footnote 40). This has never been truer than during the recent refugee crisis.

'Refugee Crisis' and European Identity: A Disguised Crisis of the Political

The early 1990s saw the first post-Cold War references to a migration crisis in the European space (but also globally, see, i.e. Weiner, 1995; Castles, De Haas, &

Miller, 2014). In one such instance, the author argues that such a crisis exists and simultaneously considers that its existence may be a matter of perception:

> many governments and their citizens do believe that there is a crisis although they do not always agree what the crisis is. It remains unclear as to whether the crisis is a matter of perceptions, exaggerated fears, and xenophobic reactions linked to economic recession or whether the global movement of peoples is a long-term threat to the security and the cultural and economic well-being of countries. (Weiner, 1995, p. 8)

It is true that conflicts of the time in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan (Castles et al., 2014) did contribute to an increase in asylum applications in Europe, even doubling the numbers between 1989 and 1992 (Hansen, 2003). However, European and security scholars suggest that the focus on immigration 'crises' reflect European problems or even crises of another nature (Huysmans, 2001). These could be a variety of internal socioeconomic issues, such as the lasting effects of economic decline and the crisis of national welfare systems, the backlash to free movement ahead of the prospect of a European expansion in the east of the continent, or the continuing social and economic imbalances between the north and south of the EU. Such problems are obscured by an external security issue: the threat of the migrant at the border of the European community.

The confusion of perception with reality, and the inability to distinguish whether there is indeed a migration crisis or a set of overlapping crises (economic recession, political crisis, etc.), is not new. It has been widely discussed in political theory, political economy, sociology and other disciplines (see e.g. Offe, 1976; Koselleck, 1988 & 2006; Holton, 1987; Masco, 2017, among others). While it is impossible to engage with the genealogy of the term and its full sociological and political dimensions in the space of this contribution, it is fair to say that crisis has become such an 'all-pervasive rhetorical metaphor that its analytical utility for contemporary social thought has become devalued and confused' (Holton, 1987, p. 592). Koselleck's seminal treatment of the modern concept of crisis found it to be 'a means of exercising the historical imagination [and] a tool that theorists use to give shape or figure to history' (2006, pp. 373–375 as cited in Samman, 2015, p. 967), while Masco defined it as 'a counterrevolutionary idiom in the twenty-first century [and] a means of stabilising an existing condition rather than minimizing forms of violence' (Masco, 2017, S65). It is an ambivalent term, characterising epochs or structures, novel historical conjunctures that are always unique but ever-amplified by the media. Roitman argues that the concept of crisis is as always 'an a priori structure' used as 'political denunciation of particular situation' (Roitman, 2013, p. 49), which in essence means that 'the approach of addressing such situations through the concept of crisis actually ends up ontologising it' (Roitman, 2013, p. 35). The 2015 'refugee crisis' is no different in this respect.

The protracted Syrian conflict has indeed caused one of the largest refugee crises since 1945, but this is part and parcel of an ongoing increase in border-crossing and migration involving also other nationalities of migrants and preceding the Arab Spring. The Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) argues in a 2015 press release:

> what we see is neither a 'refugee crisis' nor a 'migrant crisis'. The situation which is unfolding has not been caused by refugees and migrants over the past months, but a result of years of political measures which have focused on sealing the EU's borders, including through agreements with non-EU countries to prevent migrants and refugees from coming to Europe, and steadfastly avoided taking progressive steps towards a holistic, pragmatic and just policy framework to regulate modern human mobility. The significant humanitarian challenges to accommodate the number of people currently arriving reflect a crisis of political will. (Schmidt-Hieber & Keith, 2015)

Similarly, Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak explore the mediatisation and the politicisation of the 'refugee crisis' concept, arguing that the discourse itself is strongly ideologically charged and mainly used 'to legitimise the alleged urgency, including various "special measures"' (2018, p. 3) in dealing with migrants that lack transparency and evade accountability. They find the concept stigmatising for migrants, unnecessarily alarmist and serving an intentional and purposeful political function.

Without negating or trivialising the suffering and strife experienced by Syrian refugees, this contribution argues that the European approach to migration and refugee fluxes, and its use of the term 'crisis', suggest an 'establishment of a chronic state of "crisis" preceding the Syrian conflict while also betraying a lack of a cohesive political, social and cultural identity' (Ammaturo, 2019, p. 562). In a region challenged by a series of upheavals and a feeling of instability (due to the 2007 economic recession and subsequent austerity policies, the resulting surge of right-wing nationalism and populism in member states challenging the European project and a general ambivalence regarding its actual contours and relevance), migrants appear to fulfil again the scapegoat role, essentially functioning as an answer to the legitimacy crisis of the European project and by extension European identity. It could be argued that the transformation of migrant fluxes into a 'crisis' constitutes a particular political strategy seeking to (re)establish social integration and political legitimacy at the European level. Establishing an urgent need to deal with an external enemy, here the invasion of migrants, veils the failure of the political order to address effectively its own crisis of legitimation (Huysmans, 2001, p. 203).

Interestingly, according to Ammaturo (2019), Europe is currently facing a crisis, but this is not one of migrants or refugees; instead it involves Europe's uncertainty regarding its own identity and relevance regionally and globally. Going further than the 2016 statement by the then president of the European Commission, Jean–Claude Juncker, that 'the European Union is facing an existential crisis' (Rankin, 2016), Ammaturo argues that the crisis Europe

is currently facing is actually an epistemological and ontological one, deriving from 'its incapacity to acknowledge, and critically engage with its fundamental neo-colonial and neo-liberal matrix' (2019, p. 548), along with its exclusionary and violent practices towards non-European others. In essence, Ammaturo is echoing arguments by Gurminder Bhambra (2016) and other scholars (e.g. Hansen, 2002; Zhang, 2014) regarding the tensions at the heart of the post-war European project and identity: deliberations and theorisations of European identity and integration have repeatedly failed to engage with Europe's imperial past and with colonialism and decolonisation's significance for European identity. If colonialism's influence on the formation of national identities in Europe has been identified and studied over the years, how is it that the more specific relationship between colonialism, the movement towards decolonisation and the nexus of European integration and European identity has been ignored (Hansen, 2004, p. 53)? This oversight undermines an earnest commitment to multiculturalism and does not serve minorities and migrants and their established rights, but instead empowers the securitisation of migration by allowing for 'the role of the border in creating, securing and protecting a crystallised form of European identity that is inherently white and neo-colonial' (Ammaturo, 2019, p. 550). Such oversight is detrimental for the normative framework of the European identity itself, as the next and final section will explain.

Key thinkers on the European project and identity fail to engage convincingly with how Europe scapegoats migration to cover a deeper ontological crisis of the project. While their 1990s 'optimism has now faded' (as the presentation of Habermas' later book on *Europe: The Faltering Project* (2009) eloquently admits), their focus on cosmopolitanism remains. They insist that only a cosmopolitan Europe can overcome the new challenges (recession, rise of nationalism, migration, etc.) to the European project: cosmopolitanism is 'Europe's way out of crisis' (Beck & Grande, 2007). However, this renewed and sustained commitment to the cosmopolitanism of European identity seems to be to the detriment of multiculturalism and multiculturalist policies that could arguably address some of the underlying issues of the securitisation of migration. In these discussions, which cannot be explored here fully, the immigrant presence is again antagonistically posed as a problem. Although diversity is welcomed ('unity in diversity' is after all the EU motto) and cultural tolerance promoted, the accommodation of the migrant other still remains 'painful' or 'dissonant' (Habermas, 2009, pp. 62–73; also see detailed discussion in Bhambra, 2016). An insistence on a narrowly understood cosmopolitan European identity, which fails to question the racialised and violent hierarchies inherent in its encounter with the migrant other, is destined to keep this identity weak, vulnerable and fragmentary.

Conclusion: Migration as an Opportunity for European Identity

> Immigration laws are about as central to a nation's mission as anything can be. They are central because they literally shape who we are as a people. They are central also because they function as a

> mirror, reflecting and displaying the qualities we value in others. For both reasons, decisions on immigration policy put us to the test as no other decisions do. They reveal, for ourselves and for the world, what we really believe in and whether we are prepared to act on those beliefs. (Legomsky, 1993, p. 335)

The securitisation of migration has led to the dehumanisation and exacerbation of violence towards the migrant other. This can be seen in current practices such as the militarisation of borders, detention camps and hotspots, and state-sanctioned illegal push-backs of refugees. The slowing down of the asylum-granting rate in the majority of EU Member States (Gowlland-Debbas, 2001) and the well-established problems of the Dublin Regulation, briefly mentioned earlier, are often seen as the main cause for leaving migrants and often *bona fide* refugees in legal and institutional limbo, pushing them underground and making them even more vulnerable.

A two-tier human rights system has therefore been created:

> one that grants [European] citizens the most sophisticated protection from human rights abuses yet excludes from full human rights protection unwanted aliens, branded as 'illegal' or those in an 'irregular' situation. (Gowlland-Debbas, 2001, p. 222)

The result is a striking dissonance and a paradox for European identity, where 'the values that lie at [its] core and that are continually evolving in the direction of strengthening the rule of law, democracy, and human rights' (Gowlland-Debbas, 2001, p. 222) are in the same breath circumvented for non-European citizens. If immigration laws and their applications are indeed a mirror of the values and the essence of communities, as Legomsky (1993) argues, what does the reflection of this two-tier system tell us about European identity?

Its self-image based on respect for human rights and rule of law is incompatible with the repression and violence inherent in this two-tier system. What is more, this system undermines the traditional narrative that sets Europe as an attractive space for the wronged and persecuted because of the strengthened protection and judicial procedures afforded by human rights law. Whereas migrant movements and their advocates have consciously looked to the ECHR and ECtHR as sources of support for articulating identity along non-national lines, and as a guarantee against regressive politics at the national level (Kastoryano, 2009), the action of said movements and migration advocacy groups have become severely constrained because of the securitisation and criminalisation of migration. International organisations often find it difficult to break the security logic (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2018; Wolff, 2015), while NGOs are increasingly repressed, and in some cases, even subjected to administrative and legal persecution (Heller & Pezzani, 2017; Pécoud, 2017; Stierl, Ataç, Kron, Schilliger, & Schwiertz, 2015). Thus, European migration management policies aiming at exclusion in the name of preservation of a mythical European identity are paradoxically resulting in a dilution of this same identity (Gowlland-Debbas, 2001, p. 213).

Migration puts European identity and the European political community to the test: between the far-right, anti-immigrant nationalism on the one hand and 'the forces arguing for a liberal multicultural society or for a post-national republican community with autonomous citizens' (Huysmans, 2000, pp. 149–150) on the other hand, immigration is not just seen as a threat but 'an anchoring point for political movements seeking the transformation of the political community' (Huysmans, 2000, pp. 149–150). Important places in the current refugee crisis, like Lesvos, Lampedusa, Calais and Idomeni, have become 'peripheral ideological battlegrounds, (…) where the building blocks of European identity and citizenship are assembled and layered' (Ammaturo, 2019, p. 557). Such battlegrounds point to the need for an opening up of European identity towards plurality *in practice* and not only in theory. Faced with undermining its very identity, by denying the application of universal values to Third Country Nationals who seek entry, a window of opportunity opens for the European project to test its political and normative significance (Huysmans, 2000, p. 158) in an accepted context of contingency and uncertainty (Delanty, 2005, p. 20) with a renewed emphasis on diversity, pluralism and difference (Walker, 2000, p. 19). This entails acknowledging 'its historical constitution in colonialism' (Bhambra, 2016, p. 187) and engaging with its colonial and imperial past, and post-colonial present, to define its responsibility towards a poorer, less privileged and partly conflict-ridden global south. It also involves desecuritising migration and relinquishing it from the role of a scapegoat to deflect internal tensions. It needs to actively implement more responsible policies towards immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

Most importantly, European identity needs to be envisaged as open and multiform, plural and contradictory (Morin, 1990). Bhabha's concept of hybridity addresses this need for European identity to be open-ended (1990). The process of hybridity addresses the problematic relationship of the inside/outside: it essentially entails the continual process of definition and redefinition of identity of both exclusion and incorporation, whereby the inside itself is continually being constituted through the incorporation of elements from the outside. Applied to the European context, hybridity suggests that perhaps the essence of European identity derives not so much from the existence of foundational values in principle and in theory but rather from the lack of a homogeneous centre, which allows for the real application of said values (humanitarianism, respect of rights) and by extension the incorporation of the elements of the foreign other (Bhabha, 1990; Doty, 1996, pp. 252–254). Iver Neumann, in his 2001 consideration of the EU's expansion to the east and its challenges for European identity, argued that

> identities are necessarily fluid and ever in need of reinscription, that there cannot be such a thing as a European identity in the singular but only a plurality (…) [against] a racially homogeneous collective. (Neumann, 2001, p. 160)

The same needs to apply urgently in the encounter with the non-European other.

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Chapter 3

Identity and Citizenship: The Search for a Supranational Social Contract

Evrim Tan

Abstract

The prevalence of anti-EU integration and anti-immigration rhetoric across the continent, the increased presence of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament, and most importantly Brexit suggest that the European Union is having an existential crisis. This chapter debates the role of the EU citizenship regime on this crisis, by resting its central thesis that there is a fundamental mismatch between the way that EU citizenship is at present derived from Member State citizenship, and the transnational affinity of the EU citizenry that is invited by the internal market and migration. As a remedy, the chapter projects a supranational EU citizenship regime that coexists with the current EU citizenship regime. Focussing on the social and political imperatives, the chapter brings forward tangible policy recommendations for the proposed EU citizenship regime and expounds how it can be an effective policy instrument for the EU's internal and external struggles.

Keywords: Identity; EU citizenship; supranational citizenship; European demos; Brexit; transnationalism

Introduction

Over the past decade, the supranational European project has faced a series of backlashes from reactionary movements. The rise of radical right and left parties in national elections; the increased presence of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament (EP) and the prevalence of anti-European Union (EU)

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 41–60
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211005

integration and anti-immigration rhetoric across the continent have all challenged the notions of European unity and solidarity. Is there a common cause behind these seemingly disparate phenomena? Are they the side-effects of an economy still recovering from the almost decade-long financial crisis? Are they indications of deeper problems that have to do with the accommodation of non-Christian, non-Western, non-white migrants in Europe? Or is there something more overarching, as a result of rapidly changing working and social conditions along with globalisation?

Regardless of the cause of the problem, the symptoms of reactionary politics severely threaten the unity of the EU. For the first time since the initiation of the project, a Member State decided to leave the Union, while even the most pro-European voices have become reluctant to move towards further integration. The question is what should the EU and European countries do to overcome the challenge of this reactionary movement?

In a spectrum of Eurosceptic and oppositional movements in national and European politics, critics call for major or minor reforms at the EU level. Major reformists contend that the EU should reduce its power by returning some of its discretion over economic and social policies to the Member States. Minor reformists call for more accountability of EU institutions and a reduction of red tape to address the democratic deficit and social cohesion.

This contribution discusses the role of the EU citizenship regime in relation to this crisis and proposes an alternative as a potential remedy to certain institutional weaknesses of the EU polity. The EU is a *sui generis* entity in international relations; it owns many of the characteristics and institutions of a sovereign state on which the Westphalian international system is established, but unlike any sovereign state the EU cannot *grant citizenship*. While the EU has the formal and legal institutions to protect the rights of citizens, granting citizenship status is completely at the discretion of the Member States. Therefore, access to EU citizenship rights is dependent solely on a Member State identification card or passport.

My central thesis is that there is a fundamental mismatch between the way that EU citizenship is at present derived from Member State citizenship, and the transnational affinity of the EU citizenry that is invited by the internal market and migration. This mismatch undermines the stability of the whole supranational European system by creating political and legal fault lines between active and inactive EU citizens,[1] between Member States, and also between the Member States and the supranational EU institutions. As an alternative, I advocate a supranational EU citizenship scheme that coexists with the current one and that is granted and governed at the community level.

Member States have been determined to retain EU citizenship as their prerogative, and object to any delegation of power to the supranational level. I argue, however, that the proposed new supranational citizenship regime upholds not

[1]By active citizens, I refer to the EU citizens who benefit from and invoke EU citizenship rights through regular cross-border activities and engagements.

only a viable solution to many democratic, social and institutional shortcomings of the derivative form of EU citizenship, but also mitigates many of the existential challenges faced by European citizens. This form of citizenship would open up the possibility of owning multiple citizenships, both national and supranational, which do not necessarily conflict. By elaborating the institutional, legal and political dimensions of the proposed scheme, this contribution discusses the potential implications of a 'new EU citizenship' not only for the reciprocal relationship between European citizens and the EU but also for the larger dimensions of European identification beyond and to a certain extent independent from the nationality-bounded frames of reference.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I examine the legal rights associated with EU citizenship and discuss its evolution through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) to the post-Brexit implications. Next, I discuss why the current EU citizenship regime is a contributor to the crisis in Europe by elaborating on the conceptual, conjectural and everyday fault lines created by it. Lastly, I look into why the current EU citizenship regime does not support European *demos* and how an alternative supranational regime can overcome these challenges.

The Evolution of EU Citizenship

The origins of EU citizenship go back to the Treaty of Paris (1952), which introduced the premises of free movement and work across borders. The Treaty of Rome (1956) took the power and the responsibility for proposing measures on the free movement of workers from the Member States and granted them to the European Commission. Hence, a cross-border movement across Member States became the discretion of the supranational body. Since then, the tenets of EU citizenship have gradually evolved, but the term itself was only formalised with the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) which established the institution of the Citizenship of the Union and legally secured for the citizens of the Member States the rights to free movement, settlement and work across the EU without any restrictions. Outside of the EU's borders, citizens are allowed to apply for consular protection by embassies of other EU Member States when a person's country of citizenship does not have a representation in the foreign country in which they require protection. The Treaty of Maastricht also granted EU citizens the right to elect their representatives directly to the EU Parliament and to stand in the local elections of the country where they reside. Later, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) enhanced the direct relationship between citizens and institutions with the establishment of the EU Ombudsman and the European Citizen's Initiative.

Alongside the legal treaties, EU citizenship has also evolved with the jurisprudence of the CJEU. Through various rulings,[2] the status of EU citizenship has found new interpretations in terms of the extent of the Community Law, the fundamental rights of EU citizens, the conditions for acquisition and loss of EU

[2]See the cases of *Rottmann, Zambrona, Mccarthy, Knoors*.

citizenship and its application to the non-national citizens of Member States. As Maas (2014) describes:

> The political development of European rights started with certain categories of workers, then expanded to all workers, to certain categories of non-workers (e.g. retirees, students), and finally perhaps to all citizens. (p. 802)

The properties of EU citizenship in relation to national citizenship are set out in Article 9 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Accordingly, every person holding the nationality of a Member State is a citizen of the Union. The nationality of the Member State is defined according to the national laws of that state. EU citizenship is complementary to but does not replace national citizenship. This infers that EU citizens have certain supranational rights and duties in addition to their rights and duties as citizens of a Member State.

In reality, however, the complementary nature of the two citizenships is complex and often conflicting. Since the initiation of citizenship of the Union, Member States have faced a conundrum: they do not wish to lose their sovereignty rights over their subjects but they also wish to keep their status as part of the European Community and the Single Market that grants transnational political and economic rights to their citizens. At this juncture, the CJEU's jurisprudence has been the trendsetter in interpreting the dividing lines between two types of citizenships: decoupling citizenship from nationality, and the boundaries of EU citizenship over national citizens. De Groot and Chun Luk (2014) claim that

> European Union citizenship, once a mere complementary facet of the national citizenship, has transformed into an institution in its own right, forming a symbiotic relationship between the Member State nationality and the European Union. (p. 821)

This logic is exemplified in the *Rottman* case, in which Advocate General Maduro[3] explained the relationship between national citizenship and Union citizenship as follows:

1. There are no European people and thus no European nationality.
2. Union citizenship strengthens the ties between individual and national citizenship as it is the source of accessing EU citizenship rights.
3. By belonging to the institution of EU citizenship, new rights and duties emerge which are beyond the nationality of a Member State.
4. Since these rights are beyond the limitations of the national citizenship, they cannot be limited in an unjustified manner by the Member State.

[3]Rottmann, CJEU Case C-135/08.

Hitherto, this reasoning has been instrumental in expanding Union citizenship rights in cases regarding Second Country Nationals (SCN) and Third Country Nationals (TCN),[4] but the CJEU jurisprudence has its limitations in the case of Brexit.

Post-Brexit Implications

As Member States cannot deprive citizens of their EU citizenship rights, a decision has to be made on the acquired rights of British nationals living in the EU as well as EU citizens living in the United Kingdom (UK). In November 2017, both parties agreed to invoke reciprocal rights on the protection of social security, healthcare, education and pensions for those who have spent five years in the UK and the EU. Several citizen petitions have been initiated to retain the rights of the EU citizenship for UK citizens, and these have found resonance within the EP.

Most saliently, the EP's lead Brexit negotiator Guy Verhofstadt proposed an 'Associate Citizenship' for those who wish or need to keep their EU citizenship rights. The idea, albeit not a formal proposition, was supported verbally by David Davis, who was the leading Brexit negotiator on behalf of the UK government.

A study (Roeben, Snell, Telles, Minnerop & Bush, 2017) endorsed by Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Jill Evans assessed the feasibility of Associate Citizenship through possible legal interpretations stemming from international treaties, EU treaties and case law. The first reading is that Brexit would not create any change in the status of British nationals in the EU or vice versa. By the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the CJEU jurisprudence on the fundamental rights of EU citizens (e.g. *Rottmann*), EU citizenship is a fundamental status of individuals that cannot be taken away, but the rights contained within the citizenship can be changed over time. The report underlined that Article 70(1)(b) of the Convention provides the legal justification, in that 'legal situations' created during the currency of the Treaties continue after withdrawal. This reading is, however, controversial for two reasons. First, it contradicts the provisions of the TEU, according to which EU citizenship is derived from national citizenship of a Member State. The jurisprudence of the CJEU has opened up an interpretation of EU citizenship that can be extended to TCN (*Zambrano*[5]). Yet if this reading of the EU citizenship is extended to the case of Brexit, it will no longer just be exceptional cases such as the Zambrano family who obtain Union citizenship without belonging to a Member State, but 65 million people. Secondly, this reading potentially creates a duality in citizenship rights within a nation-state.

[4]SCN refers to the citizens of other EU Member States. TCN refers to the citizens of non-EU countries.

[5]In the *Zambrano* case, the CJEU ruled that Member States are precluded from refusing a third country national the same right of residence and nationality of his EU citizen minor children. In addition, EU nations cannot refuse to grant a work permit to that third country national, if it would deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of EU citizen.

UK citizens who were born before Brexit would enjoy the privilege of EU citizenship – and will be bound by its rights and duties – while those born post-Brexit would not. Therefore, this reading creates fundamental contradictions according to international law, and by extension, it could undermine the whole Westphalian international system.

The second reading of the Community Law is that under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, if a Member State leaves the Union then its citizens lose their Europe-wide rights. Yet, no provision of Article 50 actually clarifies the status of nationals in the case of the withdrawal from the EU. The only definite consequence is that the withdrawing Member State shall no longer participate in the discussions of the European Council, or of Councils representing the Member States, nor in decisions concerning it.

Irrespective of the interpretation of Article 50, withdrawal from the Union still creates a jurisdictional contradiction under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the report prepared by Roeben et al. (2017) recommends that Associate Citizenship should be negotiated as a potential solution. What would Associate Citizenship entail for the current EU citizenship regime and jurisprudence?

First of all, Associate Citizenship would produce a new category of EU citizens, whose citizenship status is derived from a former Member State that no longer safeguards them since it is no longer part of the EU governance structure. This would pose an immediate question about their representation in the EP. Since the allocation of the seats within the EP is proportional to the population of the Member States, a new arrangement would be needed to accommodate the associate citizens. Secondly, the EU citizenship regime is based on the reciprocity between Member States in terms of guaranteeing the rights of the EU citizens. UK citizens with associate citizen status could benefit from the law of non-discrimination in the EU, but post-Brexit UK would not have to guarantee the same rights to other EU citizens. Extension of the same rights to Union citizens living in the UK could be included in post-Brexit agreements, but politically this would defeat the Brexit aim of controlling immigration and so it remains unviable.

The report tentatively suggests a third alternative: granting post-Brexit British nationals an opt-in option for EU citizenship. It describes this option as the furthest from the law as it stands and leaves it unpacked, but it is a good basis upon which to expound an alternative supranational citizenship regime in this chapter. This 'opt-in citizenship' is the only viable alternative whereby the rights of British citizens, whether they want to leave the Union or remain part of it, can be guaranteed. Its advantage is that it bypasses the legal and political contradictions caused by Brexit at the inter-state level and creates an agreement between the individual and the EU. By doing so, it creates a legal situation similar to dual citizenship; individuals have both UK and EU citizenship, instead of EU citizenship *through* UK citizenship. Those British citizens who want to keep their EU citizenship can voluntarily join the scheme in return for accepting its conditions, independent from the membership status of the UK. The downside is that this legal domain is yet to be identified with associated rights and duties, which are

beyond the institutional paradigm of the current EU citizenship regime. I will address later how a supranational EU citizenship can create this legal domain with associated rights and duties, but first, I will focus on the present theoretical discussions in the literature about the pros and cons of the existing form of EU citizenship.

The Crisis of EU Citizenship

The derivative character of EU citizenship has long been contested and debated. While some critics question whether it is even entitled to be called 'citizenship' (see Menéndez, 2014; Eleftheriadis, 2014), others point out that it matches the *sui generis* institutional structure of the EU (see Bauböck, 2014). We can identify two competing views on the derivative character of EU citizenship. The favourable view perceives EU citizenship as functional and adaptable to the unique and multi-level structure of the EU. The critical view, on the other hand, contends that it has a 'birth defect', since it lacks the social and political dimensions that characterise the institution of citizenship.

It is noteworthy that both camps of scholars distinguish between mobile, cross-border active Europeans and the inactive majority of the European population in terms of access to EU citizenship rights. This is a unique predicament of EU citizenship, because whether you are member of the cosmopolitan elite or part of the 'precariat', EU citizenship rights only apply if you engage in a cross-border activity. Although both camps see this as a weakness of the current citizenship regime, they present differing responses to the question of how to address it. For instance, while Menéndez (2014) calls for a strengthening of the social dimensions in the present EU citizenship regime and thus remedying its feebleness for the sedentary population, Bauböck (2014) points out that only a small percentage of the European population is active, and as such, there is no need for further changes. Both views propose a solution either at the expense of national citizenship or EU citizenship. On the one hand, critical voices call for an expansion of EU citizenship rights to cover the social and political sphere, which would degrade the prerogative of Member States to shape trans-generational policies. On the other hand, supporters of the status quo deem it acceptable to undermine the institution of EU citizenship by leaving out the political and social rights associated with free movement.

Menéndez (2014) argues that, at present, EU citizenship is not a citizenship but rather a juridically made concept lacking crucial social and political rights. According to him, the CJEU jurisprudence has contributed to a disembodied understanding of the economic freedoms (i.e. free movement of goods, workers, capital and establishment) from national citizenship. To complement the economic freedoms associated with the EU citizenship rights, there is a need for introducing social citizenship rights in the normative conception of a social and democratic *Rechtsstaat*. Moreover, Menéndez argues that the ambivalences and weaknesses of the EU citizenship not only create inequality in terms of access to rights but also undermine the resilience of the Union against external shocks in the absence of social and political rights associated with it. He asserts that:

> the Union was and remains not only extremely exposed to external shocks, lacking the institutional structures and resource basis to correct the socio-economic imbalances resulting from the said shocks, but is also prone to self-subversion as a result of the depoliticising effects of having constituted itself in the absence of a 'full' democratic constitution-making process. (Menéndez, 2014, p. 915)

By the same token, Eleftheriadis (2014) argues that EU citizenship is a transnational by-product of the 'principled reciprocity' among the Member States, which invokes a sense of solidarity among the countries and their citizens. In his words, the rights of EU citizenship are:

> rights of equal treatment, requiring European citizens to be treated the way a national would have been treated. They are not self-standing entitlements to membership or participation in a new community or a new social welfare state. (p. 795)

Eleftheriadis says that EU citizenship lacks a common core of citizenship rights and does not rest on the principle of equality, therefore fails to create a special bond between citizens and the EU, unlike national citizenship. For example, according to EU law, TCN Nationals who are family members of a Union citizen derive the rights to enter and reside in a Member State only if their relative has exercised the right of free movement.[6] Hence, EU citizenship applies only to those who have exercised the rights of free movement. Failing to pinpoint a European community or a formal recognition of citizenship, Eleftheriadis infers that the right of EU citizenship is weaker wherever the bond of community is stronger. Referring to Marshall's (1950) distinction between the legal, social and political status of citizenship, Eleftheriadis argues that EU citizenship fails on all fronts to secure equal treatment of its citizens. In a sense, legal rights apply to those who are mobile and economically active; the EU does not provide a reciprocal system of social welfare based on direct taxation and 'from cradle to grave' social protection. Nor does it award equal political rights, since the Community law does not say anything about the process and conditions for the election of the members of EP. All these rest on the discretion and the power of the Member States. Therefore, Eleftheriadis argues that EU citizenship encumbers the Member States with a moral responsibility to create a safety net for individuals of other Member States, in order to assuage the weakness of the EU in protecting the social rights of its citizens.

On the contrary, Bauböck (2014) claims EU citizenship does not have an inherent flaw in its structure; rather it is just something different to national citizenship. Drawing on the nature of multi-level governance, Bauböck argues that each level of citizenship (local, national and supranational) has a distinct role to play. Bauböck categorises three levels of citizenship according to the rights of acquisition; local citizenship is based on residence-based citizenship,

[6]See Article 3 of the EU Residence Directive 2004/38.

that is *ius domicili;* nation-state citizenship is based on birthright, either *ius sanguinis* or *ius soli;* and EU citizenship is a derivative citizenship and based on mobility rights. Bauböck argues that even though EU citizenship is derivative of Member State nationality, the EU exercises a powerful control over the acquisition and loss of EU citizenship. Here, Bauböck draws on the similarity between the Swiss and the EU cases where citizenship derives from a lower-tier polity. In both cases, the lower polity (canton and Member State) has self-determination rights on naturalisation. However unlike in the EU, in Switzerland, the federal level regulates the rights of birth acquisition and loss of citizenship – thus the self-determination of Member States in matters of citizenship is stronger than in any of the historical or contemporary federal nations (Bauböck, 2014).

What Is the Alternative?

When it comes to the differences between the rights of mobile and sedentary citizens, even Bauböck (2014) acknowledges the discriminatory nature of the law, yet he calls for caution on changes to the derivative system, pointing out that only 6.8% of EU residents are mobile TCN and SCN. Bauböck suggests that rather than overhauling EU citizenship towards federal citizenship, migrants must be enabled to integrate into the countries where they live. Indeed, this position is closest to the EU's present policy of harmonising the integration policies among its Member States.[7] Nevertheless, these efforts are limited to TCN while SCN integration in their host countries is omitted from EU policies.

Bauböck argues that an alternative to the derivative form of EU citizenship could be based on residence, although this would entail more complexity. Here, Bauböck paints four possible options for residence-based EU citizenship:

1. The automatic acquisition of EU citizenship, but not Member State nationality, to long-term resident TCN.
2. Abolishing any remaining distinction between First Country Nationals and SCN, and granting the latter access to national elections on a residence-based franchise.
3. Granting EU citizenship to all those born in the territory of the EU with the condition of prior parental residence in the EU, and to all those born to EU citizen parents outside the territory; turning birthright citizenship into the basic principle for determining EU citizenship while abolishing it in Member States.
4. Abolishing birthright citizenship at supranational level, turning long-term residency into the only condition of citizenship in every polity.

Bauböck admits the difficulty in rendering these reforms into reality. He concedes that the second and third scenarios would irreversibly undermine nation-state citizenship and turn the EU towards the path of a fully fledged federal state.

[7]See 2016 EU Integration Action Plan of Third Country Nationals.

He treats the fourth scenario as dystopian, as the legitimacy of democratic institutions and the nation-state would be eroded without the assurances of transgenerational continuity provided by birthright membership. He also disregards the first scenario, as it would create disincentives for immigrants to naturalise into Member State citizenship and participate in politics at the national level.

Although I agree that the second, third and fourth proposals would fail without consent for a federal Europe or an identity superseding national identities, I believe the first scenario – the automatic acquisition of EU citizenship for long-term resident TCN, without Member State nationality – deserves further scrutiny and deliberation.

First of all, Bauböck's presumption that immigrants would lack motivation to integrate in the social and political life of the host state is conjectural. Even if we assume that immigrants would find less incentive to naturalise despite their long-term residence in a Member State, this does not conflict with the notion of national citizenship – because if a person does not wish to become part of a community they should not be coerced through EU citizenship.

Secondly, Bauböck acknowledges that granting EU citizenship to long-term Third Country National residents would create two classes of EU citizenship; one based on domicile and the other derived from Member State citizenship,[8] but he does not dwell on what EU citizenship without a Member State citizenship would entail. Without achieving institutional reforms at the transnational and supranational level, this proposal would also create a duality of the rights for TCN and citizens of Member States. For instance, the candidates for EP elections are required to have Member State citizenship. This obstacle could be overcome by introducing transnational lists but in the absence of them, the new EU citizens would have no representation in the Parliament. Furthermore, this model would inevitably require the establishment of a European passport as a travel document separate from Member State passports. The social welfare system in Europe is at the discretion of Member States and relies on the harmonisation of systems at the EU level. Given that the EU cannot extend its harmonisation strategy outside Member States, to ensure social solidarity and equality the EU would have to introduce a redistributive welfare system based on direct taxation and social protection for the new EU citizens.[9] Therefore, this proposition entails the creation of a supranational citizenship regime based on reciprocal rights and duties between citizens and EU institutions similar to national citizenship.

It thus raises the question: why should only the long-term residents of Member States have access to this new form of EU citizenship and not all TCN, if these people will not become part of the Member State nationality? The EU could formulate its own migration policy towards TCN, introduce its own conditions

[8]For the simplicity of the argument, I will call the former 'new' and the latter 'old' EU citizens.

[9]This is because there are huge financial discrepancies in social coverage between EU countries and the majority of third countries.

to citizenship and arrange multilateral arrangements with Member States on accommodating the new EU citizens in exchange for reciprocal reliefs and financial benefits. A key consideration here is whether it is possible to create a European citizenship independent from the national identities of EU countries, and to have two co-existing citizenship regimes that share the same space but do not undermine the national identities and solidarity among countrymen and women.

In the following sections, I will consider whether supranational citizenship undermines national identity, whether it is possible to constitute a supranational EU citizenship regime without deepening the socio-cultural dividing lines between mobile and immobile citizens, and the possible broader implications of supranational citizenship on the European and national identities.

An EU Citizenship for European Demos

According to Weiler (1997), 'citizenship is not only about the politics of public authority. It is also about the social reality of peoplehood and the identity of the polity' (p. 503). Although often conflated with nationality, citizenship creates a social and political identity shared by the members of the polity, that is the *demos*. So, if citizenship is about a shared social and political identity by the members of the polity, who are the members of the EU citizenship? The citizens of the Member States or citizens of Europe? And what is the shared identity of European citizens?

As a starting point, is there a European nation or *demos* with a unifying civic identity? The presence of a European *demos*, or rather a lack of it, has been debated regularly in the literature (Bañkowski & Christodoulidis, 1998; Bauböck, 2016; Bellamy & Castiglione, 2013, 1997; Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira, 2012; Weiler, 1997). For many, European *demos* is a *mythos* rather than a reality. In the middle ages, the Catholic Church projected a unifying identity for the European people. In time, the prevalence of Christianity as a way of identifying European people was superseded by notions of democracy and human rights. However, as Habermas and Derrida (2003) emphasise, these notions are no longer exclusive to European people but widespread globally. Meanwhile, identity formation in Europe has become embedded in nation-state formation (Habermas, 1994). Here, the national identities of European people are formed through either ethnic-historical-cultural or civic-voluntary constructs (Brubaker, 1990; Roshwald, 2015). In the former, the institution of citizenship has become conflated with national identity and adopted common culture, past language and ancestry as preconditions of acquiring citizenship. Notwithstanding the close affinity between citizenship and national identity, EU citizenship has not coalesced with a European identity akin to national citizenship. Empirical evidence suggests that European identity remains marginal and fragmentary (White, 2011). Likewise, Eurobarometer polls about European identity do not display any significant change throughout the years compared with national identities, even though the number of people who identify themselves as 'European' has increased over

time.[10] Therefore, it is difficult to argue for a European nation to buttress EU citizenship.

This weakness of European identity has prompted two different attempts to pinpoint a European *demos*; one within the limits of the nation-state and the other beyond it. The former 'national' school of thought argues that there are national *demoi* of Member States through which citizens share a sense of past and culture, which is imbued with the virtues of democratic constitutionalism and thus form a nexus of belonging among European people. Proponents of this position object to the replacement of nation-state membership with a European *demos*. For instance, in a recent interview, Bauböck (2016) warns of the risk of changing the derivative nature of the EU citizenship towards a residence-based system by arguing that

> the alternative of an EU citizenship based on residence would disconnect the EU demos from the *demoi* of the Member States and would risk to dramatically weaken the salience and sense of belonging to Europe among the vast majority of stable EU citizens. (p. 208)

Nonetheless, this argument condones the commodification of EU citizenship by some Member States. For instance, if a Third Country National possesses enough wealth to pay up for citizenship in Cyprus, he or she can easily acquire EU citizenship without any waiting period or additional residency requirement. Therefore, even if we assume the derivative form of EU citizenship is necessary to reinforce a sense of belonging among non-mobile citizens, this is already undermined by the current practices of the Member States. There are less deterministic arguments in this theoretical strand. As an example, converging with the Habermasian 'constitutional patriotism', Bellamy and Castiglione (2013) argue that the European people can relate to a 'thin' form of civic identity at European level and a 'thick' form of civic identity at the national level, with the presence of both conditions creating a *demos*. They assume that the weaker these conditions are, the more socially and culturally segmented a society will be, while democratic politics will be individualistic and protective. They reject, however, the creation of a political and administrative uniformity at the supranational level that can eventually lead to another form of social and cultural homogeneity. This means that if the EU evolves into a federal state, the European *demos* of the entity would be exclusionary and so deprived of the freedom and flexibility that the current form of EU citizenship engenders. This post-structural reading also presumes that the incomplete form of European identity enables nesting multiple sub-national identities without being subsumed by national identities. For instance, Bañkowski and Scott (1996) claim that the EU enables the representation of sub-national

[10]According to 85th Eurobarometer (2016), 6% of respondents identify themselves as 'European and nationality' in comparison to 51% of respondents who identify 'nationality and European'. 2% of respondents identify themselves only as European.

identities without falling foul of the problem of excessive nationalistic demands. Yet, this argument has largely been debunked by the Catalan independence referendum and it seems like wishful thinking rather than reality.

On the contrary, the post-national and transnational schools of thought argue that the shared values and interests in Europe are neither implicit nor explicit, and instead there are multiple identities and spaces that supersede or at least replace the national boundaries (Isin & Saward, 2013; Meehan, 1993; Soysal, 1994). Here, individual identities are the bedrock of a European *demos* instead of national or cosmopolitan identities. For instance, Soysal (2012) argues that the European social project endorses individuality and active participation of citizens as the route to socially cohesive and inclusive European societies. Accordingly, the moral and legal boundaries of participation exceed the limitations of the nation-state. This not only creates a dichotomy between national citizens and immigrants, but also between citizens who are active or inactive economically, politically and socially. She labels the latter as 'lesser European'. Throughout the years, the post-national accounts have provided many other dividing lines to describe categories of European citizenships, such as *market citizenship* (Isiksel, 2013) which creates political and social divisions between citizens who engage in cross-border economic activities and others; *transnational* and *cosmopolitan families* (Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002) who are product of mixed marriages and living in multiple countries; *Eurocommuters* (Ralph, 2015) or *transmigrants* (Portes, 2003), who adopt transnationalism as the 'condition of being'; and various political and social actors within and beyond the borders of Member States, who perform the rites of European citizenship by *enacting European citizenship* (Isin & Saward, 2013).[11]

One pervasive claim of the post-nationalist accounts is that transnational identities do not replace the national identities, as they are not bound to the national imperatives but rather contingent on being in-between (Olsen, 2012). In the European context, another unifying aspect of post-national identities is that they are facilitated by the European integration process, if not created by it. Generations of people are shaped by the freedom of cross-border travel, settlement and economic activities, whereby the freedoms of movement are not only rights but also the conditions of preserving their livelihood.[12] Therefore, it seems important to project an EU citizenship that is beyond the national *demoi* of the Member States.

[11]Nora Schröder elaborates this conception of European citizenship as a practice (Schröder, this volume).

[12]According to Eurostat-Statistics in Focus 29/2012, the number of marriages between native-born and foreign-born citizens for the years 2008–2010 is 8.3%, approximately 1 out of 12 for the EU population. These numbers do not include partnerships (non-marital unions) or marriages between two foreign-born citizens. Furthermore, according to the 2016 report on intra-Europe mobility, there are 11.3 million EU citizens of working age (20–64 years) living in an EU member state other than their country of citizenship, making up 3.7% of the total working-age population across the EU. Another 1.3 million EU citizens were residing in one Member State while working in another, while 1.4 million retired EU-28 citizens lived in a Member State other than their country of citizenship.

Would the Supranational Citizenship Undermine National Citizenship?

Is it not possible to accommodate both nationalist and post-nationalist positions under a supranational citizenship regime? This would require first of all putting aside the dogmatic zero-sum approach to EU citizenship, whereby supranational citizenship comes at the expense of Member State citizenship. The prevalence of dual citizenship regimes, Europeanisation and globalisation have all created formal and normative conditions for the acquisition of multiple national identities. Yet, the opposing argument is that any deprivation of the national citizenship, in order to empower the supranational citizenship, would undermine the national *demos* and people's willingness to become part of the community. Here, the objection to supranational citizenship is not about redistribution of social justice but the politics of recognition (Isiksel, 2018). This argument can be challenged on two fronts. First, the freedom of movement and adherence to liberal democracy inside the EU paved the way for a performative form of EU citizenship held by multi-national, cross-border operating, politically, socially and economically active people. Their belonging is not to any territorial, ethnic or cultural imperatives of European states but merely circumstantial. Yet these people do not abandon their national identities but carry out different and diverse belongings. Bloemraad (2004) found out in her empirical work on Canadian dual-nationality citizens that cosmopolitan, professional and more educated immigrants claim more citizenships and belonging than economically marginalised immigrants. All these characteristic traits of the Canadian dual citizens are common among active European citizens; therefore, it is fair to presume for a majority of active citizens it should be easier to accommodate national and supranational identities at the same time.

Second, citizenship does not necessarily have to be a means of belonging to national identity (Habermas, 2001). By drawing on the empirical findings among naturalised citizens in France and the United States, Bloemraad and Sheares (2017) show that the link between citizenship and national identity is contested. While some naturalised US citizens distance themselves from American identity, unlike non-naturalised Americans, in France citizenship is strongly associated with national identity.[13] It seems that empirical accounts give a complex picture. In some cases, acquisition of citizenship seems to increase the feeling of belonging and also political participation (Escafré-Dublet & Simon, 2014). Nevertheless, as in the case of France, citizenship does not solve exclusionary problems such as 'visible' distinctions between second or third-generation immigrants. The reverse reading of the equation between citizenship and national identity is also questionable. When the Hollande government decided to increase tax rates for higher incomes, iconic Frenchmen such as Gerard Depardieu decided to renounce their

[13]The 79% of naturalised immigrants report 'feeling French', less than the majority population (98%) but significantly more than the 52% of non-citizens who feel French despite lacking citizenship status (Escafré-Dublet & Simon, 2014, p. 72).

French citizenship. I doubt that the actor feels less French after renouncing his citizenship, however, or that French collective identity will erase his place in the country's culture.

Furthermore, Bloemraad and Sheares's (2017) work on naturalised immigrants in the United States, Canada and Switzerland shows that the preference for naturalisation varies according to the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the hosting community. This also suggests that the preference for citizenship is driven by community belonging rather than a cost-benefit analysis between welfare provisions and barriers to applications. Yet, the intricate balance between EU citizenship and national citizenship makes it difficult to make a similar distinction in the acquisition of EU citizenship. Therefore, a salient Eurosceptic argument rests on the proposition that freedom of movement allows social welfare 'shopping' among Member States, and so EU citizens undermine the benefits of national citizenship by picking the state with the best welfare provision. Recent findings of the REMINDER project based on a longitudinal study among countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) from 2002 to 2014 show in fact that identity considerations underlie people's perceptions of immigrants' impacts on welfare more than economic considerations. In other words, within or outside the EU, how many immigrants receive state benefits matters more than how much they receive (Blinder & Marconi, 2019). By allowing immigrants to apply for supranational EU citizenship, Member States can have more control over the rights of national citizenship. Member States can implement either facilitating or inhibiting policies for the naturalisation of other European citizens without creating pressure on the national/communal identities and the social welfare system.

Acquisition of the Supranational Citizenship

The next question is who would acquire supranational citizenship? Any Union citizen with multiple national identities, cosmopolitan ideals, or dissenting political views might apply for supranational European citizenship purely for ideological or practical reasons. These people might be willing to exchange their Member State citizenship for a supranational citizenship without losing the EU citizenship rights associated with it.

Another important pillar of the supranational European citizenship regime (SECR) would be a social security scheme whereby people pay a certain share of their income taxes to the EU, not in addition to their current payments but through the redistribution between the Member States and the supranational social security institution. This supranational social security system would need to be created as the continuation of the rights and duties secured by the SECR. Citizens opting into this citizenship regime would become subject to a separate social welfare system managed by a supranational EU organisation. This would be preferable for mobile SCN who are part of several social security schemes, but less desirable for inactive citizens. Studies show that there are deficiencies in social protection when SCN move from one Member State to another (Essers, 2019). This is more the case if people are employed for a short time, work part-time,

on-call or through digital labour platforms in other Member States (Pulignano & Tan, 2019). The SECR could create a single point of entry for mobile citizens to an EU-wide social protection scheme, which is directly managed at the EU level. Therefore, I envisage that the EU citizens would participate in SECR for either practical or ideological reasons.

Thirdly, TCN residing in Member States could participate in the SECR. By that means, they could receive the rights of movement within the EU without going through a naturalisation process. Here, there are possibilities for softer or stricter conditions. One possible condition of acquisition could be residence in a Member State for a period of time to develop a sense of belonging to the community. For TCN, the EU could provide a temporary identity card that allowed them to work and reside in any Member State and become part of the European social welfare scheme. This monitoring period could be augmented with practices of integration at the local, national and supranational levels. By allowing immigrants time to develop a sense of belonging to their place of residence, the choice of national or supranational citizenship would rest on preference and affinity. Furthermore, through this arrangement, immigration to the EU could be governed at the supranational level, and so ease the pressure on individual Member States in the intergovernmental coordination of immigration policies.

Another possibility is that supranational EU citizenship could be conditional on particular cosmopolitan principles and be open to anyone willing to abide by the duties associated with this supranational social contract. For example, Held (2005) identifies eight paramount cosmopolitan principles: (1) equal worth and dignity; (2) active agency; (3) personal responsibility and accountability; (4) consent; (5) collective decision-making about public matters through voting procedures; (6) inclusiveness and subsidiarity; (7) avoidance of serious harm; and (8) sustainability. The content and the extent of these principles could be decided by the EU polities, and thereby establish a shared political identity and a route for civic nationalism for the supranational EU citizenship. Although the EU identifies itself with democratic and liberal principles, its rules of compliance are stipulated for states rather than citizens. Therefore, its civic virtues do not create an identifying feature of citizenship. Habermas (1994) asserts that the nation of citizens does not derive its identity from common ethnic and cultural properties but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights. By making the acquisition of EU citizenship conditional on compliance with cosmopolitan principles, the EU could promote civic virtues as a source of legitimacy and a unifying European identity for the supranational citizenship. For instance, individuals could pledge to a list of cosmopolitan values when acquiring citizenship, and if they breach them the EU could strip them of their SECR. This would eventually create a European *demos* that identifies itself with cosmopolitan values and has a stronger sense of belonging to Europe, without necessarily undermining national identity. Such a supranational EU citizenship could open up the possibility of two types of claimants to European identity; a civic identity stemmed from the supranational level and a cultural identity stemmed from the national level, allowing the formation of a more inclusive society which is less prone to

socio-cultural frictions on the basis of being European or non-European. This form of citizenship could also be a solution to the paradox asserted by Canovan (2001): that how the very European/Western nation-states that most successfully defend individual rights for their own citizens are also persistently guilty of inhumane treatment towards the desperate would-be immigrants against whom they try to defend their borders. Through two co-existing citizenship regimes, where the social rights of immigrants are secured by a separate welfare system and where they can claim a separate and independent European identity that does not threaten the basis of national identities, citizens of European nation-states and immigrants from non-European origins could be accommodated amicably in the same geopolitical area.

Finally, supranational citizenship could also provide a solution for the transnational representation of EU citizens. In January 2018, the EU Parliament proposed a debate on the introduction of pan-European candidate lists to replace the seats of the departing British MEPs. This motion became void, as Brexit did not take place before elections, yet it showed a willingness to further pan-European identity. At the moment, transnational identity remains an abstract notion, which relies on individuals who experience the benefits of EU citizenship. But that does not mean that these individuals share a joint political identity far from a sociological collective identity. Another policy arrangement to bridge the gap between the EU institutions and EU citizens, the European Citizens Initiative, has proven to be ineffective, as, since its initiation, only four out of 66 petitions have led to the European Commission to act. The European Citizen Initiative introduced a form of participative democracy in EU governance; the election of transnational MEPs infers a representative form of democracy. But I wonder, what is the value of representation without a pan-European *demos*?

Conclusion

The upsurge of Eurosceptic movements, the growth of illiberal and undemocratic practices in Hungary and Poland, and most importantly Brexit, suggest that the EU is suffering a crisis of identity.[14] This contribution discussed the role of the EU citizenship regime in this crisis.

The EU and its institutions created a new generation of Europeans who are not bound to the formation of citizenship linked to the nation-state. Many have multiple nationalities, speaking different languages, moving between numerous countries and benefiting from cross-border activities as part of their living conditions. For these people, EU citizenship is not derived from belonging to a Member State but rather a result of the EU institutionalism. In its current form, it does not project a unifying social and political identity to these people. The EU's crisis is often associated with the sedentary people who are adversely affected by

[14]Abrams, Büttner and Machin discuss the implications of Brexit further in their chapter (Abrams et al., this volume).

globalisation and the Single Market, but EU citizenship is, in fact, a source of crisis for mobile people who live in transnational conditions. Brexit showed that when it comes to choosing between national prerogatives or European ones, many sedentary citizens will opt for the abolishment of the EU status at the expense of the mobile citizens. The solution can be found by allowing supranational European *demos* and *demoi* of the European national states to exist together.

My argument is that this stalemate can be overcome by adopting two separate EU citizenship schemes co-existing together: one deriving its legitimacy from Member States belonging to the EU and the other from the state of transnationalism. This way, the interests of mobile citizens and the reservations of Eurosceptic groups can be honoured. It is even possible to contemplate that this dual form of EU citizenship could foster the allegiance of those who actively and willingly invoke their rights of EU citizenship and thus lead to a separate European *demos*, which is not subject to a nation-state. For the others, EU citizenship could be a derivative of national belonging, which is not actively invoked but also not at risk of being lost. Hence, people could have a third option between a Brexit and waiving national prerogatives.

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Chapter 4

Identity and Protest: Towards a Multiplicity of European Citizenship

Discovering the Potential of the Anti-TTIP-Protests

Nora Sophie Schröder

Abstract

The contribution draws upon the protests against a proposed trade deal between the European Union (EU) and the United States as an example of the potential to identify as European citizens. It is relevant given the multiple challenges the EU is currently facing, particularly a crisis of democratic legitimacy. While trust in EU institutions is at a historic low, some citizens – such as the Anti-Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) protestors – want to have a say in EU decision-making. The resulting conflicts should not be misunderstood as a threat. Instead, the author's suggestion here is that democratic conflict has the potential to contribute to the politicisation and the identification of citizens with the European project. Following this line of thought, the potential of the Anti-TTIP protests lies in a civic democratisation of the EU through conflict. The author focusses on protestors' participation experiences and their self-understanding processes as European citizens. The author explores the different ways in which protestors experience themselves as European citizens which aims to open up the discourse about the multiplicity of European citizenship. This variety of meanings ascribed to European citizenship is not regarded as a danger, but as the potential to enrich Europe with new ways of being and acting as European citizens.

Keywords: European citizenship; protest; European identification; TTIP; phenomenography; enacting citizenship

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 61–74
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211007

Introduction

The contribution approaches conflict as a critical component of possible political changes. This assumption from Conflict Studies is the starting point from which I will look at European protest participation and the self-understanding processes of European citizens. I use the protests against the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) deal between the EU and the United States as a meaningful example of citizen protest action on the European level. We will see that the conflict between the EU and its citizens taking part in the movement against TTIP offers great potential for Europe's democratisation: all over Europe, citizens mobilised around the topic; signed petitions; filed a lawsuit against the European Commission; established transnational networks; came together in European Days of Action; exchanged ideas on alternative economic trade policy and took to the streets demonstrating. In short, European citizens were politicised. In the following, I argue that such politicisation experiences affect what it means for the protestors to be European citizens.

The so-called 'European crisis of democratic legitimacy' can be understood as the gap between the increasing demand to be involved as citizens, and the limited possibilities to do so. 'In other words, the citizens of Europe have begun to desire to take a more active and critical stance on European affairs than current arrangements permit' (Bellamy & Warleigh, 2001, p. 2). Therefore, if the EU wants to tackle its 'democratic crisis', this is where it must start: there is great democratic potential in active European citizens who engage with EU policies and who are ready to join together in European protest. The perspective of Conflict Studies is complemented by the epistemological frame of Civic Studies, a field of citizenship study which focuses on the search for potential. Analysing the Anti-TTIP protests from these perspectives, this contribution aims to highlight grassroots practices of European citizenship, while turning away from top-down understandings of what a good European citizen is or should be. It aims to open up the discourse about European citizens, which is too often limited to the extremes of diagnosing either 'political apathy' or 'anti-Europeanness'. Instead, protest experiences are seen here as crucial in order to find out how different ways of being, acting and feeling as a European citizen are conceptualised by active citizens themselves.[1]

The contribution is structured in four parts: after outlining the theoretical frame in which 'enacting European citizenship' will be addressed, the second part starts from the current discourse and stresses the need for a new conception of it. In the third part, I will portray an alternative concept of citizenship as multiple, enacted and experienced, based on the findings of my research, followed by the conclusion.

[1]Evrim Tan also considers the problems and limitations of the European citizenship regime (Tan, this volume).

Enacting European Citizenship in Protest

The contribution draws upon the Anti-TTIP movement as one of the most outstanding examples of the Europeanisation of political protest. Not only were the protests addressed to the EU institutions and aimed to have a say in this policy, they also showed that political participation is at least partly moving to the supranational level (Becker & Hutter, 2017, p. 16). Protest acts were European in their locations, their targets and their networks. When on 10 October 2015, 50,000 people flooded the streets of Berlin against TTIP, it was the largest demonstration since the start of the Iraq war. But it was in no way only a German phenomenon. Throughout Europe, critical debates surrounding TTIP led to protest actions of different scales and styles. More and more national groups united against TTIP and established the pan-European alliance 'Stop TTIP'. This collective launched a European Citizen Initiative (ECI), a political mechanism of the European Commission that allows citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies.[2] However, its registration was refused because of supposed 'legal reasons',[3] prompting the alliance to start a self-organised ECI (sECI). After one year, the sECI had gathered 3.3 million signatures against TTIP from all over Europe, showing the scale of the resistance in all 28 European countries as well as growing solidarity across national borders. Eventually, the protests brought together 500 organisations in the Stop TTIP network and many more citizens in actions against the deal. The framework supported the movement-building process and politicised an active and critical civic mass under a common goal. Following a definition by Zürn, 'politicisation' is understood here as 'public communication about and contestation over collectively binding decisions concerning the common good' (Zürn, 2014, p. 50). Even though TTIP was never implemented, the conflict over it contributed to a Europe-wide politicisation process.

The conflict between the proponents and opponents of TTIP is not understood as a disturbance of the public order. Instead, social conflict (at all sociopolitical micro, meso and macro-levels) can be seen as a constitutive and transforming component of the social world (Coser, 1956; Simmel, 1908). This understanding refers to the need not only to accept, but even to affirm conflicts as a condition of liberal, non-violent and democratic societies. The transforming component refers to the understanding that the resolution of conflicts can lead to a higher (or lower) level of social (dis)integration depending on how the conflict is approached.[4] Following the epistemological roots of Civic Studies (Levine, 2014), I analyse the Anti-TTIP movement by way of its potential to create new

[2]For more on the European Commission, representation and identity see the chapter by Max Nagel and B. Guy Peters (Nagel & Peters, this volume).

[3]In 2017, this decision by the European Commission was declared unlawful by the European Court of Justice.

[4]The discipline's foundational theories of peace and conflict research (see Senghaas, Dahrendorf, Dubiel) show that the institutionalised resolution of conflicts can prevent destructive forms of conflict which endanger social cohesion (e.g. escalation of violence, radicalisation, exclusion and discrimination).

and more democratic structures in EU politics. This means that what is of interest here is not the question of the existence or evolution of a European demos (discussed most prominently by Habermas, 2001) but to discuss it in the light of the example of Anti-TTIP-protests. I am interested in the movement's potential to express different self-understandings for European citizens. On an epistemological level, what follows from this combination of Civic Studies and Conflict Studies is that a conflictual understanding of democratic politics[5] allows more civic EU politics from the bottom-up. Taking seriously the integrative and transformative potential of conflicts is expected to provide constructive solutions to the so-called 'European crisis' of democratic legitimacy.

How can we define the democratic deficit of the EU, which is often described as causing this crisis, and how does it relate to civic protest? It is the discrepancy between the people's aspirations to participate in EU politics and the lack of opportunities to enact European citizenship. In their influential 'Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration', Hooghe and Marks (2009) discover a shift from a permissive consensus to a constraining dissensus in EU politics. They argue that in the 1990s the so-called 'permissive consensus' allowed EU policymakers to shape EU politics in the almost complete absence of the citizens. Later, a 'constraining dissensus' emerged with a growing desire by citizens to participate in the decisions made on a European level. This shift displayed a politicisation of European citizens, away from the pure acceptance of EU policies. Bellamy and Warleigh (2001) distinguish between active and passive legitimation in order to underline that difference. While active legitimation entails 'citizens endorsing and helping formulate its goals', passive legitimation is defined as the 'mere popular acceptance of its results' (Bellamy & Warleigh, 2001, p. 2). This lack of democratic legitimacy of political decisions on a European level is what Isin and Saward refer to when they speak of a 'European crisis' (Isin & Saward, 2013a; Saward, 2013). While this lack of legitimacy shows the limits of participation in EU politics, acts of citizenship claim the democratisation of politics on a European level (Isin & Saward, 2013a, p. ix). In this way, they create new forms and spaces to enact European citizenship.

In the case of the Anti-TTIP protests, disagreements were voiced in Europe-wide actions such as demonstrations and European Days of Action. Taking part in such events can be understood as one way of enacting European citizenship. The enacted citizenship approach allows the study of such manifestations of citizenship in protest actions, and the tracing back of the political subjectivation processes of those engaged. In the case studied here, we see that the protest experiences of those involved in Anti-TTIP activities have the potential to translate into self-understandings as European citizens. The potential is to understand European citizenship in new terms, namely as a political subjectivation process that can manifest itself in protest actions. But how do civil society activists and ordinary citizens become European citizens through acts of protest? Acts of protest

[5]in the sense of agonistic pluralism that Chantal Mouffe proposes (Mouffe, 1999, 2005,).

are a form of political participation that bring about opportunities of political subjectivation (Isin, 2008). The process of how individuals construct themselves as political subjects is what I call political subjectivation (Rancière, 1992), while self-understandings as European citizens are regarded as one possible outcome. In the case of TTIP, we can see that political subjectivation processes are triggered by political participation: European protest experiences allow the actors to perceive themselves as European citizens. To reconstruct these self-understandings as European citizens, European-wide protest actions against TTIP are understood as 'acts of citizenship' (Isin, 2008).

My analysis of the Anti-TTIP protests as enacted citizenship is placed within a qualitative empirical research framework, which takes seriously the different ways of experiencing political phenomena from the perspectives of the people actively involved. The phenomenographic approach is designed to answer certain questions about how people make sense of their experiences.[6] It aims to investigate descriptions of the different ways in which people experience specific phenomena (Marton, 1986, p. 143). Here, the phenomenon being examined is European citizenship. Phenomena are objects of study constituted through the various ways of experiencing them, which means that European citizenship per se does not exist prior to the protestor's experience of it. This means, too, that European citizenship is constructed through the different ways of experiencing it, all different but interrelated to the object under analysis. This reasoning makes clear why the experience of an object is not exclusively subjective but 'a part of the whole which is subjective and objective at the same time' (Marton, 2000, p. 105). If we take this assumption seriously it matches the idea of enacted citizenship, which sees citizens as constructed through – and not as a prerequisite of – acts of citizenship. In the same vein, phenomenography states that the object under study is not predefined by the researcher but develops through the various perceptions of it from the perspective of the research participants. To put it another way: the object cannot be defined without asking how it is understood and experienced, because this is what essentially makes it an object (Marton, 2000, p. 108).

It is an appropriate way to answer the question: what are the different ways in which protestors experience themselves as European citizens in the Anti-TTIP protests? The approach seems especially useful since it is sensitive to the diversity of experiences: its conceptual framework explicitly recognises that phenomena are experienced in a variety of ways. Therefore, the approach is sensitive to the individuality of experiences, without seeking to record every possible way of experiencing the phenomenon under analysis. However, the focus of this research project is on collective rather than individual ways of experiencing European citizenship: while the object is experienced from the specific perspective of a subject,

[6]Experience is defined in a non-dualist, relational way as the '*internal relationship* that is constituted between individuals and phenomena' (Linder & Marshall, 2003, p. 271). This means that the object under study is the relation between the experiencer and the experienced, which is in this study the protestor and its (political subjectivation process in the) Anti-TTIP protest action.

all perceptions have in common this object which is present in their experiences. This means that I do not seek to gather a complete understanding of the experiences of single individuals; instead, my phenomenographic analysis focuses on identifying the qualitatively different and similar ways in which a phenomenon is experienced by a group of people. The outcome is a variety of experiences that provide a powerful way of understanding how European citizenship is understood by the citizens themselves. Focussing on the European dimension of a political subjectivation process in protest action, the following section exemplifies this for the political subject, which became active in the protest actions against TTIP in EU countries. I start from the critique of the narrowly framed discourse on European citizenship, followed by my positioning within it.

Moving Beyond Simplistic Ideas of 'the' European Citizen

For many years now, research has been carried out on the question of what role citizens can play in European democracy (Delanty, 1997; Wiener & Della Salla, 1997). Trends in citizenship discourses can be seen as an answer to the multiple crises that Europe is facing. Against the background of a so-called European democratic crisis, current events seem to strengthen the need for a new form of communality and representation (Gaventa, 2002) articulated in more protectionist or more multicultural visions of community. However, when looking at the discourse (in politics and media, as well as in academia), European citizens are often portrayed as either too passive or too populist. The citizens' disagreement with or disillusionment towards EU politics is often accused of causing a 'crisis of legitimacy' of the European institutions. In one typical example, in an article published in the German newspaper *Die ZEIT* the author Alexander Görlach asks for 'better citizens' as the only solution to the democratic deficit of the EU (Görlach, 2016).

From a potential-oriented perspective, however, it makes sense to focus on critical and democratically engaged European citizens located somewhere between those two poles of complete indifference and the abandonment of the European project. What made them raise their voices in this way? What experiences did they have, what difficulties did they encounter? Although not representative for the European citizen per se, these citizens articulate their will to participate in EU politics. Jones and Gaventa claim that 'this participation is effectively depoliticised' (2004, p. 7). The above-mentioned simplified narratives of the European citizen enable public victimisation or blaming: victimising the citizens as powerless puppets of a neoliberal and corporate-driven political elite, or blaming them as an apathetic, indifferent or dismissive mass. What is needed instead is an empowering concept of European citizenship, because

> when citizens perceive themselves as actors in governance, rather than passive beneficiaries of services and policy, they may be more able to assert their citizenship through actively seeking greater accountability, as well as through participation in the shaping of policies that affect their lives. (Jones & Gaventa, 2004, p. 7)

There is a need for an empowering alternative that can be situated between those dominant extremes to portray the multiplicity of European citizenship.

Too little research has been done on the question of how the active experience of political protest can shape civic self-understandings. It can also uncover a power relation inherent in the current European crisis of democracy itself, namely that the 'power to define citizen status and activity lies not only in citizens themselves' (Jones & Gaventa, 2004, p. 7). The aim here is not to stop at mere criticism but instead to point to the potential that lies in a closer investigation of citizens. On the basis of a democratic crisis and the urgent need for change that accompanies it, it is worthwhile breaking new ground: If citizens themselves interpret their participation as practice and an expression of citizenship, this can create a force for change.

I start from the claim that the way in which Anti-TTIP-protestors 'understand themselves as citizens is likely to have a significant impact on their perception of their rights and obligations and on whether they participate, in what form and why' (Jones & Gaventa, 2004, p. 13). This assertion connects to the appreciation that European protest action has an impact on self-understandings as European citizens. In this sense, potential-oriented research on European citizenship can be regarded as a reaction to widespread narratives that draw a pessimistic picture of political participation. It is born out of the observation that in the Anti-TTIP movement there are multiple examples that contrast such dominant narratives without being of a different, homogeneous kind. Highlighting this multiplicity is loaded with potential. It can improve our knowledge about the variety of realities of acting as a European citizen today, as well as of future citizenship ideals and practices. This should not be misunderstood as a universalist claim to portray 'the new concept of European citizenship'. Instead, the aim is to make visible a multiplicity of alternative understandings of citizenship produced in practice.

This aim is based on (at least) four important implications for the way European citizenship is understood as an identification process through political action:

1) Citizenship as a construct, it has no essence: First, the label 'European citizen' is a multifaceted term that contains attributions to an individual's identification with Europe. It must therefore be regarded as the product of an individual and collective construction process and can therefore only be analysed as such. This raises the question of where the construction processes take place.
2) Citizenship as developed bottom-up, not top-down: The mainstream approach presupposes a political socialisation as a citizen though duties and rights provided from the top-down, that is by the state. By contrast, if we understand citizenship as construct, we follow a bottom-up approach of becoming a European citizen. This means assuming that (and looking at how) personal political experiences trigger political subjectivation processes, which shape the protestors' self-understanding as European citizens.
3) Citizenship as practice, not normative ideal: In the literature, much research has been done on citizenship discourses in educational material. However,

as Abowitz and Harnish admit: 'Citizenship texts, like all other texts, are shaped by political interests and particular visions of what democracy and the nation-state should be' (2006, p. 655). While it is helpful to understand what political elites imagine as an 'ideal type of citizen', it cannot address the identification practices of the citizens themselves. To highlight this difference between the development of citizenship *in line with* versus *in demarcation from* the political elites, Rancière refers to political subjectivation instead of identification processes (1992). As Jones and Gaventa point out in the preface of their review on concepts of citizenship: 'very little is known about the realities of how different people understand themselves as citizens' (2004, p. v) and how this impacts their political activities.

4) Citizenship as civic, not civil: The triad of being, acting and feeling as a European citizen implies the fundamental rejection of the understanding of citizenship as a legal status, as it is defined in most of the dominant approaches to citizenship. The main interest lies in the 'civic' dimension of citizenship which includes active participation and lived experiences of citizenship. In this sense, 'civic' refers to citizenship practices as a crucial element of a functioning democracy and as such necessarily sceptical (and potentially conflictual) towards the state. What makes the Anti-TTIP protests an insightful example of the construction of such a civic European self-understanding is the fact that it develops markedly in conflicts and criticism, here exemplified in the engagement in Anti-TTIP protest action.

European Citizenship: Multiple, Enacted and Experiential

It is important not to stop at the criticism of dominant (and too narrow) conceptions of European citizenship. As I will show in greater detail, this contribution understands citizenship as *multiple, experienced* and *enacted*: these categories are born out of the aim to broaden the narrow (often morally framed and binarily structured) concept of European citizenship towards the *multiplicity* of ways being a European citizen. By focussing on this, I hope to encourage thinking about alternative forms of being a European citizen, both in political theory and practice. My starting point, therefore, will be the multiple but entangled experiences of European citizenship *enacted* in acts of protest that I reconstruct from the interviews I conducted with Anti-TTIP activists. I asked them: how did this participation in the protests relate to your political self-understanding as a European citizen? In the following, I will outline some findings using quotes from my interviewees that provide insight into the many ways European citizenship can be experienced, and will conclude with a suggestion of how to discover the multiplicity of European citizenship mentioned in the title.

When researching protest experiences, different meanings of these political acts emerge. First of all, and most prominently, they can be understood as *manifestations of political discontent* concerning a particular policy. This is what the protestors expressed by taking to the streets against TTIP, but in the interviews additional layers of criticism became visible. In the early phase of the protests,

the criticism was targeted at the content of the treaty itself, with protestors accusing the European Commission of harming the standards – whether social, environmental, cultural or political – we have in the EU. However, when no serious discussion resulted from the concerns articulated by opponents of TTIP, the focus shifted towards the method of the negotiations. The European Commission was accused of failing to take into account the voices of its citizens and refusing a debate on the treaty's effects on their lives. This more fundamental criticism brought the democratic dimension into play, as protestors experienced not having a say in the negotiations. That is what one interviewee from France refers to when saying: 'Europe yes, but not this one' (my translation, original: 'L'Europe oui, mais pas cela'; D., France). This position illustrates clearly the protestor's doubts about the democratic quality of EU politics. Not only did this experience trigger the question of citizens' roles in EU politics in general and their self-understanding as citizens in particular, it also mobilised more people to join the protests, particularly when the European Commission refused to accept the ECI that was meant to give ordinary citizens a voice in this debate. 'The fact that it [the ECI] was rejected was the start we couldn't even dream of' (M., the Netherlands). Despite a lot of public support for the opponents, the open criticism also translated into conflicts as this interviewee made clear: 'It's hard to be critical and not be seen as just destructive' (M., Estonia). It was a constant struggle for the protestors to frame their protest as *manifestations of political discontent* and not to be (mis)interpreted by others as Eurosceptic or just troublemakers.

Second, the protests can be seen as an *expression of agency* in the sense of an attempt to regain power over the future shape of the political system. The spectrum of how they felt during the protests was very wide. Some felt powerful and highlighted the multiple successes of the movement, such as the number of signatures collected, the leaks of secret TTIP documents and the final non-implementation of the treaty: 'At least I felt powerful in what I was doing' (M., the Netherlands). Others felt it was 'totally hopeless' to try to participate in decision-making and therefore said they 'feel resigned about being part of Europe' (S., Latvia). Those quotes show the extremes of this spectrum, while many interviewees revealed the complexity of political decision-making by the citizens. For example, one woman acknowledged that citizens can decide on European issues but criticised the limited and almost hypocritical ways democracy is enacted in the EU: 'We have the impression that we can't decide on the most important things. We can decide on the regulation of the opening of windows but not on questions of welfare' (E., Italy).

In the case of the Anti-TTIP protests, a third dimension comes into play, which is to see them as a field of negotiations *about what it means to be a European citizen*. I follow Dewey in his argument that regardless of the motives driving people, when taking part in collective, performative action, experiential learning takes place (Dewey, 1938). Experience of protest therefore plays a crucial role in political subjectivation processes. These transformational qualities can be observed in the way the interviewees reflect upon the role they want to play in EU politics. The realisation that citizens need to care about EU politics is described as something new: 'What is new is that it was not clear that the population has something to do

with these things' (my translation, original: 'was neu ist, ist, dass überhaupt nicht klar war, dass die Bevölkerung hat etwas zu kümmern über diese Sachen'; G., Bulgaria). Moreover, during the development of the conflict surrounding TTIP, the protestors started to realise the power they have in these political debates: 'It's the citizens who became cautious of the fact that politics cannot exist without the citizens' (my translation, original: 'es sind die Bürger die zum Bewusstsein gekommen sind, dass die Politik nicht mehr kann ohne die Bürger'; R., Belgium). Their powerful position was reflected in the slowdown of the negotiations between the United States and the EU, and finally the process was thwarted so much that it did not come into force. This experience of power pushed the protestors' engagement for more democratic participation by the citizens in EU politics, as this interviewee put it: 'People demand a voice, we don't have it yet, but at least we know that we want to have a say' (M., the Netherlands). However, it is not only about claiming rights, but also about finding ways to enforce their interests in the current system: 'It was an exercise indeed in to know what we as people have a say in' (M., Belgium). As a consequence, experiences in the Anti-TTIP protests account for new enactments of citizenship which are active, critical and confident of their (powerful) role within EU politics. This role can reveal new self-understandings as European citizens developed in the protest actions.

These findings suggest that the process of political subjectivation can only be captured by an open, empirical approach to European citizenship, which acknowledges what I call in the title of this contribution the 'Multiplicity of European citizenship'. As I will outline in the following, thinking about citizenship as multiple is rooted in the critique of citizenship conceptualised in terms of binary differences (normative: good/bad; quantitative: passive/active; qualitative: pro/con).[7] Recognising the multiplicity of *European* citizenship is based on the understanding that the term Europe, too, is conceptualised by citizens in different and sometimes conflicting ways. The concept of 'Multiple Europes' by Manuela Boatcă (2010) tries to capture this. She developed it in reference to Samuel Eisenstadt's concept of 'multiple modernities':

> I suggest replacing the notion of a single Europe producing multiple modernities by the one of multiple Europes with different and unequal roles in shaping the hegemonic definition of modernity and in ensuring its propagation. (Boatcă, 2010, p. 2)

'European multiplicity' aims to describe the variety of ways in which Europe is constructed, perceived and lived. In Boatca's work, this multiplicity is traced back to unequal power relations which continue to exist within Europe. However, here it is useful to focus on the fact that the empty signifier 'Europe' (as well as being a citizen of it) is filled with different meanings (in forms of narratives, images,

[7]Evrim Tan makes a similar dichotomy between active/inactive citizens to differentiate between the European citizens who actively use their freedom of movement rights and those who do not (Tan, this volume p. X).

experiences, memories, practices) that are continuously re- and de-constructed. While they often have contradictory meanings, what they have in common is the power to mobilise processes of community construction through collective meaning-making. The concept's strength is to overcome the idea that (comm)unity can only be realised when following a homogeneous idea of (a past, present or future) 'Europe'. On the contrary, this concept claims that the multiplicity of Europe is not only a factual reality, but also its potential. Its aim is to make visible the different and sometimes even conflicting ways in which such multiple Europes exist, both in terms of processes of construction and in terms of its results.[8]

While Europe's diversity is an empirical fact, it also entails the normative claim to allow for exploring new ways of being and acting as a European citizen. Citizens' varying experiences and different ways of thinking about Europe are not only regarded as a 'powerful way of seeing' how European citizenship is understood, but also support 'powerful ways of acting'. The enactment approach (Andrijasevic, 2013; Isin, 2008, 2013; Isin & Saward, 2013a, 2013b) claims that political subjects enact themselves as citizens through political practices. The perspective this approach adds to the discourse on European citizenship is that citizens come into being through practices, which are called 'acts of citizenship' (Isin, 2008). That means that the focus of research is on the acts that create political subjects, while the political subjects that emerge are an outcome of analysis. The enactment approach is useful for understanding the process of becoming European citizens through protest action, since it does not assume subjects of European citizenship in advance, as most concepts that connect (collective) identity and political protests do (for an overview, see Flesher Fominaya, 2010). Instead, it is conceived as an empirical task to demonstrate that an act of citizenship brings subjects as citizens into being (Isin & Saward, 2013a, p. 26).

We can conclude that to act and to feel as a citizen can be both a result of and a cause of the protest action. In fact, if protest is experienced (however not necessarily reflected in that stage), processes of political subjectivation (Rancière, 1992) take place which may impact a person's civic self-understanding. A person cannot experience without being involved, nor can their initial understanding of acting as a citizen (as we assume that experiential learning is always taking place) remain unchanged. The construction of such a civic self-understanding must be understood as a continuous process of mutual influence between the self and the political world – connected through the realm of experience. In the moment of political action, values and beliefs are put into practice and are thereby re-formulated in public (most prominently theorised by Arendt, 1998). Thereby, the self-understanding as a European citizen can become part of the self, given that

[8]More precisely, her work is concerned with the fact that postcolonial structures *within Europe* continue to exist. As her analysis shows, they appear most significantly in inner-European hierarchies and cleavages of power between the Member States. Her critique is directed against the EU 'monopolising the label of "Europe"' (Boatcă, 2010, p. 1) used as an instrument of exclusion and inclusion, both outside Europe and within.

it is experienced and reflected.[9] Jones and Gaventa refer to this as a 'civic identity', which they define as the way 'people see themselves as citizens and act upon this' (2004, p. 13). However, what the protests against TTIP show is that European civic self-understandings can also develop when taking European action – which in turn influences the way how people see themselves as citizens.

Conclusion

This contribution follows the constructivist assumption that European citizenship as such does not exist. It comes into existence only through its enactment. Therefore, there is not 'the' European citizen to be discovered – but a lived multiplicity of ways of being a European citizen. This multiplicity is not regarded as a danger to the European project, but as the potential to enrich Europe with new ways of being and acting as European citizens. What follows from this concept of 'European multiplicity' as well as the concept of 'enacted citizenship' is that in order to analyse this multiplicity, the meaning of 'European citizenship' and also 'Europe' must not be fixed in advance. In the study of Anti-TTIP protests we see that 'Europe' and 'European citizenship' are signifiers (rather than signified) and include a variety of meanings. The phenomenographic approach allows the investigation of this multiplicity empirically.

Using interviews with people who protested actively against TTIP, I presented three approaches to investigate the potential that lies in the Anti-TTIP protests as a democratic conflict about EU politics. First, if we look at the protests as *manifestations of political discontent* we can see that several layers of criticism come into play in this protest movement, which are mutually dependent and develop along the course of negotiations and discourse. The protests were not necessarily experienced as *expressions of agency*, but rather we see a spectrum that ranges from feeling powerful to apathetic. One reason might be missing instruments and competences to enact the role the protestors want. These findings emphasise that self-understandings as European citizens may develop through the experience of being part of an active, critical and self-conscious citizenry ready to act for more opportunities to shape EU politics.

What these findings suggest, too, is a shift in the way the EU as a political actor is perceived by the citizens active in the Anti-TTIP protests. This reflects the broader development from permissive consensus to constraining dissent, which calls for a new role that citizens can play in EU politics. The experiences of the Anti-TTIP protests do not only pave the way for a more active citizenship on the EU level as they have the potential to change the way political subjects understand themselves as citizens. If we follow this line of thought, the protests also show that the 'democratic crisis' resulting from the limited opportunities citizens

[9]Dewey claims that citizens are motivated to take action if it contains emotional, moral and personal experiences, especially when reflected and framed in terms of identity. Dewey's conception of reflective learning reminds us of the need to cultivate competencies and skills for intelligent action in the political field (Dewey, 1938).

have to co-create EU politics cannot only be 'solved' from the top-down. It can also be tackled from the ground upwards, by prompting democratic conflicts about the role of citizens in EU politics.

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Chapter 5

Identity and the Far-Right: People Talking About 'The People'

Tim Kucharzewski and Silvia Nicola

Abstract

The resurgence of right-wing parties and movements in almost all Member States of the European Union seems to indicate an escalating crisis not only of the European political project, but also of the societal fabric across Europe. In order to better comprehend its origins, it is important to understand how the identification of citizens with the EU is being shaped and challenged by attitudes including rising nationalism, Euroscepticism and anti-immigration feelings. While the focus during the current political crises has been overwhelmingly on statements and policies made by politicians, parties and institutions, this chapter instead studies the perceptions of the 'common people' and how they construct their identities within the European discourse, thus closing an important research gap.

This contribution is based on empirical data gathered during a large-scale project called Restorative Circles for Citizens in Europe, financed by the Europe for Citizens programme of the European Commission. Between January and June 2017, individuals from different walks of life came together in Trebnitz and Berlin to talk about 'their' Europe. Originally envisaged as an opportunity for dialogue between Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans, it soon revealed that there are many nuances in these attitudes. The presence of members and sympathisers of populist and right-wing movements and parties in the meetings changed the communication dynamics, and offered a unique opportunity to observe how (bottom-up) identity is constructed and what impact it has. This contribution analyses the extensive collected data.

Keywords: Germany; populism; restorative circles; discourse; societal tensions; Euroscepticism

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 75–91
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211009

Introduction

Between January and June 2017, four groups of individuals from different backgrounds came together in the German town of Trebnitz and the capital Berlin to express their thoughts on the European Union in so-called dialogue circles. Originally envisaged as an opportunity for dialogue between Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans, the meetings soon revealed the complexity of the growing rift within German society and the escalating crisis of the European political project. As the project unfolded in the context of the resurgence of far-right parties and movements in almost all Member States of the European Union, it became clear that far-right parties were challenging the notion of EU citizens' alleged European identification, which had been so often proclaimed in German mainstream politics.[1]

In Germany, this alternative framing to mainstream politics has been voiced by the 'new' far-right, which is represented most powerfully by the party 'Alternative für Deutschland' (AfD), political movements such as PEGIDA ('Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident' or in German '*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*') and the local branch of the Identitarian Movement ('Identitäre Bewegung'). While small far-right parties have existed in Federal Germany since soon after the end of the Second World War, a new dynamic can be observed as these former fringe parties and movements attempt – and succeed – to move into mainstream society. In September 2017, the AfD entered the German federal parliament for the first time and is currently even leading the parliamentary opposition as the strongest non-governing faction.

One of the insights revealed by the dialogue circle project was that identity and identification played an essential role for all participants. The presence of members and sympathisers of the above-mentioned right-wing movements and parties changed the communication dynamics and offered a unique opportunity to observe how populist argument is constructed in societal discourses. It was not just the supporters of far-right movements who were affected by populist rhetoric, but also the participants who opposed right-wing policies and attitudes. This contribution does not see populism as constituting a 'thin-centred' ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 498), but rather as 'a mode of discursive political expression that is employed selectively and strategically by both right and left, liberals and conservatives' (Gidron & Bonokowski, 2013, p. 8).

While there have been plenty of studies dealing with the populist far-right, as 'the only successful new party family in Europe' (Mudde, 2007, p. 1), research has mainly focussed on the image of populist leaders or on the particular language and discursive frames employed by the main actors in the European far-right. Despite this wealth of academic research that has accumulated over the past decade, the 'new' far-right in Germany and its entanglement with mainstream populism remain matters of controversial debate. Arguably one reason for that is that the bottom-up part of the phenomenon has been ignored or stereotyped.

[1]William Outhwaite makes the point that right-wing populism 'thrives on crises, real or imagined' (Outhwaite, this volume p. X).

Therefore, a major research gap remains: the way citizens (the oft-invoked 'people') absorb, interpret, internalise, reproduce and broaden populist language and discourses. This contribution aims at closing this particular gap by building a link between the rise of populist far-right parties on the macro level and the identifications of individuals on the micro level, with the objective of providing a better comprehension of the contemporary European crises and how the resulting dividing lines are perceived by people. In order to do so, this chapter asks the following two questions: *How is the identification (or lack thereof) of self-perceived common citizens with the EU being shaped and challenged by far-right parties' arguments? How do these people cope with the emergence of far-right parties?*

This chapter analyses how the sample group who participated in the dialogue circles expressed their views, as individuals outside an institutionalised populist body, while interacting with others. Throughout nine meetings which took place over a two-day period at one of the two locations, in Berlin and Brandenburg respectively, as part of the extensive project Restorative Circles for Citizens in Europe, anonymised written protocols were recorded. These underwent a theory-driven qualitative content analysis by the authors.

For the theoretical framework, classic social identity construction theories were embedded in the context of populist right-wing parties and their rhetoric. Before delving into the analysis and deconstruction of identification, a brief overview of the history of the far-right in Germany will be provided. In addition, a more detailed description of the project and the participants aims at providing a better picture of 'the people' who make up our sample.

The Resurgence of the Far-Right in Germany

Election results across the EU over the past decade indicate a rise of nationalistic, anti-establishment parties. In Italy, France, Great Britain, Czechia, Spain, Austria and Germany, among others, these groups have emerged on the far-right of the political spectrum.[2] While this phenomenon is certainly not entirely new, even for the post-Second World War era, some of the developments accompanying this resurgence (such as bigger marches, attacks on people with migrant backgrounds, terrorism, etc.) have surprised observers, especially in Germany.

The most vocal post-war party dedicated to a Nazi revival, the NPD (National Democratic Party Germany), was established in 1964 (Jun, 2006, p. 226). It emerged from the far-right Deutsche Reichspartei (DRP 'German Empire party') which had existed since 1950 (Schmollinger & Stöss, 1975, p. 187), a mere five years after the end of the Second World War. While these parties were certainly extreme and prone to violence, they mostly remained on the fringes of German politics, not only in their views and ideology but also their very limited constituency and societal support.

[2]In her chapter in this book Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz provides an analysis of right populism in Poland and Hungary (see Bartoszewicz, this volume).

It was only with the emergence of a broader Euroscepticism and the growth of social media as an alternative to conventional press and media coverage (Hamann, 2017) that far-right ideas were able to gain a foothold in mainstream political discourses in Germany. What started out in 2008 as essentially a countermovement against the EU's financial policy (Trebesch, Funke, & Schularick, 2008) under the leadership of Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel, turned into the first mainstream far-right party in Germany, the AfD.[3] Anti-Islam movements such as PEGIDA and the Identitarian Movement, which can trace their roots back at least to right-wing reactions to the terror attacks of 9/11, surged in popularity with the so-called 'refugee crisis' of 2014/2015.[4] Anti-immigrant sentiments are, however, no new development. Earlier examples include the incineration of refugee shelters by angry German mobs in Hoyerswerda at the beginning of the 1990s and the murders committed by the National Socialist Underground (NSU), a German home-grown far-right terrorist organisation.

The post-war division of Germany has also left its mark on society. The east/west divide is still visible in election results, with the AfD gaining far more seats in regional parliaments on the east of the former 'iron curtain'. However, the renewed acceptance of far-right ideas is a rising trend across Germany as a whole.

One cause is widely thought to be growing resentment among voters on both the left and right with the centrist 'grand coalition' of the centre-right Christian Democratic CDU and centre-left Social Democratic SPD, which has governed the country for over a decade. There had long been Left and Green parties as alternatives to the SPD but on the right there were 'only' the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, and this perceived vacuum became filled by far-right ideas.

It is important to consider the formation of collective identities here. We understand collective identities, with Charles Tilly, as forming around a demarcation line called a 'boundary'. On both sides of the boundary, 'within-boundary relations' take place, as well as 'cross-boundary relations'. Additionally, on both sides of the boundary, the groups of actors have a 'shared understanding' about themselves, about the group of others, about the boundary, and about their interactions (Tilly, 2005).[5] Resurgent far-right parties often promote and foster their own 'shared understandings' using populism.

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[3]The AfD was originally established by the economist Bernd Lucke (professor of macroeconomics at the University of Hamburg) as a political platform for financial arguments against the Euro and EU fiscal policy. After it lurched to the right of the political spectrum, Lucke left the party he helped create. He then founded the party ALFA (Alliance for Progress and Awakening, or in German 'Allianz für Fortschritt und Aufbruch'), later known as LKR (Liberal-Conservative Reformers, or in German 'Liberal-Konservative Reformer').

[4]Other, more absurd far-right phenomena emerged including new-age nature movements and *Reichsbürger*, who deny the existence of the federal German state and proclaimed their own fantasy states, sometimes completed with flags, passports and currencies.

[5]Ove Skarpenes also considers the construction of symbolic boundaries, in his case in the context of the working class in Norway (see Skarpenes, this volume).

Contrary to Mudde, we do not consider populism to be a 'a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite"' (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Instead, we understand populism to be 'a mode of political expression that is employed selectively and strategically by both right and left, liberals and conservatives' (Gidron & Bonokowski, 2013, p. 8), a political rhetoric challenging the legitimacy of the current political establishment (Abt & Rummens, 2007, p. 407), through interpretative frames. These interpretative frames help identify the populist *Weltanschauung* as propagated by far-right leading figures.

Identifying Populism

Following this theoretical framework, the written protocols of the dialogue circles have been subjected to a qualitative content analysis with the aim of examining to what extent ordinary citizens are using similar frames as those employed by far-right leading figures. This theory-driven approach helps to identify patterns and compare them, enabling us to answer the question of how the European identifications of regular citizens change when challenged by right-wing rhetoric.

The populist *Weltanschauung* of the far-right exhibits some very clear features. At the core of the classic 'us and them' divide lay *anti-establishment, anti-mainstream* attitudes (Nedelcu, 2015). This suggests that a group is mostly defined by who they are not, rather than through the identification of unifying characteristics. This dividing line is enforced by the *artificial creation or heightening of fear* which does not allow for shades of grey between the 'righteous' (own group) and the 'bad' (the other, which needs to be fought) (Kinnvall, 2014; Wodak, 2016). The 'bad' takes a plurality of forms, such as the political establishment, immigrants, Jews, homosexuals or any other minority.

However, the core mechanism employed by populists is not fear itself but *strong emotions* in general, which come to replace unshakable and verifiable facts. If statistics show that the crime rate is falling but the feeling promoted by populists suggests otherwise, this emotion can neutralise the facts. This builds a hermetically closed recursive bubble, in which populists are *catering to what people – their own or potential voters – want to hear* (within-boundary relations) (Faas, Arzheimer, & Roßteutscher, 2010; Pérez, 2016). Facts and objective reality are disregarded in favour of personal emotions and subjective realities. Such distortions are strengthened by fake news, alternative facts or post-factual views, which reinforce only the known narratives and the need to fight against the chosen enemy. This also leads to a decline in cross-boundary relations and means there are barely any interactions with the other, only with its constructed notion.

When turning against mainstream opinions, the group portrays itself as an *oppressed victim* (Böttger, Güldenzopf, & Voigt, 2017). It describes its members as 'resistance fighters' in a *self-proclaimed revolution* against a corrupt, oppressive system. Nevertheless, the system was not always broken, as it may be currently because of the imagined enemies. The fight is thus guided by a *return to an imagined past* (which never really existed). This shared story, also common in nationalistic arguments, relies on unverifiable and often far-fetched or distorted myths

(Wodak, 2016). The self-proclaimed oppressed victims, fighting the system, claim they are in fact speaking for an *alleged silent majority*, for *THE people*, consisting of the entire 'true' people or national community. The German protest slogan 'WE are the people', which first emerged during protests against the Communist regime during the twilight months of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), is today hijacked by populism. The implied meaning is the less democratic version: we are the real people – not you (Akkerman, Zaslove, & Spruyt, 2014; Canovan, 2002).

Shared meanings and stories are often created by far-right groups through revisionism (such as the hijacking of successful chants), the most controversial being their view of Germany's Nazi past. Their ambiguous utterances together with their inability or unwillingness to distance themselves from neo-fascist sympathisers and thoughts transforms them into what we call *Schrödinger's Nazis*.[6]

Examples of this attitude include prominent AfD parliamentarians such as Björn Höcke calling the Holocaust memorial in Berlin a monument of shame (Höcke, 2017), and Alexander Gauland referring to the Second World War as 'bird dirt of history' ('*Vogelschiss*') (Gauland, 2018) and claiming the right to be proud of the achievements of German soldiers in two World Wars (Die Welt, 2017). Until it becomes undeniable that these speakers are or are not Nazis, they remain in a state where both possibilities exist at the same time. They are Schrödinger's Nazis in a box of political context; they may or may not deny or relativise the Holocaust in their comments. Only if they came to govern and dictate actual policy would observers be able to see if the metaphorical cat emerged as a Nazi or just as a far-right politician accepting the basic law.

Nevertheless, this kind of speech still has far-reaching consequences for the social fabric of a society, as it certainly appeals to neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists by reinforcing their beliefs and hatreds. Right-wing populism has shifted the boundaries of what the German public space judges acceptable.[7]

These populist narratives and shared understandings and stories have been time and again observed, described and analysed. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of understanding of how ordinary people use the same rhetoric and how they cope when exposed to it. This contribution aims at closing this research gap by analysing protocols of the meetings, in which 36 people holding opposing views regarding the EU interacted with each other.

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[6]This name is an allusion to physicist Erwin Schrödinger's famous thought experiment in which a cat is put into a closed box with a flask of poison and a radioactive source. According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, if the poison is released, the cat is alive and dead at the same time. Only when the box is opened, the observer sees the cat as alive or dead. This suggests that something ambiguous can maintain two different conditions at the same time.

[7]German law does grant freedom of speech but sets some limits to it. Denying the Holocaust, for example, is forbidden, as is showing Nazi symbols.

Who Are Our 'People'? – Notes on Methodology

In order to facilitate dialogue between citizens in Europe who hold different views and are on opposing sides of the growing societal rift, a project called Restorative Circles for Citizens in Europe,[8] sponsored by the agency Europe for Citizens, was conceived. The dialogue circles were organised by the Kreisau Initiative[9] as weekend-long meetings, taking place once a month between January and June 2017 in the cities of Trebnitz (Brandenburg) and Berlin,[10] using the dialogue method of the restorative circle,[11] which facilitates communication even where there is deep conflict.

Each session was guided by two facilitators, while a third person from the organising team took part as a note-taker and produced the written minutes of each meeting, which now constitute our empirical data.

The originally non-academic context of the source data poses some challenges. A first potential shortcoming concerns the participants' recruitment. A total of 51 people registered online for the project but only 36 of these actually took part. Given this relatively modest figure, we do not claim that our sample is representative of the entire population of Germany. Nonetheless, considerable efforts were made to ensure that the participants included people from all walks of life.

Despite extensive efforts to reach opponents of the EU, the project did not manage to include an equal number of 'pro' and 'anti' Europeans. Among the 51 people who registered, 72% identified positively with the EU. The rest adopted either a neutral or a negative position. This proportion was also consistent among the 36 actual attendees. The Kreisau Initiative is open about holding a

[8]More information about the project can be found at http://circlespaceurope.org/.

[9]More information about the Kreisau Initiative (KI) can be found at https://www.kreisau.de/en/ueber-uns/leitbild/.

[10]The original design of the project envisioned that in the first session (in January), people with a pro-European attitude would meet parallel in Berlin and in Trebnitz to exchange views, learn the rules and prepare for facing 'the other'. In February, during the second session, the Eurosceptics would meet and follow the same procedures. Between March and June, a random mix of people from these sessions would come together to engage in dialogue. They were initially required to take part in three meetings (one weekend every other month), but not all were able to comply with this. Because of a very low commitment by the participants enrolled for Berlin, half of their sessions had to be cancelled and the April circle took place over only one day. Since all other circles took place over the entire weekend, we decided to exclude the minutes from April from the analysis.

[11]The restorative circle method is part of the broader concept of restorative justice. There are many fields of application (schools, criminal law, post-war settings, US congress debates) and different interpretations of it. During our circles, we followed the conceptualisation of Kay Pranis. More information about her and her work can be found at http://www.livingjusticepress.org/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC=%7B5EA7355F-29D7-411D-A977-BF092BC6CC9C%7D

pro-European attitude and some Eurosceptics who were approached were apprehensive because of the liberal, multicultural background of the organiser.

While the two groups were unequal in absolute numbers, the proportion of Eurosceptics mirrors to some degree the regional and federal parliamentary election results of the far-right party, AfD, in Brandenburg and Berlin. Some of the anti-EU participants were openly members or followers of established far-right movements and parties such as the AfD, PEGIDA or the 'Identitäre Bewegung'. Others were sceptical towards the EU without affiliating themselves with any movement, and used populist arguments.

There was a further recruitment imbalance in terms of gender (see Table 1). Almost twice as many women attended as men. This is an important fact to bear in mind when discussing the far-right. With few exceptions (such as Marine Le Pen and Alice Weidel), most far-right figures are male.

Despite the above-mentioned disparities, the project did manage to gather people from all age categories. The participants in Berlin were only slightly younger on average (Table 2).

A further shortcoming concerns the recording of the nine meetings. Since the project was not designed as an academic one, the semi-standardised data collection sheet was not tested for the three criteria of measuring instruments: objectivity, reliability and validity. The log outline was revised based on the discussions and hands-on experiences of the other international facilitators.[12] Through this feedback, the level of reliability, usability and validity was improved. In each meeting the minutes were taken by another facilitator, according to a rotating principle.[13]

While there were no academic aspirations in the design of the data collection logs, they were submitted to high ethical standards. The note-keepers promised not to write down any information that might allow the identification of any of the participants.

The People Talking About 'the People'

The eight analysed meetings of the restorative circles managed to gather people of every political colour, from members or followers of established far-right movements and parties such as the AfD, PEGIDA or the 'Identitäre Bewegung', to former Allianz für Fortschritt und Aufbruch (Alliance for Progress and Awakening) (ALFA) members and voters of all parties represented in Germany's federal

[12]There were 27 international facilitators in total.

[13]Six different people recorded the minutes during the nine dialogue circles in Germany, producing a potential bias through their own socialisation and backgrounds. Both authors of this chapter were responsible for the note-taking of one session each. While the authors of this chapter challenge the idea of absolute objectivity in social sciences, control mechanisms and processes did improve the objectivity of the collected data. During all nine meetings which took place in Germany, at least one of the two authors of this chapter was present, meaning that the minutes are backed by the authors' participatory observations.

Table 1. Participation in the Dialogue Circles According to Session, City and Gender.

Dialogue Circle Session	**Gender Distribution at the Two Locations of the Dialogue Circles**			
	Berlin		**Trebnitz**	
January	3 Men	10 Women	5 Men	3 Women
February	3 Men	–	1 Men	6 Women
March	–	–	5 Men	6 Women
April	–	–	2 Men	2 Women
May	–	–	4 Men	4 Women
June	–	–	3 Men	3 Women

Table 2. Distribution of the Attendees According to Age Category and Location.

Age Group of the Participants	**Location of the Dialogue Circles**	
	Berlin	**Trebnitz**
18–25	5	2
26–30	2	5
31–40	2	6
41–50	4	4
51–65	3	2
65+	-	1
	16	20

parliament at that time. Together they discussed different topics related to the EU, such as migration, security, identity, finance and the way the EU works. The participants who openly stated their links to far-right groups made most use of populist rhetoric. They mark the starting point of the analysis.

The circles usually started with more general topics before the participants could steer the discussion according to their interests. From the very beginning, one participant stood out with a very unequivocal disapproval of the EU, as 'an artificial construct', which is only about 'power, suppression and deprivation' and is a 'dictatorship' because of the 'centralisation around Brussels'. According to this participant, 'the EU flag should be forbidden'. On the other hand, the participant stated that she[14] personally has also only profited from the EU (this was

[14]We use a generic female gender in this chapter; this does not necessarily reflect the actual gender of the person.

not a point she raised herself at first. However, when other participants said that they profited from the EU, she joined in and said that she did too). Furthermore, during one of the participant's monologues, she mentioned that she was never as free as when living in the GDR. People in the current German federal republic could only dream of such levels of freedom. Following this logic, the participant reminded all others present – several times – about the importance of 'the sovereignty of the people', as 'the people in Germany and France were never asked if they wanted to join the EU'. These opinions show clear signs of anti-establishment and anti-mainstream feelings, as well as the desire to return to a 'glorious' past.

Despite this rejection of the European political project, the participant felt a close connection to Europe, which she wanted to protect, claiming it was under siege from Islam, which 'has massively changed the scenery on the streets'. She does not feel safe any longer as a result of 'the apocalypse of the mosques'. The enemy changed from being a supranational institution to Islam and Muslims,[15] which the participant seemed to genuinely fear. This fear was further increased by the claim that Saudi Arabia wants to build 200,000 mosques across Europe, although the source of this information was never disclosed. Moreover, the participant spoke about 'foreign infiltration through Islamisation', showing an obvious, profound anguish about being overrun by foreigners, which she felt she did not know nor understand. At the same time, she felt 'they' did not belong to 'us'.

Another classic, very clear-cut 'enemy group' were refugees. She raised a series of questions: 'What are refugees?', 'What are the causes for them fleeing?', 'What are their intentions?' She further claimed that only 3% of them are people in search of protection and over 90% of them are criminals (without mentioning what the remaining 7% were). Most importantly, she believed 'we are at war and the refugee waves have been planned as part of this war'. She seemed to be genuinely worried about Europe and Germany, which she judged in need of saving. Based on these convictions, she proclaimed herself to already be in the 'resistance movement', which recalls the populist shared stories above discussed: claiming the role of the victim against overwhelming opponents.

Furthermore, the collective enemies were at times personified:

> Trump and Israel are agitating against Iran and Russia; with the World Trade Centre, we have all seen, they do not care about anything, and in France we have civil war because of the Muslims and the third generation migrants.

It is not clear who the ominous 'they' are in this case, since she regarded 9/11 as a CIA inside job. When names started to be mentioned, Angela Merkel drew the most criticism. She was even likened to Hitler, both being 'dictators'. Her 'treason' was depicted as all-encompassing and ranging from 'breaking EU law'

[15]Originally, the participant stated that she is against all religions and called for a ban on all of them.

and permitting 'endless Islamisation' to 'her position on the IMF and Greece', as well as causing Brexit. Having presented more balanced – albeit critical – views on the first day, the second day consisted mostly of rants. The participant covered the whole range of topics usually addressed by AfD, PEGIDA and the like. As the number of (perceived) enemies continued to grow, the participant seemed to be reciting a poem, remembered by heart, of which portions had been forgotten.

These opinions made a lot more sense after learning about a key influence on her beliefs: during the lunch break, she produced a book titled 'Illegal Wars' by the academic Daniele Ganser, who fell from grace and lost two teaching positions in Switzerland in recent years. Further research suggested that many ideas introduced by the participant during the circle were reproduced from the book almost verbatim, although in a more aggressive and far less coherent manner. The author positioned himself in a way that could grant him plausible deniability, as someone who was merely raising uncomfortable questions and who conceded that other 'alternatives' were also conceivable. On the other hand, our participant accepted every theory in the book as true at face value. She considered it a personal goal to fight against all these possible (or impossible) injustices. Furthermore, it was important for the participant to underline that she completely opposes any 'mainstream' media and only relies on three specific newspapers/platforms for information, one of them being Sputnik. Fear-mongering, fake news and conspiracy theories were all present as propagated by the respective far-right groups.

It might be expected that the atmosphere of this dialogue circle would have been tense. However, during the review session, it was not described that way by any of those present. While the other participants disagreed strongly and openly with the opinions presented above, no personal offence had been taken inside the circle. In the case of severe exaggerations, the other participants openly addressed them and explained why they wished for more nuanced and neutral language. This had been done with respect for the person who stood behind all the ideas presented above. The participant who replicated far-right populist speech stated in the closing round that she felt she had been listened to.

This is a very straightforward example of how populist right-wing rhetoric has been adopted and modified by regular citizens. Strong emotions – mostly constructed fear – are used to activate the identification boundary and delimit oneself from these dangerous others, be they Muslims, refugees or specific politicians whenever a personification of 'the enemy' was needed. Noteworthy is the way in which the right-wing speech was adapted. Separate stories, used in the right-wing *Weltanschauung* to strengthen the sense of belonging to their group and create shared understandings, were taken out of context and reflexively reproduced by this participant in such a way that the other participants could not follow or recognise any logic in them. This impeded cross-boundary relations, which brings us to the second main question of this chapter, namely, the coping strategies of regular people when exposed to right-wing ideas.

The other individuals concluded for themselves that the method we used for our circle would not be suitable for discussing facts. Nevertheless, it would be ideal for meeting new people whom one would not meet in everyday circumstances. When confronted with some of the conspiracy theories, the other participants

tried to reason by offering facts and rational explanations. However, these were presented at an intellectual level (albeit in a simple, intelligible language). By contrast, the fears expressed existed on an emotional level. The restorative circle method meant, however, that the participants did not regard themselves during the discussions as enemies, even if they belonged to groups each would define as being the respective 'other'.

One of the 'social democratic' participants thanked the 'populist' participant for having agreed to come to the circle and for expressing her beliefs and sharing personal stories. She was happy to have had the opportunity to meet her, since she otherwise 'only knew such people from television'. At this remark, the populist participant nearly jumped out of her seat, shouting: 'They show people like me on TV?' (since she regarded mainstream media as fake news). Notably, the position of the participants did not seem to change after the exchange. People identifying with European values tended to identify even more strongly with them when confronted with (far-fetched) far-right populism. In the case of the far-right follower, she exhibited an unshakable world view that is supported by the within-boundary relations she nurtured, as she did not seem to interact much with people with different convictions. Furthermore, an overarching feeling of fear appeared to trump the numerous logical flaws in her argument.

One important observation is that the more extreme the claims, the more rigid the boundary between the 'us' and 'them' groups, as there are fewer overlaps between the stories that the groups repeat to enforce their sense of belonging. This was also the case when, as part of the trust-building phase, the participants were invited to share two personal and two societal values. They wrote down values such as 'relative freedom and pluralism; respect and tolerance; responsibility; empathy; openness and consideration; fairness; human dignity and self-confidence; education and interest; social security, participation and rules'. A participant who was an AfD member suggested 'homogeneity and moral' but the idea that a society should be homogeneous was controversial among the others present.

The participant defended her position and reinforced her argument by making extensive use of abstract theoretical terms and by name-dropping academics and perceived authoritative figures. She was less a follower who just repeated and internalised shared stories than a leader who made up stories that would become shared understandings for their group. Furthermore, she claimed that homogeneity – which she deemed as expressed in terms of culture and ethnicity – had been identified as early as the 1970s as a prerequisite for German society by the former constitutional judge Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. There is indeed something known as the 'Böckenförde Dilemma'[16] that was postulated in the

[16]The Böckenförde Dilemma refers to his quote: 'The liberal (German "freiheitlich"), secularized state lives by prerequisites which it cannot guarantee itself. This is the great adventure it has undertaken for freedom's sake. As a liberal state it can only endure if the freedom it bestows on its citizens takes some regulation from the interior, both from a moral substance of the individuals and a certain homogeneity of society at large. On the other hand, it cannot by itself procure these interior forces of regulation, that is

mid-1960s regarding the role of religion in democratic states. Our participant, however, removed the idea from its true context and used it to support her claims. Several decades after making the statement, Böckenförde refined it by explaining that the homogeneity of society means a certain 'sense of community' is necessary in every social group to create a feeling of belonging.[17] Invoking the 'Böckenförde Dictum' – which had been unfamiliar to the other participants – the participant went on further, defining 'acceptable' physical features of a true German. She conceded that nowadays it might be potentially acceptable for a person to have 'curly hair and a slightly darker skin tone', as long as they accepted German rules and German culture. Thereby she almost expressed a more enlightened than romantic version of nationalism. Nevertheless, she also claimed that 'Turks' have 'Turkish blood', even if they were members of the seventh generation of migrants living in Germany. This implies that second and third generation children of Turkish guest worker families would still not be German but Turkish, regardless of their citizenship. Such arguments fit our description of Schrödinger's Nazi.

The far-right sympathisers were obsessively interested in identity matters. Nevertheless, most of arguments sooner or later turned to migration. Other conservative participants – such as voters of the former ALFA party – refrained from introducing controversial ideas but still formulated anti-elite arguments, mostly regarding financial matters and the problems of the 'bureaucracy kraken' EU. Their arguments were calmly made, and appeared paradoxically as technocratic as the bodies and institutions they criticised. They often failed to establish a personal connection with the other participants, and it felt like they would be trapped in the middle between far-right and left. This isolation can be explained by the fact that many of the conservatives' shared stories were 'hijacked' by the far-right, leaving them without enough distinctive features to create a convincing boundary.

In addition to the participants who openly stated their political conviction (either on the right or the left), others did not take part in the political process beyond casting a vote every few years. They did express strong opinions and concerns, but usually lacked a deeper interest in political matters or a desire to inform themselves thoroughly, especially regarding potential solution to their problems. These participants did not regard migration as that important to them, yet they too considered the EU as at least partly responsible for their problems.

Their most drastic criticism was directed towards the opaqueness of the EU and its perceived communication problem. They were very vocal in saying the

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not with its own means such as legal compulsion and authoritative decree. Doing so, it would surrender its liberal character (Freiheitlichkeit) and fall back, in a secular manner, into the claim of totality it once led the way out of, back then in the confessional civil wars' [authors' translation from German] (Böckenförde, 1976, p. 60).

[17]'To conceive of such a state the liberal order needs a unifying ethos, a "sense of community" among those who live in this state. The question then becomes: what is creating this ethos, which can neither be enforced by the state nor compelled by a sovereign? One can say: first the common culture. But what are the elements and factors of that culture?' [authors' translation from German] (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2010).

EU should be obliged to tell them about everything it does, in understandable language. Furthermore, the participants demanded this information be somehow channelled directly to them, without them having to search or ask for it. These claims were made from the standpoint of 'sovereign people'. If these requests were not met, they concluded, then the EU must be some sort of dictatorship. This sort of invocation of the 'sovereign people' and the anti-establishment stance towards the EU bears a strong resemblance to the rhetoric used mostly by the far-right in Germany. Even if in an attenuated way, this rhetoric has made its way into the speech of regular citizens who lack political ambitions.

Confusion about what the EU is and does was immense at times. Despite a vast amount of available information, regular citizens felt uninformed. Their doubts emboldened strong emotions to the detriment of verifiable facts. Most public communication efforts from the EU fail to reach a broader audience, which is too busy with day-to-day problems to reflect on abstract and complex matters. Because of this gap, it has become easier to demonise the EU and its institutions. The 'us and them' mentality hardened to such an extent that these unintelligible others – technocrats and elites working for the EU – were soon portrayed as enemies. The populist rhetoric took grip of the discussion. Their arguments, topics and general sentiment started resembling those of the 'concerned citizen' conjured up by populists across Europe.

When asked how mechanisms criticised for their opaqueness (such as drafting legislation) worked in Germany rather than at the European level, a similar lack of knowledge based on the perceived non-availability of understandable information was revealed. However, these participants declared that they trusted the German state because it functioned properly. Also, if they had doubts then they would know whom to approach. This level of trust did not exist for the EU. This made it harder for these participants to identify with the EU. But they let their views be transformed during the six months of dialogue. The more arguments they were exposed to, the more they started to question their beliefs. One participant even retracted her original statement that the EU was a dictatorship. This raises the question of how her opinions would have changed if the circle had been dominated by anti-EU participants. Populist rhetoric makes it easier to find someone to blame for one's problems but does not offer effective solutions.

Conclusion

Populists from both ends of the political spectrum might have a case when they claim the 'elites' have lost touch with the 'common people'. Substantial swaths of voters flock to self-styled avengers of the dispossessed and their promises of national salvation. It is no deep observation that democracy is the only form of government that could vote itself out of existence. In this way, democracy is its own worst enemy. The people can indeed turn against itself, as it never was and never can be a singular organism, as purported by populism.

In this chapter, we scrutinised 'the people' on the demand side of what far-right populists offer but our findings raise more questions and puzzles than they solve. What our sample could not address is the psychological aspect of how the

rhetoric had been conceived in the minds of those who apply it. What makes a certain type of argument attractive? Gender issues could not be addressed properly because of our small sample. Further interdisciplinary research is required here.

What this chapter was able to show is that populist rhetoric is also being used by 'common people' who have no political ambitions. Far-right ideas seem to activate their doubts and embolden demarcation lines. Far-right adherents, in their extreme form, often fortify themselves in a hermetically sealed, self-made construct. Other perspectives, checkable facts, at times even any form objective reality itself, are denied by them. Firm believers in delusional theories about chem-trails and lizard aliens might be a fringe group, even among extremists, but the arguments used to defend a chosen point are similar. This is not a psychological problem of individual persons, as the phenomenon is observable on a mass level. The use of populist rhetoric by far-right supporters resulted in an entrenchment of positions. Political opinions we encountered were sometimes barely related to thought-out arguments and facts. They sounded like mantras, repeated with quasi-religious adherence. Their followers do not only identify with their own camp in extreme demarcation to any other, but sometimes go as far as negating any other points of view. For their (simultaneously traditional and ground-breaking) natural identity to flourish, they proclaim that other identities and ideas must be combated. This 'us and them' framework is, as claimed above, inherent to politics and social interaction in general. Yet populism functions like steroids for regular political dividing lines and turns them into impenetrable walls. In this way, far-right groups did indeed manage to 'build the wall'. This made the coping of common people exposed to far-right ideas more challenging, as normal rules and behavioural patterns of generic communication could not be applied. Rational arguments, more often than not, fell on deaf ears. How to argue with someone who 'knows' to possess the 'absolute truth'? Any counter-argument only reaffirms to them that detractors are brainwashed by fake news to follow the anti-democratic elites.

The political crisis of communities is, thus, related to identifications. Identity is being politicised and used as a powerful tool to mobilise 'the people'. The identity of participants opposing far-right attitudes seemed to be bolstered in a similar fashion, only widening the divide. When exposed to far-fetched claims, some verging towards racism, these participants found comfort in belonging to their bubble and embraced European identity even more passionately.

New forms of dialogue, information, education and media may help to address the increasingly pressing issue of the resurgence of the far-right. The dialogue circle project, which contained aspects of all these elements, had a limited impact on right-wing followers. It might have even reassured them of their position and given them the legitimacy of being acknowledged as persons, not only as carriers of an idea. On the other hand, our dialogue circles might have made a difference for the participants who were not particularly interested in politics, who did not have the time to think about abstract collective identities such as the European one. The circle offered this type of participant the possibility of being exposed to several different kinds of answers and possible solutions to their problems.

That might be the key for countering crisis-inducing populist narratives and divisions inside a community: people from the democratic spectrum of society need to become more engaged in minimising political disenchantment within their groups. Our communities are only as strong as our commitment to pluralism and democracy.

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Chapter 6

Identity and Security: The Affective Ontology of Populism

Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz

Abstract

Populism is one of the main symptoms of the contemporary crisis in Europe. How can the rise of populism best be understood? Whereas existing analyses predominantly utilise rationalist and behaviouralist approaches and focus on political, economic and cultural interests, this contribution proposes a different approach. The author focusses on affects and emotions. The author shows that where other parties or political movements opt for rational and dispassionate debates on merits of political programmes, populists instead offer, invoke and respond to strong emotions across multiple political settings. Emotions feed and propel populism in its bid for power by forming collective identities through the clustering of love for 'us' and hate for the 'other'.

Ontological Security Theory (OST) is used here as a framework for understanding populist behaviour in the sphere of security perception, identification and community-building. In recent debates, OST has been used because it allows the motives for certain behaviours to be located in the need to maintain or recreate positive identity constructed via biographical narratives. OST suggests that any lack of narrative continuity regarding the shape of the self-images for both individual and collective identities will therefore constitute a source of ontological threat; the lack of a sense of security. In this contribution, the author uses the examples of populist policies and discourses in Hungary and Poland that illustrate this dynamic to analyse the past- and future-oriented collective identifications underpinning the recent rise of populism in Europe.

Keywords: Political populism; identity; ontological security; emotions in politics; Poland; Hungary

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 93–110
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211011

Introduction

Populism is one of the main symptoms of the contemporary crisis in Europe. How can its rise best be understood? Whereas existing analyses predominantly utilise rationalist and behaviouralist approaches and focus on political, economic and cultural interests, this contribution proposes a different approach. I focus upon the existence of affects and emotions. I show that where other parties or political movements opt for rational and dispassionate debates on the merits of political programmes, populists instead offer, invoke and respond to strong emotions across multiple political settings. Emotions feed and propel populism in its bid for power by forming collective identities through the clustering of love for 'us' and hate for the 'other'.

Ontological Security Theory (OST) is used here as a framework for understanding populist behaviour in the sphere of security perception, identification and community-building. In recent debates, OST has been used because it allows the motives for certain behaviours to be located in the need to maintain or recreate positive identity constructed via biographical narratives. OST suggests that any lack of narrative continuity regarding the shape of the self-images for both individual and collective identities will constitute a source of ontological threat; the lack of a sense of security. In this contribution, I use examples of populist policies and discourses in Hungary and Poland that illustrate this dynamic to analyse differently orientated collective identifications underpinning the recent rise of populism in Europe.

Populism is the most commonly recognised symptom of a community in crisis (Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, Kioupkiolis, Nikisianis, & Siomos, 2018). Emotions have long featured in the study of populism, but their presence has mostly been implicit, either as a silent 'other' of rational policy-making or the convenient 'black box' for things that otherwise 'do not fit'. Our understanding of the dynamics between crises, populism and emotional policy-making is cursory at best. Contrary to the prevailing interpretations, this chapter will conceptualise populism not so much as a way to express popular will, but as an outlet for popular emotions. This offers an alternative to the behaviouralist approach, which understands populism as motivated by interests on the one hand, and the ideational approach that puts identity-related norms and values to the fore. The affective approach to populism understands it as a response to insecurity inherent to the individual-collective nexus of political emotions.

I approach populism not as a particular, coherent strand of political thought with an established body of doctrinal dogma, but as a phenomenon that is emotional first and foremost. It gives feeling precedence over thinking, based not on a coherent set of beliefs but rather on a specific cluster of politicised emotions that arise in time of existential crises. To put it differently, while it is impossible to distil populist political thought because of its 'chameleonic nature' (Taggart, 2000), populism can be distinguished from other political phenomena by its distinctive emotional patterns. Consequently, while not advocating the abandonment of reason for emotion, I argue that an analysis of emotions instead of political programmes is more illuminating when it comes to populism. In what follows, a conceptual clarification precedes an analysis of emotions in societies where

populism is rampant. I focus specifically on the emotional dynamics driving the orientation towards past political processes (in Poland) and present ones (in Hungary). This analysis sheds light on how the affect-driven dynamics of populism have an impact on the ontological dimension of the community in crisis.

The Affective Approach to Populism

Even the earliest accounts of populism nod towards its emotional side. For Shils (1956), populism appears when a feeling of political animosity appears towards a social order enforced by a well-established elite that has a monopoly on authority. Thus, in his view, populism is born out of feeling; feeling helpless and anxious in the face of a lack of a political alternative to the system. In this sense, populism is not so much about giving the voice to the will of people, it is more an outlet for popular emotions. Canovan (1981) notes the pivotal role of mood and also observes a tendency to frame the heightened emotions on a charismatic leader (Canovan, 1999, p. 6). Weberian understanding of charismatic leadership points towards a specific bond or emotional relationship between the leader and their followers (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 66). With the help of the media, particularly tabloid newspapers and social media, this stages politics as emotional drama, turning it into a dramatised theatrical production (Mastropaolo, 2008, p. 47) that relies on the affective relationship between the audience (society) and the performer (populist politician).

Demertzis (2006, p. 112) observes that nearly all interpretations of populism include the affective factor either in a disguised or implicit way. Indeed, the centrality of emotions and the role of particular feelings or moods in populism has been recognised and acknowledged in political sciences. Unfortunately, emotions are usually mentioned only perfunctorily and used as embellishments in analyses concentrating on political processes. General affective categories have been used descriptively, not analytically, while there has been a lack of proper interpretation of the collective identification founded on the feeling of belonging and emotions that supports populist movements. The commonly used 'shopping list' approach simply lists different emotions instead of explaining the dynamics between them or how they connect to the phenomenon in question. To quote Demertzis again: all we know is that

> there is not one but many, though interrelated, feelings in place that permit the existence of populism as a practice, a movement, a party and a regime [and](…) in the context of particular populisms, which flourish in particular national political cultures, then, one can easily find a wide range of feelings, which include nostalgia, angst, helplessness, hatred, vindictiveness, ecstasy, melancholy, anger, fear, indignation, envy, spite and resentment. (2006, p. 112)

The emotional nature of populism is evident when one considers how populists from different backgrounds all latch onto symbolic issues such as identity, culture or religion. Because of its malleability, populism thrives on what Inglehart

(1990, pp. 275–279) called a shift from class-based to issue-based politics. In the same vein, Betz (1994, p. 107) observed that modern voters increasingly tend to privilege issue- and value-oriented forms of participation over ideology-oriented ones. Accordingly, the current wave of populism in Europe is enhanced by the celebritised (Bartoszewicz, 2019b) 'post-political' nature of present-day liberal democracy, marked by cultural rather than political or ideological opposition (Oudenampsen, 2011, p. 120) and which involves the 'passions and affects' (Oudenampsen, 2011, p. 122). Hence, norm- and value-related issues are taken on board by populist parties and movements because they are more emotional and, therefore, more compatible with the nature of populism. The emotional lining of populism renders it more than just a discourse and the affective element empowers emotion as a mechanism of political significance.

Decker (2005, p. 16) also points out that significant ideological differences between political parties have faded, and identification with a particular party has lost its doctrinal foundations.[1] The nature of party rivalry has changed because voters are more likely to switch sides, influenced by various factors. Populists have responded by depoliticising their electorate, pursuing a strategy of personalisation and symbolic actions, making the people and their feelings the central point of reference in their rhetoric (Decker, 2005, pp. 16–17). In lieu of structural changes in the political sphere, feelings are given a prominent place in the 'post-truth' era: it is not statistical data or substantiated facts that matter and influence the political choices of the masses, but social sentiment driven by and aggravated in social media through more or less verified information. This all points to the fact that emotions are another way of explaining political actions, an alternative to interests, norms, opportunities or institutions (Clarke, Hoggett, & Thompson, 2006, p. 11).

Feeling Identity

Populism is often portrayed as a vehicle for resentment, steered by negativism and a lack of ideas (Pels, 2011, p. 33) and propelled by fear. It makes analyses complicated since emotions such as fear are not simple reflections of cultural meaning, but a synthesis of meanings evoked in a situation or event (Van Rythoven, 2015, p. 467) and thus will be expressed differently, depending on the contextual setting. Fear may begin with sensory perception, but sometimes invoked memories or symbolic narrative is enough to start perceiving something as a threat. As Crawford (2014, pp. 539–540) reminds us, once fear is aroused, there is no simple way to disentangle thinking from fear and fear from thinking, to the extent that the ability to distinguish threats from non-threats is diminished and it becomes difficult to turn off the fear response. This is precisely why by offering a narrative of danger and urgency, populism primes people for threat perception, rendering the audience hyper-vigilant and over-reactive.

While the capacity to tap into collective fears and cultivate them remains at the core of populism, it also strengthens the connection between collective emotions

[1]On the erosion of party democracy, see Mair (2002).

and group identities, understood as cognitive boundaries between insiders and outsiders. Such boundaries have no bite without positive emotions towards fellow insiders; equally important are shared negative emotions about outsiders and the state of the world (Jasper, 2006, p. 26). Identity is inherently connected not with material benefits but with emotions. Populism aptly illustrates how group-level emotion is powerful, pervasive and irreducible to an individual, while at the same time different from a collection of individuals experiencing the same emotions.[2] Note that to be salient and more powerful than the individual experience, group emotion does not have to be homogenous. Populism renders identity-related emotions as objectively true and externally driven rather than as subjective and individually constructed (Mercer, 2014, pp. 515, 518, 526). Particularly during crises, populism is associated with emotions that can be stronger than and different from individual emotion, especially in a situation when group members share, validate and police each other's feelings.

In crises, populism epitomises collective identity as the drawing of a cognitive boundary dominated by an in-group versus out-group dynamic (for details, see Tajfel, 1970), whereby the strength of an identity, even a cognitively vague one, comes from its emotional side (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2009, pp. 8–9). Mercer (2014, p. 522) argues that identification without emotion is useless since one who does not care would not act. While indifference renders identity meaningless and powerless, emotions makes it relevant and robust. Most notably, he observes that

> the weaker one's identification with a group, the more receptive one is to negative information about the group (…) the more one identifies with a group, the less receptive one is to negative information. (Mercer, 2014, p. 529)

Pasquino (2008) claims that the individuals most likely to be attracted by populism and open to 'populist experience' are those who suffer from socio-political isolation and alienation, and 'are in serious need of emotional attachments, of both the vertical and horizontal type' (p. 23). This cognitive opening is a characteristic feature for times of exigency that strengthens affects that are typically tied to elaborate cognitions and can underlie political solidarities. The 'people' constitute more than a community; they become a space of safety. This is why the populist worldview ascribes only positive characteristics to the in-group, invoking feelings of pride, trust and security, while only negative features are imbued with the out-group (be it the financial elite or ethnic minorities), arousing distrust, disdain, fear and hatred.

One significant consequence of the affect-driven dynamics of populism is its impact on the ontological dimension of communities in crisis. In recent debates related to the narrative turn in political sciences (Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2005; Guzzini, 2013; Huysmans, 1998), OST has been invoked frequently to explain how the motives for certain behaviours can be found in the need to maintain

[2]See Giannousi, this volume.

or recreate positive identity anchored in a consistent, auto-reflexive narrative about the self and the community we identify with (Delehanty & Steele, 2009; Mitzen, 2006, 2016; Rumelili, 2014, 2015; Steele, 2005, 2008). The lack of continuity regarding the form of narrative and the shape of the self-image (both for individual and collective identity) will, therefore, constitute the primary source of the ontological threat.

Giddens (1991, p. 243) defined ontological security as a 'sense of continuity and order in events'. Insecurity in this sense means not the traditional realist definition, in which survival is at stake. Ontological security is instead shaped by normative threats rather than physical dangers (Creppell, 2001). To be ontologically secure, explains Giddens (1991, p. 47), is to have 'answers to fundamental existential questions'. Thus, a group uncomfortable with or unsure of who it is lacks security in its ontological dimension. In the same vein, Steele (2008, p. 52) asserts that ontological security comes about when agents' actions reflect their sense of self-identity constructed via biographical narrative. This collective biographical continuity in the form of narratives and images of the self (and the other) is sought to be institutionalised, and the dominant discursive frames inform routinised relationships with significant others.

Amid a plethora of definitions of identity, we can agree that it is inherently 'relational' and so demarcations between domestic and international, similarity and difference, or the self and the other, are what demarcates its boundary (Campbell, 1998; Connolly, 1985; Neumann, 1992). Identity construction, as Steele reminds us (2008, p. 30), becomes a political project when states distinguish the 'we' as a basis for action. These notions point to the inherent linkage of collective identity constructions via subjective security perceptions by defining the self (and the other) in a narrative that links past, present and future. In other words, categories of political belonging and directions of political actions are both parts of the fundamental self-other ontology and remain 'a subject of considerable political controversy and great consequences for security' (Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 18–19).

Securitisation of Feelings

The above framework allows us to anchor the populist search for affective ontology, and its ability to concentrate on identity-related discourse then adjust actions to confront recognised threats to self-identity. Drawing insights from this, in what follows I will discuss how populism works by responding to, constructing and maintaining emotion-invoking narratives that create an ontological security-insecurity dyad regarding both past and present events.

Security can be understood as a phenomenon not solely evident from a material distribution of power, but socially constructed through language (speech acts) within certain social structures (positions of authority), whereby those in power convince their audience that there is something to be feared (a threat that must be affectively recognised and internalised). This 'securitisation'[3] approach,

[3]This analysis is based on the following works discussing the concept and ramifications

which has become important in security theory, places heavy emphasis on society as the focal point of European security concerns. One of the fundamental assumptions is that the state and the society 'of the same people' are two different things (Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, Tromer, & Wæver, 1990, p. 119) with the latter able to reproduce itself independently of the state and even in opposition to it. More importantly with respect to the argument presented here, a lack of societal security also enhances the discrepancy between the state and the society or, more precisely, between the society and the political elites. This is understandable when one considers that the elites and the general public pursue a different logic, with the elites more closely linked to the state and the public to the society (Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup, & Lemaitre, 1993, p. 82). This is where populism comes to the fore with its fixation on the rule by the people. The division between 'the people' and 'the elite' is a common feature of populism (Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn, 2013).

Van Rythoven's above-mentioned analysis (2015) elucidates the adequacy of securitisation theory by reflecting how social reality is contingent on how ordinary people think and talk about security. I would like to add four caveats to his otherwise excellent line of thinking, which capture the gist of the affective ontology typical for communities in crisis.

Firstly, the recent wave of populism in Europe constitutes a reversed (bottom-up) securitisation whereby society securitises[4] specific issues (e.g. immigration, Islamisation, increase in foreigners or *Überfremdung*, European integration etc.) in opposition to those in power (politicians) and so the powerless, not the powerful, become the agents of securitisation. Communities are the driving force here. Secondly, since this angle incorporates emotional dimensions of political identity (Ross, 2006, p. 198), bottom-up securitisation depends not only on how people 'think and talk' about security but also how they feel about security or its absence. A threat is ineffective unless the accompanying feeling is also internalised, especially if this is something immaterial, like an imagined community that is endangered (Anderson, 2006). Thirdly, while the relationship between emotions and securitisation is latent as the threat construction is an emotional phenomenon, populism does not limit its repertoire to fear only; it offers a vast assortment of emotional stimulants such as pride or love.

Finally, while Van Rythoven in common with current securitisation approaches tends to concentrate on agents who strive to cultivate or kindle and mobilise

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of traditional approach to societal security (see Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Buzan et al., 1990; Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Wæver et al., 1993). By doing so, this chapter does not follow critical studies on societal security (see: Bigo, 2002; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008; Huysmans, 2000). As the chapter focuses on European affairs and political science, works beyond this scope (e.g. Salter, 2008; Aradau, 2016; or Williams, 2007) are not taken into consideration.

[4]By politicisation of the issue I mean introduction of the problem onto the state's political agenda as one of many issues that can be coped within the standard political settings, whereas securitisation renders it the most important issue; a threat that requires extraordinary measures and engagement.

(Crawford, 2014, p. 536) specific types of emotions among audiences through recognisable memories, identities, images, metaphors and other tropes (Van Rythoven, 2015, p. 466), they always put audiences in the background, considering them predominantly passive agents. Scholars seem oblivious to the securitising influence of the *populus* that infuses populism with internal fear-induced dynamics. In my approach, however, the audience (society) is considered an active agent, initiating securitisation dynamics that populism responds to, feeds off and only then reinforces (cultivates) the emotional state of societal hype so that the securitised becomes the new normal, the new mainstream. Van Rythoven (2015, p. 462) concedes that audiences (that is to say: communities) are not entirely passive as they observe and appraise. Nonetheless, he does not include the possibility of affective and ontological securitisation by the audience even though he notes that 'it leads to viewing audiences as passive vessels waiting for emotions being authoritatively spoken to them' (Van Rythoven, 2015, p. 463). From my perspective, it is impossible to assume such passivity as emotion always requires information-processing, even if such a process is limited to the most primitive form (Ekman & Davidson, 1994, p. 232). Clore (1994, p. 181) points out that

> emotions are mental states, so that cognitive involvement is substantial, by definition (…) It does not mean that emotional persons know why they are emotional or that they can not be surprised by their emotions. It only requires that emotion be seen as part of a larger information-processing system.

To assume that a community is merely passively accepting the interpretations of emotion-induced impulses imposed upon it by populist politicians would be tantamount to assuming that community may only be the recipient of the message, not its sender, or that the community is not able to process it. Emotions are the means of communication and therefore, depending on the direction of this communication (receptive or expressive) can be generated on command or spontaneously, and seen as receptive or expressive (Suchy, 2011, p. 117).

In line with this understanding, the final section of this contribution offers an overview of two case studies, showing how the affective ontology of communities in crisis manifests itself via populist discourses and policies in Poland and Hungary. Each was selected to show a different facet of affective populism: the former driven by a past-oriented pride-shame cluster, the latter guided by future-oriented, fear-induced love–hate relationship between the us and the other.

Poland: Memory as a Security Policy

Before the parliamentary elections in 2015, the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość; PiS)[5] promised that its coming to power would mean a new

[5]Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Polish political party founded in 2001 by Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, is a combination of social and national conservatism with the ideas of

'systemic history politics in Poland', thus rectifying an erroneous narrative regarding Polish identity. This sentiment resonated with a pre-existing historical awakening among Poles who through civic initiatives and grassroots movements brought to prominence the so-called Cursed Soldiers[6] phenomenon. This fascination with the anti-Communist Polish resistance movement had already resulted in the Day of Cursed Soldiers being established as a national holiday on March 1, by PiS's predecessors in power. Once the party won, thanks to a campaign directed against the 'lying elites' (*łże-elity*) of the previous political establishment, its promises were delivered both in the domestic and international context. The prominence of history politics on the Polish political agenda is at present palpable in the discursive dimension, with new narrative frames of the overarching 'we are the victims, we are the heroes' theme and also attempts to tell the Polish version of history on the international arena. It is also apparent when it comes to legislation, structural arrangements (establishment of several new institutions, such as museums, research centres, national institutes, etc.), allocated resources (294 million PLN [$75m] for special military operations compared with three times more, 680 million PLN, for various historical projects in the 2018 budget and the trend continuing into 2019), and policy decisions (particularly against Ukraine, Germany and Israel).

In stark contrast to its predecessors, PiS focussed on contentious issues that were in its opinion insufficiently exposed and either silenced, suppressed and marginalised or simply ignored. Indeed, the party leadership frequently claimed that Polish history had been neglected over the past 25 years. The new identity-related discourse of the Polish government can be conceptualised as ontological security-seeking behaviour in two respects. Firstly, it aims to address the 'rupture' in the Polish historical narrative. This lack of continuity has been identified in a seminal work by Ryszard Legutko (professor of philosophy, PiS politician, current Member of the European Parliament) called Essay 'On The Polish Soul' (2008). In the opening paragraph, he writes:

> Poland, which I have known and lived in since birth, is a Poland of *broken continuity*. It was created from scratch, built consciously in opposition to everything it had been for centuries. Its modernity

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solidarity, interventionism, Christian democracy and partly also socialism. The party is frequently referred to as populist and Eurosceptic (even though it supports Poland's membership of the EU and supports the extension of its structures but believes that the EU should be reformed). PiS is currently the largest political party in the Polish Parliament, presenting a mind-boggling mixture of features traditionally associated with both the left and right of the political spectrum.

[6]This term applies to anti-Soviet or anti-Communist resistance movements formed in the later stages of the Second World War and its aftermath by members of the Polish Underground State. These clandestine organisations continued their armed struggle against the Stalinist government of Poland well into the 1950s. The Cursed Soldiers were a taboo subject and resurfaced only recently in public discourse.

> did not emerge gradually in the process of complex multi-dimensional historical changes that would transform social structures, customs, institutions, and human minds. The very essence of modern Poland is new as if it was created from a new embryo, unknown to previous generations and in previous centuries.[7]

For Legutko, the point of rupture is the outbreak of the Second World War, while the lack of continuity was further perpetuated during the half-century of enforced Communist rule. Not only did it affect national self-identity, but also the consciously rejected past annihilated collective memories necessary for ontological security maintenance:

> For seventy years, Poles have been almost exclusively an object, and only to a negligible extent, a subject of history. For seventy years, they have been referring not to what they are but what they are to become, accepting without reflection that achieving this future goal cannot succeed without shedding the burden of the past. (Legutko, 2008, p. 8)

The reservoir of collective memories critically depleted in this process did not constitute the new identity foundation, but rather served as a reminder of what not to become. Lack of continuity was further exacerbated by a lack of internal cohesion. Another PiS politician and MEP, Zbigniew Krasnodębski, argued:

> In Poland, we observe a clash of two models of memory. In a sense, we live in a state of an unfinished civil war (…) We are divided into those whose parents or grandparents were connected with the Second Republic, and those whose [parents and grandparents] fought against it. (Kosiewski, 2008, p. 20)

Hence, the second ontological security aspect embedded in current Polish history politics: it attempts to address the perceived lack of equilibrium between the 'shame' and the 'pride' affective components in the historical narrative. In particular it aims to counter the so-called 'pedagogy of shame', a term used in journalism and public debate to describe a particular way of speaking about Polish history that supposedly exaggerates negative national characteristics, shows Poles as criminals and highlights dark moments of the country's history. By contrast, the 'pedagogy of pride' is manifested by the approval of cultural, religious and national identity, as well as an affirmation of patriotism. That these two terms have appeared in Polish discourse is in itself very interesting, since 'lack of continuity', 'pride' and 'shame' are ontological security markers with a clear emotional resonance.

[7]Author's translation of the Polish edition, emphasis added.

The new history politics in Poland rests on three main pillars: (1) more relevant historical content in educational system and the public space; (2) this content can be made possible thanks to a new institutional framework devoted to developing and maintaining historical frames; and (3) enable Poland to popularise the Polish version of history in the international arena. Jarosław Sellin, a PiS politician and a member of the cabinet, told the audience that the Germans managed to convince the world that the Second World War was caused by 'some Nazis of unspecified nationality', and that the Russians 'only recall the defeat of Hitler's Germany' while keeping silent about their atrocities from 1939-41. At the same time, he argued, the Polish account of what happened has been marginalised. In the same vein the minister of culture and national heritage, Piotr Gliński, said 'we must tell the story of Poland to the world because it is not known' (Krajewski, 2018), while Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki declared that

> the commitment of our government is unconditional and absolute when it comes to commemorating the victims, defending the truth, and ensuring that those responsible for these crimes are never made into a victim and that a victim is at least honoured and remembered, which is our duty. (PAP, 2018)

In this case, an overlap between two different narrative orders, the nationalist and the populist (identified by De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017) is clear. Whereas normally the former frames the people as a nation, and the latter as an underdog, the affective approach provides a link that integrates both through emotive frame that presents an image of Poles as an underdog nation (Bartoszewicz, 2019a).

The affective populism approach within the OST framework enables the understanding of why maintaining an exaggerated narrative about the universal heroic attitude of Poles during the war, and legitimising it legally and institutionally, is a successful policy. It explains certain behaviours in the need to maintain or recreate positive identity anchored in a consistent, auto-reflexive narrative about the self and in the sphere of securitised emotions. Consequently, the lack of narrative continuity and a self-disparaging historical narrative, as well as categories of belonging, constitute the primary source of threats. Hence the importance of history politics aimed at the construction of a binding historical memory, by organising history in particular narrative constructs (frames) that help to develop and/or maintain a salient group self-identity and the prevalence of group identities understood as cognitive boundaries between insiders and outsiders. While affective ontology is not without its limitations or certain blind spots, it can help establish patterns in state behaviours that otherwise would appear erratic and even counter-effective when it comes to securing *raison d'État*.

Hungary: Emotional Underpinnings of Migration Policies

Hungary is a relatively homogenous state without a history of organised immigration. Until 1989, it remained isolated behind the Iron Curtain along with the rest of the Soviet bloc. Since the beginning of 2015, however, it has been targeted

as a transit state and thus hugely affected by the European migration crisis. Although Germany had the most asylum applications in 2015, according to EU statistics Hungary 'received a record number of first-time asylum applications in 2015 (14% of the EU total)' and the highest proportion of asylum applicants relative to its population (1,799 per 100,000 residents) (Samek Lodovici et al., 2017, p. 18). In contrast to the welcoming policy based on the concept of responsibility-sharing among EU Member States, Hungary has a restrictive ideology based on protectionism, strict border control and tough admittance restrictions (Higgins, 2015). These are rooted in fear-induced narratives that are typical of affective populism concerned with the protection of identity.

At the beginning of the migration crisis, Hungary became one of the most affected EU Member States as a result of its geographical situation. According to the migratory routes mapped by EU border agency FRONTEX, Hungary is a part of the Western Balkan route, which became a popular passage into the Schengen area. In 2015 alone, the number of illegal border crossings on this route was 764,038 (FRONTEX, 2018). To restrict this flow, a number of actions were instigated by the Hungarian government.[8] Asylum legislation was amended and border controls strengthened. While these had already been tightened in July 2013, new restrictions were introduced in June 2015 when the Hungarian government ordered the construction of a barrier 175 kilometres long and 4 metres high along the border with Serbia (Order of Ministry of the Interior 60/2015, n.d.). By the end of August, the construction of the border barrier had been completed. Nevertheless, the migration crisis in Hungary peaked in September 2015 when migrants broke out of a registration camp at Röszke and clashed with the police forces and special anti-terrorist units (BBC, 2015). In response, Hungary closed its border with Serbia and declared a 'state of emergency caused by migration' in two southern counties. Simultaneously, another amendment entered into force, which made it a crime to cross the border illegally or damage the fence along Hungary's border with Serbia (Bíróság, 2015). Work also began on a similar fence along the Hungarian border with Croatia and the government closed Croatian crossings (Ministry of the Interior, 2015).

In 2016 fewer legal actions were undertaken, but their impact was significant. An important decision was issued in February to strengthen the border barrier and declare a state of emergency across the country (Sullivan, 2016). The state of emergency was meant to be in force until September 2018 (Government Decree No. 21/2018) but has been in effect ever since even though the number of migrants has fallen. Furthermore, during 2016, the Hungarian parliament accepted several bills that accelerated the asylum application process at the border (Hungarian National Assembly, 2016). The most significant change, however, concerned the constitution; new regulations designed to handle the threat of a terrorist attack were accepted, granting the government the right to seek temporary extra powers

[8]Since 2010, the ruling party FIDESZ has had a parliamentary supermajority, which means that it can even change the constitution the support of any other party. Simply put, in Hungary, party policy becomes national policy.

(BBC, 2016) 'to combat a possible terrorist attack, including greater public surveillance and wider use of the army' (Dunai, 2016).

These legislative measures were exacerbated by the negative discursive frames concerning migration in the political and popular debates in Hungary that clearly rode the emotional wave. The first negative narratives appeared in February 2015 during parliamentary discussion, when economic migrants were likened to parasites (Dull, 2015). This metaphor was also used in the following months when the government launched a billboard campaign supporting national consultation with slogans such as: 'If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture and law!' (Német, 2015). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán characterised European migration policy as 'Germany's problem' (Colmáin, 2016), while government statements presented it as something unacceptable and violating national sovereignty. Mass migration was seen as a threat to Hungarian identity, and a danger for Christian Europe. Aside from threats to societal and cultural securities, migrants were also portrayed as potential terrorists. It was also implied that the crisis was far from being spontaneous and had in fact been orchestrated by global forces, most notably the philanthropist George Soros. Prime Minister Orbán had displayed strong anti-refugee and Eurosceptic attitudes and objected to the relocation plan from the very beginning. From summer 2015 onwards, asylum seekers and refugees became an everyday topic in news media, particularly in the state-owned media (public service TV channel M1), which framed it mainly as a security threat, suggesting the need to maintain the state of emergency. CNN (2018) reported that an official campaign described the German-led EU quota system as a 'coerced settlement' that would 'increase the terror threat' and cited the examples of the Paris, Brussels and Nice attacks. In Hungary, the main threats were security (terrorism), cultural (identity) and societal (social cohesion, crime, economic strain). Orbán has repeatedly said that his main goal is to 'preserve Christian Hungary', while Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said he refused to accept multiculturalism 'as a value by itself' and:

> Hungary has been a Christian country for a millennium and I don't really understand why is it a bad news that we don't want to change that and I don't understand why it is bad or why is it unacceptable that we would like to stick to our history, to our culture or heritage, to our religion. (CNN, 2018)

The anti-migration, anti-EU, anti-quota and anti-Soros arguments are still present in public media, FIDESZ's communications and government statements. Only politically independent and left-wing media provide a different account, but they are in a clear minority.

Recognition of the potency of affective populism explains the emotional foundation that allows Hungary to diverge from EU migration policies even at the cost of international ostracism and widespread criticism. While the Polish case was dominated by the pride-shame dyad, the Hungarian example exploited the love-fear cluster. Migrants aroused fear as a security threat, perpetuated by the state of

emergency.[9] This fear was augmented by anger directed against the German-led EU quota system. Arguments concerning the ineffectiveness of EU politicians and agencies (FRONTEX in particular) were also invoked. The fear directed at the enemies without (migrants) and the enemies within (pro-migration EU elements) was clearly juxtaposed with love for everything that should be protected against the danger, and the need for this protection was defined by the bonds of belonging and trust which, in turn, invoked a feeling of solidarity. The emotional lining transformed this reaction from a xenophobic, nationalist resentment – as seen by an overwhelming majority of analyses – into a form of altruist chivalry driven by righteous indignation. In line with this understanding, Hungary's attempt to secure its borders was presented as evidence of European solidarity since the border barrier was built to protect Europe from a further influx of migrants. Application of the affective populism frame explains that political elites believe Hungarians to be an endangered community, threatened with an identity crisis engendered by mass migration. The legal, political and narrative means are aimed at tackling an existential threat. Simultaneously, by responding to and then augmenting these popular feelings via policy narratives and instruments, Hungarian political elites strengthened their positions within their own country by using fear and anti-EU sentiments as legitimising tools resonating with and amplifying the emotions present in the public sphere.

Conclusion

This contribution has shown that Poland and Hungary, while being far from exceptional in the context of a broader European landscape, are distinct yet both emblematic cases of how communities in crisis are a focal point and a main agent of the securitisation processes manifested via affective ontology.

Securitised memories and identities are not going to vanish, and recent events suggest they are gaining ever-increasing importance. Politics of remembrance and collective identity arguments in political debates are becoming more prominent both in internal and international affairs. Similar controversies concern the tensions between reconstruction and maintenance of identity. The affective ontology of communities in crisis provides a consistent interpretation of this phenomenon.

Emotions most often associated with populism are resentment and anger (at the elite establishment), hatred (frequently resulting in aggression) and fear (of the other). It should be noted that, of all the political doctrines, populism is most often accused of various phobias (xenophobia, homophobia) that resonate with feelings of uncertainty and existential insecurity (Kinnvall, 2004). Simultaneously, populists thrive on 'nativist' love the communities have for their own 'heartland' (Taggart, 2000, p. 95) and collective pride akin to cultural narcissism. These dichotomous dyads of opposing feelings (such as love-hate, pride-disdain, fear-feeling secure) that depend on each other seem to be a distinctive feature of populism, helping it to reiterate these narratives and translate them into concrete

[9]See Fotou, this volume.

political actions. Recognition of the centrality of emotions in populist politics, both past- and future-oriented, provides new answers as to its pervasiveness in politics and helps to find appropriate responses to it. Understanding the emotional dynamics inherent to communities in existential crisis becomes all the more important if one considers that what used to be a temporary occurrence has now become a permanent element of the political landscape in what some call 'a winter of democracy' (Hermet, 2010, p. 40).

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Chapter 7

Identity and Emotion: Resented and Resentful in Crisis-Ridden Greece

Fani Giannousi

Abstract

Since 2008, Greece has been spiralling down an economic and socio-political crisis. Over the past decade, it has endured massive riots, consecutive elections, a debilitating public debt, and endless rescue plans by the EU and other international bodies. The crisis sparked an intense interest in the Greek public discourse, which is often accused of being dominated by populist rhetoric. This interest appears to be accompanied predominantly by a certain leitmotif: instead of appreciating the assistance offered, the Greek people resent it and taking refuge in populist rhetoric, further undermining the country's stability. This echoes the age-old argument that 'the people are an irrational mob acting impulsively, a lamentable state that should be cured or disciplined.' Could the shaming, the appeal to sober morality – branding all other discourses as populist and dangerous – be the fashionable response of a cosmopolitan elite, high-profile pundits and institutions to the problems of global capitalism? The debate raged in the public sphere and in the streets of Athens. On multiple occasions, the crisis was used as a trope in the European public sphere to justify socio-political changes, austerity measures and disciplinary actions. The emerging schema juxtaposed populist/anti-populist discourses, reducing discourses and identities to black and white. This chapter reads discursive constructions of the Greek crisis, by-stepping the populist/anti-populist divide. Using analysis based on affect theory and the philosophy of emotions, it investigates the various uses of resentment as part of affective engineering and as an instrument of collective identification, in an environment of multiple overlapping crises in Europe.

Keywords: Resentment; Greek crisis; political emotions; collective identities; affective discourses; political discourses

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 111–125
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211013

Introduction

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, Greece has been enduring economic and socio-political turbulence. Massive riots, consecutive elections, a debilitating public debt, crumbling social structures and endless rescue plans devised by the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have come to be known as 'the Greek Crisis' over the past decade. During this period, several kinds of discourses, both domestic and foreign, have emerged seeking to explain the country's ailments to an already dazed and confused society and to offer a possible cure. These discourses, emanating from a variety of sources – from academic accounts to political debates, EU official communiques as well as off-the-record comments and media coverage – both responded to and contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of crisis.

A leitmotif appears in these discourses: instead of appreciating the assistance offered by the EU and IMF, assuming responsibility for the nation's economic failure and responding rationally to the demands of the consecutive rescue plans, the Greek people have been resentful and taken refuge in populist rhetoric, further undermining the country's stability. The fractured voices in the streets were represented both in media and political discourse as a unified populist onslaught on reason, democracy and the country's European identity.

Many have suggested that the anti-populist discourse was the fashionable response of both a local and a cosmopolitan elite, of institutions and high-profile pundits, to the problems of global capitalism (Chouliaraki, 2013; Doudaki, 2015; Kirtsoglou & Theodossopoulos, 2010; Michailidou, 2016; Ntampoudi, 2014; Zafiropoulou, Theodosiou, & Papakonstantinou, 2015). The hegemonic discourse around the crisis has been further challenged by critical scholarship from cultural studies and political economy perspectives, denoting its neoliberal, neocolonial/orientalist and racist bias and its spectacular and propagandist character (Mylonas, 2017). Predominantly catering to the values and needs of a middle-class that represents the social norm, media coverage of the crisis has leant heavily on anti-populist argument and been accused of moralising the crisis in order to deflect blame onto the Greek working-class, the poor (who are targeted by the austerity regimes) and those on the periphery. Discourses from the political left claimed instead that the crisis was a radical national uprising in which the nation found its voice and expressed its true will.

In order to better understand how discursive constructions of crisis are built and how they work, insights from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) are required. This approach can offer a framework and a means of exploring the links between discourse and broad social and political structures (Fairclough, 2003). CDA is a relational type of research that tackles issues of power and hegemony highlighting the dialectical character of these relations. As Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) note:

> discourse or discourses […] refer to systems of meaningful practices that form the identities of subjects and objects. At this lower level of abstraction, discourses are concrete systems of social

> relations and practices that are intrinsically political, as their formation is an act of radical institution, which involves the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. In addition, therefore, they always involve the exercise of power, as their constitution involves the exclusion of certain possibilities and a consequent structuring of the relations between different social agent. (p. 5)

CDA not only critiques positivist, behaviouralist and essentialist paradigms, but also strives to put forward plausible and empirically justifiable explanations of social and political phenomena. This approach is directed at the analysis of key political issues in our contemporary world, offering valuable insight into current complex political problems and social processes. It endorses the study of emotions as part of political and discourse analysis without subscribing to overhasty dismissals of science and rationality.

The discourses on the Greek crisis have sparked conflicting feelings of resentment in various actors and audiences. The role of emotions in constructing ideologies and identities has been hotly debated throughout the centuries by various disciplines: philosophy, psychology, social sciences, theology and legal theory. The insight we can take from them is that when we only use rational tools to analyse human behaviour – which is influenced as much by emotions as by rational choices, purposes or structural conditions and contingent effects – we miss the mark.

This contribution attempts to read discursive constructions of the Greek crisis by stepping away from the populist/anti-populist divide and using instead an analysis based on both CDA and affect theory. It will interrogate particularly the role of resentment in understanding past as well as on-going instances of what has been labelled populist discourse, and the construction of collective identities in Greece and Europe.

Creating Affective Atmospheres in Political Discourse

The Cambridge Dictionary of Psychology defines an emotion as

> a transient, neurophysiological response to a stimulus that excites a coordinated system of bodily and mental responses that inform us about our relationship to the stimulus and prepare us to deal with it in some way. (Matsumoto, 2009, p. 179)

In social sciences, discussion of emotion's role in large social units and processes has typically focussed on pathological manifestations that have destructive consequences. Resentment, vengefulness, shame and fear have typically been treated in terms of their pathological forms. From Adam Smith's (1982) description of resentment as harsh, jarring, and convulsive, something that tears and distracts the breast, and destructive of that composure and tranquillity of mind, to Margaret Walker who writes on resentment agrees it is a kind of anger (Walker,

2006, p. 110) there is an extensive literature in this vein. A glaring example of such treatment is the fin de siècle crowd theory which contends that excessive and pathological emotions have disastrous consequences for society.

Emotions are conceptualised as disruptive of normal social functioning, a manifestation of strain. Therefore, social control includes the direct containment of affectivity. The conventional approach holds that emotion is the opposite of reason. Ahmed (2004a) writes that

> 'emotion' has been viewed as 'beneath' the faculties of thought and reason. To be emotional is to have one's judgement affected: it is to be reactive rather than active, dependent rather than autonomous. (p. 3)

It is still widely believed that emotion undermines reason, and this often leads to the conclusion that it should therefore be discounted and suppressed from the public sphere and restrained in the private one. From Plato's *Phaedrus* to Descartes, and from Kant to the Logical Positivists, the history of Western philosophy is filled with a tradition that places reason at the centre of being human and, consequently, distrusts emotion. These ideas are not simply part of a long philosophical tradition but remain embedded in the way we understand reason and emotion today. The idea that social agents may control or manage their emotions is core to the view that emotions are cultural artefacts relative to particular societies, significantly subjective, and phenomenologically grounded. It might also account for the accusations voiced against Greek populist discourse: that it is guilty of affective manipulation and pandering to the baser – emotional – nature of people, drawing an infantilised picture of the Greek people.

In past decades, emotions were also exiled from mainstream political science, as the field relied on theories that privilege rational choice and Kantian self-regulation. This perspective has suited the sovereign political narratives that follow the *homo economicus* model and emphasise the importance of cool, objective reasoning.

However, recent scholarship has addressed this neglect. Affective theory and social constructivism focus on the ontological nature of emotions, emphasising the emotional underpinnings of norms and identities (Ross, 2006). In particular, scholars now argue that emotions are not the property of individual bodies but are irreducibly social (Barbalet, 1992; Bially Mattern, 2011).

In her seminal work The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Ahmed (2004a) argues that emotions play a crucial role in the 'surfacing' of individual and collective bodies through the way in which emotions circulate between bodies and signs. Emotions are not simply 'within' or 'without' but create the very effect of the surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds. Emotions create narratives; an emotion works to animate the ordinary subject, to bring that fantasy to life. Within the narrative, the specific emotion cannot be found in one figure but works to create the very outline of different figures or objects of the emotion, a creation that crucially aligns the figures together and constitutes them as a 'common' threat. Importantly, then, the emotion does not reside in a given subject or object.

Emotions are economic; they circulate between signifiers in relationships of difference and displacement. In such affective economies, emotions *do things*, and they align individuals with communities – or bodily space with social space – through the very intensity of their attachments. In any 'affective economy', the power of emotions accumulates through circulation of texts.

Her account of an emotion (e.g. hate) as an affective economy shows that emotions do not positively inhabit anybody or anything, meaning that 'the subject' (e.g. in our case the Greek people) is simply one nodal point in the economy, rather than its origin and destination. This is important as it suggests that the sideways and backward movement of emotions is not contained within the contours of a subject. Ahmed's argument is not that there is a psychic economy that then becomes social and collective: rather, the individual subject comes into being through its very alignment with the collective. *It is the very failure of affect to be located in a subject or object that allows it to generate the surfaces of collective bodies*. Emotions are not 'in' either the individual or the social but produce the very surfaces and boundaries that allow individual and collective identities to be delineated as if they are objects. Emotions are not simply something 'we' or 'I' have. Rather, it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made; the 'I' and the 'we' are shaped by and even take the shape of contact with others (Ahmed, 2004a).

Emotions work in concrete and particular ways to mediate the relationship between the psychic and the social, and between the individual and the collective (Ahmed, 2004b). In this way, affective atmospheres are discursively created. CDA adopts a perspective that stresses an understanding of the political that is not only enmeshed with power and conflict, but also incorporates 'passions' or emotions (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000).

Discourses use narratives in order to be constitutive. These narratives work as a tool to create meaning around our everyday existence, but they are particularly important for people negotiating periods of dramatic social change. Through narrative exchange in the public domain, people comprehend the moral underpinnings of political authority, status and history, they reflect on past events and critically voice future concerns. Narratives have the distinctive ability to condense the 'then' and 'now' as narrators transcend temporal boundaries.

These narratives always constitute a response to a crisis while simultaneously forming it. The concept of crisis is one of the cornerstones of political theory, but is also one of the keywords that have shaped the language of media, public conversation, politico-economic discourse and academic parlance in the past few years.

Crisis is related to the Greek *krinein*, meaning to judge, determine or decide. In Greek, *krisis* could mean both the act of judging and the actual judgement – for instance the judgement of Paris – to which it leads. As such, it is related to words like *criticism* and *critique*. Medicine preserves the link between crisis and the idea of a decisive turning point: to be in a 'critical condition'. Crisis is an exceptional time, a time of change, renewal, revolution or even revelation as Koselleck points out (Koselleck & Richter, 2006).

In this context, the Greek crisis is mediated by criss-crossing and clashing discourses that critique, judge and foretell salvation or perdition and occasionally

revolution. The Greek crisis spread over a decade, with various and frequently opposite discourses emerging. The following section focuses on these discourses, with a particular emphasis on the role of resentment.

Re-examining Resentment

Resentment is a rather unfashionable subject in political philosophy and in political science as well. A perusal of the literature on passions and emotions shows there is a hierarchy between emotions: some are 'elevated' as signs of cultivation, while others remain 'lower' as signs of weakness. As part of the evolution of culture, emotions may be represented as good or better than thought, but only insofar as they are represented as a form of intelligence, as 'tools' that can be used by subjects in the project of life and career enhancement (Goleman, 1995). In his seminal work, Norbert (2006) explored how the evolution of emotions and morals has affected the power structure in western societies. It is obvious that emotions are cast as a tool securing of social hierarchy. Resentment has always been frowned upon even though the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, and Adam Smith in particular, attempted to rehabilitate it as an emotion that can and ought to play an important role in sustaining democratic norms. 'Smith', as Stephen Darwall observes, 'emphasizes justice's connection to warranted resentment' (Darwall, 1999, p. 142).

Despite these attempts, resentment – or *ressentiment* as some call it – has been cast as a negative emotion. The man of resentment, according to Max Scheler, perpetrates 'an illusory devaluation of the other man's qualities' (Scheler, 1994, p. 32). The political physiognomy of resentment is ugly. It is our feeling of impotence that makes us 'gnash our teeth' and fuels Nietzschean *ressentiment*. The hostility of *ressentiment*, this 'most dangerous of all explosives' (Scheler, 1994), presents an obstacle to genuine deliberation and healthy democratic discourse. 'Resentment', Walker acknowledges,

> embodies a sense of fault that can be difficult to dislodge, and one gripped by resentment may be far too disposed to find fault in others than to question whether his or her own resentment might be misplaced. (Walker, 2012, p 14)

We can understand resentment here as the non-detached attitudes and reactions of people directly involved in transactions with each other. We might observe it in the attitudes and reactions of offended parties and beneficiaries.

Resentment is a long-term emotional orientation (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & De Rivera, 2007), developed and imprinted in discourses that address the alleged moral deficiencies of that which is resented. Political resentment, by its very nature, is manifested and consolidated in texts: these, unlike 'inner' emotional states, can be directly studied by scholars (Bar-Tal et al., 2007). Resentment promotes a variety of unfavourable perceptions and emotional reactions to its object. Like other biases, it undermines trust, reduces confidence in the other party's competence, tends to increase fear and makes dissociation from others more attractive (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).

When reflecting upon resentment, one cannot fail to mention Nietzsche's work, upon which Scheler expounded in his study Ressentiment (1912). Scheler used the term in a specialised sense drawn from the Nietzschean dichotomous states of power or impotence: resentment is the condemnation of what one secretly craves but cannot achieve. In the Nietzschean tradition, resentment is regarded as a necessarily self-destructive form of anger which, by reinforcing a passivity in those subject to it, functions as an anaesthetic to deaden the pain of injury (Nietzsche, 1992, p. 563). Resentment is debilitating in the Nietzschean sense when those who experience it are also bereft of resources, and therefore unable to turn their resentment into action. Nietzsche's formulation had a lasting effect on the conceptualisation of resentment, but to insist that this is the only form which is possible is to essentialise and to fail to analyse it properly.

More recently, Barbalet (1992) provides a constructivist definition of resentment understood in a non-Nietzschean sense. According to this definition, the possibility of action is not defined away by fiat. Rather, resentment is taken to be the emotional apprehension of undeserved advantage. Social actors experience resentment when an external agency denies them opportunities or valued resources (including status) that would otherwise be available to them. As Smith writes:

> When the boundaries of social actors' statuses are breached and the capabilities associated with them disrupted, then a moral outrage and anger prefigures and energizes their claims to rights which are to restore the means of their social existence. (Smith, 1982, pp. 79–80)

Resentment is not static; it usually grows considerably over time. Research has identified that frequently, the frustration experienced about one's inability to rectify the original injustice becomes closely linked to the object. There is a moment when the original perceived injustice is committed, which is then transformed or rearranged through the circulation of emotions. As a result, negative feelings are increasingly associated with the character of the other. Resentment is, by nature, a highly social emotion manifesting itself in discourses, especially at the inter-group level. Injured parties tend to feel a particular need to express, propagate and justify their negative views about the other. Therefore, feelings of resentment often entail an expression of shared grievances and hopes for eventual retribution.

However, resentment is not a one-way feeling and is felt not only by members of the subordinate class towards those above them. There is no reason why there should not be superordinate class resentment against the opportunities it forgoes through action by the subordinate class (Barbalet, 1992). Spinoza (2000), in the first chapter of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, describes the resentment felt by benefactors towards those who receive their assistance. The juxtaposition of power is the key element in understanding this reversal. For Spinoza, emotions shape what bodies can do as 'the modifications of the body, by which the power of action on the body is increased or diminished' (p. 34). So, emotions clearly depend on relations of power, which endow others with meaning and value.

Press coverage of the crisis in Germany and other northern European countries serves as an example here. There is a continuous narrative of the 'self-inflicted' Greek crisis that necessitated a bailout financed by the hard-working Germans and other Europeans, while anti-austerity discourses are denounced as populist, ungrateful and dangerous. In 2010, Bild Zeitung (2010) came up with a front page claiming that 'Germany is to pay 18 billion euros! Greece is for the German taxpayer a financial nightmare! 18 billion euros from Germany for the bankrupt Greeks'.

Discourse analysis has elaborated indicators to reveal patterns of resentment in texts. For example, the use of emotionally loaded terms for describing the status asymmetry (e.g. 'outrageous', 'evil', 'vile', 'heinous'). Drastic metaphors convey the offensive character of the status asymmetry (e.g. 'enslavement', 'subjugation'). Expressions of moral indignation or disgust towards the other's character (e.g. 'oppressor', 'opportunist', 'monster', 'criminal') are also indicative. In particular, in international relations, researchers seek discursive links between negative representations of 'the other' and demands for uncooperative policies. More importantly, as Petersen (2002) observes, the resentful will try to shape the wider public discourse (in this case, the international discourse) in various ways that might hurt the other's status.

In a broader political context, this kind of research into resentment and its discursive construction involves analysing the links between the feeling of political exclusion and loss of influence (e.g. Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras, 2015e describes Greece as a 'student who lowers her gaze when confronted with ex cathedra moral teaching') and the sense of economic irrelevance, dislocation and declining material, and occupational security (e.g. the divide between the centre and the periphery of the EU). It also takes into consideration the experience of disdain and contempt ('no one cares or respects us') for socio-economic groups and socio-cultural forms of life that are becoming 'marginalised' or 'penalised' (e.g. the Greek foreign minister Kotzias (2015) insinuating in a TV interview that his EU colleagues had become accustomed to 'treat Greece as a pariah state because it owes money').

Enter the Crisis; Emergence of New Identities Through Public Discourse

During the past decade of prolonged economic crisis, Greece has been a poster boy for poor management, economic and moral failure. There has been much media speculation that if the country could no longer cut back on expenditure to meet its obligations, there would more than just national bankruptcy: there would be blood on the streets, with some extreme voices predicting civil war, military dictatorship and the collapse of the eurozone (BBC News, 2010a).

Fearmongering across Europe raised the fate of the euro, the EU itself and the fiscal viability of individual countries (BBC News, 2010a). This is why the Greek crisis has become a significant issue for all European countries and, indeed, worldwide. The 'Greek crisis' has become synonymous with spreading uncertainty and fear throughout the continent. It also explains why it has caused so much resentment not only in Greece but also among the public in northern EU audiences.

The trope of the Greek crisis is especially prominent in the context of elections. For example, during the 2010 United Kingdom general election campaign, there was often the question of whether or not the country faced a similar fate to Greece. Fuelled by the imagery of rioting on the streets of Athens, headlines focussed on how 'Britain is facing its own Greek tragedy' (BBC News, 2010b). Conservative leader David Cameron used a similar cautionary tone: 'Greece stands as a warning to what happens if you don't pay back your debts (…). You can't go on borrowing at this level forever' (Lyall, 2010).

In the international press, the crisis was called 'self-inflicted' as it was said to have been caused by Greece's widespread corruption, low productivity and lack of western capitalist attributes. Greek people were equally blamed for the financial situation because of their open participation in 'corrupt' practices and 'lazy' work ethic. Leading Dutch politician Jeroen Dijsselbloem's (Flood, 2017) infamous remarks in an interview with German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung about 'southern European countries wasting money on women and alcohol' and how 'you cannot spend all the money on drinks and women and then ask for help' are a good example of this kind of stereotypical discourse. Caricatures of inept politicians leading the nation further down the path to tragedy were a common thread in accountability narratives propagated on various international stages. These were usually accompanied by the implicit suggestion of a divide between the 'proper European' character and a deviant 'less European' one that results in calamitous political and fiscal policies.

Attempts by northern European governments to maintain control of the Greek political situation were highlighted in the media during the Greek general elections and the 2015 bailout referendum, when the popular anti-austerity Syriza party (The Coalition of the Radical Left) was portrayed in British, French and German media as 'radical communists', or the 'extremist far left equivalent to the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn' (Mylonas, 2018). By offering an alternative solution to the crisis, Syriza was seen as a tangible threat to European-enforced austerity. Unfavourable images of a radical far-left were part of a strategy 'orchestrated from the major epicenters' (Wacquant, 2012, pp. 71–72) of neoliberal power in an attempt to fashion opinion at the grassroots level.

Around the globe, the collective 'we' has been incorporated into political rhetoric to address issues of accountability and mobilisation (Carrithers, 2007). Responsibility for the crisis is thus disseminated from the top down. In Britain, then-chancellor George Osborne's (2010) now infamous statement 'we are all in this together' is surely one of the most explicit employments of the 'we' reference in recent times. In Greece, former deputy prime minister Theodoros Pangalos (2010) claimed 'we all "ate" the money together' equally. Trends of public discourse shifted violently from individualist cynicism to 'punitive asceticism'; 'we lived beyond our means' and 'the party is over' became characteristic mottos of a dominant political and media discourse that was used to spread feelings of collective blame and guilt (Stavrakakis, 2013). Guilt and blame are strongly related to resentment in philosophical accounts as well as in social and psychological ones. The 'irresponsible populism' of the past decades that 'flattered the people' with false promises was identified as the root of Greece's collective pathology

(Sevastakis, 2012). This implies a shift in accountability from figures of political power to the people, and a pre-emptive warning that if the reform legislation fails then it is not the sole responsibility of politicians. Hence, a feeling of self-responsibility was imposed upon the public; a sense of 'taking care of yourselves' that provoked the collective mobilisation through rhetoric of crisis and fear of dispossession. The traditional parties appeared unable to manage the crisis of political representation and offer a convincing narrative. Their favoured communication strategy – to blame both 'populism' for the crisis as the main symptom of the malaise of the post-authoritarian era, as well as 'the people' themselves as the irresponsible beneficiaries of a democratisation process that went too far – eventually failed to contain popular reaction. Instead, it fuelled indignation (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2018), another moral emotion closely linked to resentment as it appears as a response to perceived injustices or inequalities. The so-called 'Aganaktismenoi' (Greek for the indignant movement) was a response to this type of discourse. A grassroots populist movement claiming to represent the will of 'the people' against an alienated and unresponsive 'establishment' (Prentoulis & Thomassen, 2014), it emerged in May 2011 at the same time as similar demonstrations by the Indignados and the 15-M movement in Spain.

The Aganaktismenoi protestors forming around Syntagma Square in front of the Greek Parliament was a watershed moment, developing a new narrative. This was framed as the people's response to the crisis and produced an array of political discourses aligning with or denouncing this narrative. The Syntagma Square demonstrations were the centre of socio-political struggle during the first part of the crisis period and provided highly visible and metaphorical modes of understanding the political, economic and social conditions. The square became crucial as a space for narrative-building and exchange as national events were played out in the public domain. Some of the most striking and alarming photos showed protestors wearing Nazi uniforms or carrying posters of prominent German politicians digitally altered to portray them in Nazi garb. Although they were denounced, these images exposed a deep-seated resentment; the underlying message linking previous inflicted woes to the present-day austerity regime. Less disturbing forms of protest showed a plain rejection of what was viewed as unjust and humiliating treatment of the country.

Research shows that both individual and collective subjects give meaning to consecutive experiences of disrespect by telling themselves narratives which link their 'loss/defeat' to the negative traits of the resented actor (Barbalet, 2004; Halperin, 2008). People tend to experience the kind of emotions they deem common with the groups they identify. Since the resentment discourse accentuates their collective identity, even large groups can develop (or further intensify) a shared feeling of resentment. As a consequence, the resentful feelings can become even stronger in the group's discourse.

The protests and open debates were a valuable lesson for various groups and the various foreign shamers were confronted with a counter-narrative – a new crowd identity with a new social message and a redeemed social image. Syriza addressed 'the people' through a discourse that articulated various popular demands and grievances against the Greek and European 'elites' and their policies of austerity

along the lines of an 'us versus them' schema, the people taking back the power to speak from a corrupt and managerial political system. Syriza ran two consecutive election campaigns with its leader, Tsipras claiming to speak on behalf of those who had no voice, who were not seen. Syriza managed to interweave the familiar themes of insurrection and resistance with that of national pride. Reclaiming the nation's dignity became a demand at first then a political narrative.

As the ramifications of multiple bailouts were considered by the Greek government and new waves of austerity engulfed the nation, people were left to ponder where it all went wrong. Blame was directed at the external other – the United States, Germany, IMF, EU and the infamous Troika of the European Commission, European Bank and IMF – and the 'other within' –corrupt politicians, businessmen and bankers, and broken neoliberal promises. Former deputy prime minister Theodoros Pangalos placed the blame for the financial crisis on the Germans:

> They [the Nazis] took away the Greek gold that was in the Bank of Greece, they took away the Greek money and they never gave it back (…) I don't say they have to give back the money necessarily but they have at least to say 'thanks'. (Knight, 2012, p. 13)

Some of the descriptions are very indicative of the emotional arousal underlying them. Characterising the creditors' actions as 'killing', 'blackmail', 'fiscal waterboarding' or 'financial asphyxiation' clearly represents the policies as abusive and bound to arouse angry feelings, as does labelling them 'brutal' (Tsipras, 2015a as cited in Wolf, 2018, p. 253) or 'barbarous' (Tsipras, 2015, 2015d as cited in Wolf, 2018, p. 253). Speakers also used strong metaphors to evoke the offensive nature of the status hierarchy and its immediate causes. In addition to using the extreme metaphor of 'final solutions', it was claimed that Greece served as a 'guinea pig' (Tsipras, 2015) and as an 'experimental austerity laboratory' (Tsipras, 2015c as cited in Wolf, 2018, p. 253), that it was 'a nation in chains' (Tsipras, 2015).

The use of language with strong emotional connotations, evoking suffering and torture, can serve as the materialisation of resentment. In contrast to 'fleeting' anger, resentment is a long-term emotional orientation (Bar-Tal et al., 2007) that is often developed and memorised in discourses that deal with the alleged moral deficiencies of its object. The experience of resentment through these 'emotional tags' predisposes an actor to negative interpretations of actions and to angry reactions against the resented opponent. In the Greek crisis, this feeling tended to reinforce negative biases.

These international bodies made 'decisions of global consequence [that] shape the face of the world' (Herzfeld, 1992, as cited in Knight, 2012, p. 11). However, an internal other was also identified who sold out the 'Greek people' to foreign demands. There was a regular call (not just in Greece) for political 'elites' to be held responsible for the 'crusade of greed' that provoked the most significant consequences of the crisis. The Greek people acknowledged the structural deficiencies of Greek economy and the ambiguous relationship between neoliberal and traditional ideals, but Western interference fanned anti-globalisation sentiment

that bred 'indigenous reaction to centers of power' (Harvey, 2005, p. 88). Local elites did not escape this line of criticism either. Grand narratives failed to divert blame away from political elites perceived as the pinnacle of neoliberal ideals of accumulation and dispossession. Resentment can therefore be understood as an explanation of social and political manifestations, as a technique of social manipulation and as a factor in demarcating 'us' from 'them'.

Conclusions

During the Greek crisis, discourses from various actors (European political elites, EU officials, the international and national press, local political parties and movements) claimed to represent different interests, demands and identities. The denunciation of different discourses as populist became common practice. This chapter does not investigate the validity of such claims. On the populist scorecard (if such a thing existed), one of the points would be affective interpretation/use of affect in public discourse. What is evident is that the accusation of populism seems to link it to negative emotions[1] and suggest a 'low' emotional intelligence.

Emotions work to shape the 'surfaces' of individual and collective bodies. My analysis of the Greek crisis discourses proceeds by reading texts in the public domain that align subjects with collectives, by attributing 'others' as the source of our feelings. During the Greek crisis, feelings of resentment were at play right across the political discourse.

This resentment was crucial to forging new identities or reinforcing old ones. Individuals and the Greek people were portrayed as a body. The subject was presented as being endangered by an imaginary other, whose cruel and callous machinations and punishments not only threatened to take something away from it (both materially and symbolically) but also to expel it permanently from an imagined community. This narrative operated in reverse as well. A different subject (a north European citizen) was unjustly burdened with the consequences of the irresponsible actions of the other and its moral, cultural and intellectual deficiencies. This enabled the subject to imagine its own moral superiority. There was also an implicit threat of sharing the other's fate if its standards did not improve, yet another reason to cultivate resentment.

In the Greek crisis – as in any social interaction – there was a palpable discrepancy between political rhetoric and experienced social reality. There were numerous competing claims to truth, infused with varying degrees of political credibility. Resentment became a political trope deployed by national governments, international elites and media pundits, drawing on a rich pool of metaphors and narratives to shock populations into submission or energise populations into reaction. Equally, resentment mediascapes could be employed to rouse activism and resistance by disseminating powerful imagery and theories of impeding devastation.

[1]See Bartoszewicz, this volume

Resentment has been a powerful force in the creation of social and national identities. The Greek crisis serves as a good example of how affective experiences are not solely psychological or individual, but can be shaped in a particular cultural and socio-political context. Scholars face the challenge of investigating the extent to which socio-political resentments can affect politics and to find ways of informing democratic political theory with this knowledge. Resentment is particularly worth studying as one of the clearest manifestations of emotion in public discourse. A better understanding of the emotional underpinnings of negative prejudices could thus provide a far more realistic perspective on how discourses shape identities and policies.

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Chapter 8

Identity and Class: Boundary Drawing in Norway

Ove Skarpenes

Abstract

In recent decades, economic and social differences have increased in many Western countries. The consequences of these societal changes are higher unemployment and more insecurity within the working class. Hostile attitudes towards the poor and immigrants have grown in scale and intensity, leading to claims of a crisis. However, these attitudes are not as common among the ethnic Norwegian working class as they are in the United States and France. Workers in Norway are more hostile towards the rich than vulnerable groups. In contrast with those in the United States and France, it appears that the working class in Norway still struggles for recognition of its societal role and political identification, and this 'struggle' is still fought against the economic elite.

Keywords: Working class; boundaries; economic elite; immigrants; recognition; Nordic model

Introduction[1]

In recent decades, economic and social differences have increased in many Western countries. The consequences of these societal changes are higher unemployment and more insecurity within the working class. Hostile attitudes towards the poor, and sceptical attitudes towards immigrants, grow in scale and intensity,

[1]This text is a shortened English translation of 'Klassiske klassekonflikter? Grensedragninger i den norske arbeiderklassen'. The chapter/parts of this chapter have been published in *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning* (4) Vol. *59*, 2018, pp. 349–372. DOI: 10.18261/issn.1504-291X-2018-04-02. I would like to thank Universitetsforlaget and *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning* for permission to publish this revised version.

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 127–145
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211014

leading to a diagnosis of 'crisis'. Compared to studies in the United States and France, however, the findings reported from the Norwegian case do not disclose such growth and intensity in hostile attitudes in the culture of the ethnic Norwegian working class. Workers in Norway draw weaker boundaries towards vulnerable groups, but they draw strong boundaries towards rich groups (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). The cultural configuration I observe deviates in certain ways from what is reported in comparable studies for the United States and France. It appears that the working class in Norway continues a struggle for recognition of its societal role and political identification, and this 'struggle' is still fought against economic elites.

The Norwegian working class does not strive for social mobility as is the case in the United States; nor does it criticise the education system for giving it a hard time, for maintaining class positions, and for its cultural repression, as in France (Skarpenes & Sakslind, 2019). With some exceptions, our previous findings from studies of the Norwegian working class point to the continued existence of a collective confidence. The working class wants to be what it is; it wants society to continue appreciating it for being just that, symbolically as well as in material terms (wages); and it wants a strengthening of the egalitarian culture of valuation and justification. Egalitarian principles and rules of conduct still affect the *modus operandi* of institutions like education and labour in Norway, and how people perceive them. Our data about education and occupation do not give suggest there is an angry white male working class (Skarpenes & Sakslind, 2019).

It is hardly controversial to say that the Nordic model (with its political emphasis on full employment, collective bargaining, wage compression, a common comprehensive school system and free universal welfare rights) still acts as a buffer against neoliberal capitalism. I have argued that the Nordic model makes Norwegian workers less vulnerable than workers in comparable countries (Skarpenes, n.d.). This cultural configuration differs from what is reported in comparable studies for the United States and France. Michèle Lamont has studied working-class cultures in France and the United States and points out that in recent decades, several aspects of these cultures have changed (Lamont, 1995, 2000, 2018; Lamont & Duvoux, 2014). For instance, she states that not only have economic and social inequalities increased, but the use of market mechanisms and principles has also spread (Block & Somers, 2014; Evans & Sewell, 2013; Lamont, 2018). Furthermore, Lamont (2018) emphasises that the self-narrative itself has changed (Meyer, 2010). In general, values such as socio-economic success, competitiveness, prestige, status and self-confidence have increased in importance (Lamont et al., 2016). The working class, which is experiencing increasingly difficult economic and social conditions in several Western countries, appears to be developing new cultural values (for the United States, see Hochschild, 2016). Lamont argues that social changes are being expressed in new ways of creating symbolic boundaries (Lamont, 2018; Lamont & Duvoux, 2014). The representatives of the indigenous white working class are drawing boundaries against – and have less respect for – ethnic minorities, immigrants and the poor (for France, see Lamont & Duvoux, 2014).

In this chapter, I present findings from a qualitative study of the Norwegian working class, discussing and comparing it with studies of their counterparts in France and the United States (Lamont, 1995, 2000; Lamont & Duvoux, 2014). I use the concept of 'symbolic boundaries' as conceptualised by Michéle Lamont. Lamont and Molnar (2002, p. 168) define symbolic boundaries as the conceptual distinctions social actors use in order to categorise and classify objects, people and practices. Inspired by Lamont (2000, 2012) and Lamont and Thévenot (2000), I regard the values, norms, concepts and categorisations that appear in boundaries as based on national class cultures. One major finding is that while the informants in this study draw boundaries against immigrants and vulnerable groups, the boundaries drawn against the rich and wealthy are stronger. There are few indications in our data that hostility towards immigrants is a dominant part of the culture in the ethnic Norwegian working class.[2] Representatives of this class continue to fight a battle for recognition and appreciation of both their societal role and the work they perform, and our findings indicate that this struggle is most often fought against society's most advantaged groups rather than those that are vulnerable.

Data, Methods and Analytical Framing

The study is based on 56 semi-structured interviews in the Norwegian capital Oslo; its second- and sixth-largest cities Bergen and Kristiansand; and two small municipalities that represent typical industrial communities. The sample consists of individuals who have no education beyond vocational training and who are employed in industry, crafts, healthcare (including nursing homes, kindergartens, and before- and after-school programmes), the service sector (hotels and restaurants, cleaning, retail stores, warehouses), the oil sector and the transport sector. The interviews each lasted between one and three hours, and were conducted at the informants' workplaces, in their homes or at cafés. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. The youngest informant was 22 years old, and the oldest 64. The average age was 43.9 (Table 1).

This table shows the informants divided according to type of job, gender and residential location. The individuals we[3] were interested in studying were active in the labour market but who had no higher education; groups that can be broadly characterised as the 'working class'. Statistics from Statistics Norway shows employees according to occupation in 2015: managers 7.7%, professionals 26.8%, technicians and associate professionals 17%. Overall, 51.5% of employees had higher education. The remainder (clerical support workers 5.9%, service and sales

[2]Seen from this perspective, the finding corresponds with recent studies of Norwegians' attitudes to immigrants (Brekke & Mohn, 2018, p. 121; Hellevik & Hellevik, 2017).

[3]This article is part of a larger cultural-sociological analysis of the ethnic Norwegian working class. Rune Sakslind, Roger Hestholm and I are collaborating on this project, and all interviews have been conducted by us.

Table 1. Distribution of Informants According to Sector, Region and Gender.

	Industry		Craft		Healthcare		Sales and Service		Transport		Oil		
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
Oslo	6		5			3	6	4	2	1	2		
Bergen	1		5			3	1		1	1			
Kristiansand								4					
Two industrial communities	8	2						1					
N	15	2	10			6	7	9	3	2	2		56

workers 19.9%, skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 1.9%, craft and related trades workers 9.3%, plant and machine operators and assemblers 6.2% and other occupations 5.3%) comprise a total of 48.5%.

We found interviewees by using internet sites, yellow pages and corporate websites Additionally, we used the snowball method (where participants recruit others) and trade unions to recruit informants. Although Norway still has a high number of trade union members, several branches are declining. As a result, barely half of the Norwegian labour force (salaried employees) belongs to a trade union or an employee organisation (Nergaard, 2015, p. 38). In our sample, 71% (40 informants) said they were union members (although this number may be slightly higher because a couple of informants did not respond to this question). If the sample had comprised a larger proportion of non-unionised employees, the findings may have been different. Women employed as cafeteria staff and cleaners were the most likely to decline to take part in the study.[4]

The interview format was designed to allow comparison between low-skilled Norwegians and similar groups in the United States and France and between the working class and the middle class in Norway whom we have previously researched (Skarpenes & Sakslind, 2019). More specifically, the interviews were designed to encourage participants to talk about their education, work, personal ambitions, class, family, leisure time/vacations, politics and cultural preferences. We discussed issues they were passionate about, what they wanted to succeed at in life, groups that irritated them, groups they admired, people they liked or disliked or looked down on, who their friends were, child-rearing values, etc. We also asked if there were any issues that particularly concerned them. Since we were interested in attitudes towards immigrants, we discussed their children's choice of partners.

[4]Out of the individuals we have information about regarding how they voted at the election (45 of 56), approx. 75% voted for left-leaning parties. Approx. 11% voted for the Progress Party (FrP).

They were also asked about the extent to which work-related immigration affected their own employment. Their answers have been sorted and analysed on the background of the groups against which the informants created boundaries.

Working-class Boundaries Against Immigrants and People Taking Advantage of Welfare Benefits

Lamont (2000) showed in her material from the 1990s that the French working class drew boundaries against the 'non-French'. Immigrants with a Muslim background were especially regarded with a certain amount of hostility (Lamont, 2000). However, at the same time (again according to Lamont), Marxist ideology, as well as notions of solidarity, the French Republic's interpretation of equality and Catholicism's boundary-dissolving altruism (we are all equal before God) hindered the growth of obvious ethnic boundaries. The previous 'colour blindness' that typified the French Republic's ideology of equality is disappearing, and clearer boundaries against ethnic minorities are being drawn (Lamont & Duvoux, 2014).

In addition to boundaries against black immigrants becoming stronger, those against the poor have also grown (Lamont, 2018). This shift is largely blamed on the fact that self-reliance is now seen as more important (Lamont, 2018, pp. 16–17). As early as the 1990s, the American working class defined itself in opposition to the poor and to Americans with African origins; groups the working class often felt lacked a work ethic, an ability to provide for themselves and good morals. Since that time, respect for the poor has reduced still further, while boundaries against new immigrants have become stronger (Lamont, 2018, p. 17). There are also individuals in the Norwegian material who draw boundaries against immigrants and people living on welfare benefits.[5]

A man with a working-class background in Oslo, who was at the time living and working on the city's poorer east side, had a lot to say about immigration. Through his work this man had met young people whose backgrounds were from several different cultures. He was concerned about immigrants when we talked about both groups and issues:

> I: Sure, immigration. You know, it's so damn hard to explain without being called all kinds of things. What I think is damn scary is all the Somalis who are coming here.
> R: Because they bring a lot of crime?
> I: Yes, it's like, I know Somalis who are completely okay. Plumbers, electricians, kindergarten workers and such. But some are, some of them are so criminal that I just don't get it, can't get my head around it. Gotten 25 of them here since date. Sit inside, long sentences (…) Got them one right after the other. Got them for smoking weed and fencing different stuff. I mean – when a 17-year-old comes along on (…) a motorbike

[5]See Fotou, this volume, on the this area of conflict from an overall European perspective.

> that cost NOK 25,000 [about $2,650] and clothes for NOK 25,000, hair slicked back, and his parents don't do shit. So, it's tragic. They should, I mean, the ones that are doing this and selling stuff are committing crimes. And what do they do who are just sitting in their apartment, and usually their neighbours won't have anything to do with them. And who do they hang out with then? Of course, it's their own. All the time. Get no support at all. Just go to the welfare office and all over. No, it's really hard, that. Because there are so damn many okay kids, even though they've messed up lots of times. (Man, unskilled worker, age 60–70).[6]

His hostility was towards immigration that seems to be culturally based. In her analysis of white American workers, Lamont (1995, 2000) discovered that they switched between moral and ethnic boundaries in subtle ways. For example, their description of black people might contain phrases such as 'what's a nice way to say it?', 'I know this is a generality, and it does not go for all; it goes for a portion', only to go on and emphasise that black people were often lazy, that several received welfare benefits and lacked the willpower to become self-sufficient. According to Lamont, these white American workers felt that many black people broke with central norms like having a work ethic and a sense of responsibility, and she described this attitude by stating that racist attitudes are often justified via moral arguments (Lamont, 1995, p. 362). Lamont's term for this is 'euphemistic racism' (Lamont, 2000, pp. 55–96).

The interviewee quoted above claimed that some immigrants broke both norms and laws. He felt that particular groups of immigrants were morally irresponsible, and he used this lack of responsibility in order to create clear boundaries against these groups. Laziness was also highlighted by some informants as being a norm violation; consequently, they used it to set themselves apart from immigrants. This attitude was also shown by an electrician from Bergen (man, age 20–30).

> I: (…) People who consciously choose not to work. People who are completely capable of working. They have… they just come up with so many excuses for… for that they can't work.
> R: Welfare junkies, you mean?
> I: Yeah. Um, it irritates me. A lot. Um, people, um, I mean people who come to Norway to, um… milk it in a way, like without giving anything back… like typical Gypsies and that kind of thing, it annoys me.

Some informants also pointed out that it was important to get immigrants employed. White American workers were also concerned with work ethics, responsibility and traditional morals such as family values and being anti-crime (Lamont, 2000, p. 95). As a result, these values were used in creating boundaries against black people.

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[6]I: Informant. R: Researcher.

In Norway, morals and ethnicity were also connected in a similar fashion. Yet this connection appears less often in the Norwegian data than in Lamont's study. Boundaries are drawn against laziness in general, regardless of ethnicity. Working-class people became irritated about those who received money without doing anything, people who cheated on their taxes, people who could work but managed to avoid it. Many felt that sick leave should be restricted. A machine operator at an industrial site was irritated by the unemployed who did not even try to find work:

> I: Social groups that irritate me? That must be those who… well, I don't know, those who are unemployed for a while and get money but don't even bother trying to do anything about it, sort of. That irritates me a little bit, you know.
> R: So, people who are sort of cheating the system?
> I: That… yeah. It's… okay that somebody needs help and gets it when they need it, but beyond that I think cheating is a rotten thing to do. (Man, machine operator, age 20–30)

The operator expressed something that was obvious among several other interviewees: a strong work ethic based on a sense of duty. Complaining and false sick leave reports were a source of great irritation. Our data show this was most strongly expressed in the industrial sector and craft industries. They referred to friends or acquaintances they felt had been signed off on sick leave very easily, and some of them were critical of anyone who took advantage of welfare benefits. Perhaps boundaries were drawn against some of these people in vulnerable situations. However, my interpretation is that it was more often the case that working-class people did not respect anyone who could participate in the labour market yet chose not to do so. Irresponsibility and lack of a work ethic were in other words the basis for moral indignation.

Those French workers hostile to immigration (or 'racists', as Lamont (2000, p. 211) calls them) were less concerned with self-sufficiency and responsibility than their American counterparts. Instead, they were more concerned with a just division of social welfare benefits, and what they regarded as cultural incompatibility between the French Republic's political culture and Islam. The ethnic French created boundaries against Muslims who could 'spit in front of you' or who would be 'killing a sheep at Ramadan' (Lamont, 2000, p. 179). Furthermore, they disliked immigrant groups' resistance to allowing themselves to be assimilated (Lamont, 2000, p. 171). Strong boundaries were drawn against Muslim culture and religion. This feeling of cultural difference also appeared during interviews with Norwegian workers. One caretaker in Oslo told this story:

> My sister and her old man, they're dead now, last year, but they lived in an apartment building with a stairwell. (…) And when I went up and into those stairwells, I can tell that it smells really weird. So, I mentioned it when we got upstairs. Asked what's been going on. (…) ZZZZ, which is what he's called, he was going to open the door to get the newspaper. And there was a hen standing

> there (Laughs). No kidding. So, it turned out that the people who had moved in had come from right down there somewhere in Afghanistan, or I can't remember where. It was a four-room apartment that had really become a farm. And a lot of them do this, I mean that they don't get any explanation about the ABCs of moving to another country. (…) I really know what would happen to me if I moved to Afghanistan. (Man, unskilled worker, age 60–70)

Lamont reported that several ethnic French workers felt immigrants were culturally incompatible with 'the French'. Similarly, there were also descriptions of cultural divides in the Norwegian interviews. Our most direct question in this context was if they would care if their children's partners religion and culture were different from their own. Some informants answered yes, they wanted their children to have white, Western girlfriends/boyfriends. Others said that 'birds of a feather flock together'. In general, these people were concerned about fundamentalism or strong faith – no matter if it was Christianity or Islam. One person said they would accept anyone except a neo-Nazi. Some people replied that they would speak with their children (most often daughters) if they started seeing someone from a Muslim culture. Many expressed scepticism about religions with an oppressive view of women. The data also suggest there are notions among Norwegian workers about significant and problematic cultural differences in customs, values and different kinds of faith. One person at an industrial site (woman, machine operator, age 60–70) was explicit about her desire for assimilation:

> You know, I'm really not against immigrants as such, but my first thought when they arrive in the country… I think they should live like we do.

However, it was rare that Norwegian workers were concerned about having immigrants assimilate in the way that Lamont argues the French are. Several of the Norwegian workers themselves had girlfriends/boyfriends from other cultures, and some had children with partners from other cultures. Most of them said they did not care about their cultural background of their children's girlfriends or boyfriends; they had to make their own choices, and the most important thing was that they were happy. So, while some of the more direct statements about 'Gypsies' and Somalis were perhaps expressions of culturally based anti-immigrant feeling, there were relatively few boundaries drawn against other cultures' values, religious views and lifestyles.

As shown above, there were Norwegian workers who created ethnic boundaries based on both the absence of what they regarded as work ethics and irresponsibility, and there were those who created boundaries based on what they regarded as differences in cultural values and religious faith. At the same time, those who brought up immigration, whether or not they were critical of it, seemed to be just as concerned about society's role in the integration of immigrants in the Norwegian labour market as they were of individual morality and

cultural assimilation. A female nurse (age 50–60), who was born and raised in Oslo with a father who worked in a factory in Oslo and a mother who worked in a shop, said:

> Because I think I can see it already, especially everybody who comes here who we don't have jobs for. We accept them, I don't have anything against that, but we should take care of them after they've come to our country. Get them working, don't let them go to the welfare office or sit here begging in the street.

The same type of reasoning came from a female driver (age 40–50) in Oslo:

> And I think immigration is incredibly important. Accepting the ones we accept in a decent way. Having a system in place that actually helps them instead of pushing them down. That's what I think. And that we don't get mad at them and look at them like sneaks and money grubbers, you know. Draining us. But get them to become resourceful and utilise them. Many of them are tremendous resources.

And this from a male freight worker in Oslo (age 50–60):

> The way I see it, the way we integrate our immigrants, is absolutely the worst. Doesn't do any good to stash them away in a closed hotel way up in the mountains in Tyin or Valdres, and then, nothing more happens. It's just tragic. But sure, otherwise many of them are resourceful people that society can put to use.

It was not primarily the distance between immigrants and ethnic Norwegians that they spoke of here. Rather, they were drawing on values of solidarity and equality. Immigrants were regarded as a resource that society needs and must take the necessary steps to use. In her material from the 1990s, Lamont found that many French anti-racists (who were also opponents of the market, in contrast to American workers, who embraced the market) associated their anti-racism with equality and solidarity. According to Lamont, these workers also drew upon a cultural repertoire comprised of elements from republicanism, Catholicism and socialism. According to Lamont, these workers reacted to all forms of inequality and injustice; be it sexist, class-based or racist (Lamont, 2000, p. 196). In an early discussion of this French anti-racism, she said:

> Many oppose racism and other forms of segregation precisely in the name of solidarity and egalitarianism. They view racism as an extension of the type of hierarchical thinking that leads some individuals to believe that wearing a tie makes someone a better person. (Lamont, 1995, p. 362)

Among these French anti-racist workers, equality was such a central value that creating boundaries 'downwards' (against immigrants or the poor) was problematic. It expressed a lack of respect and recognition (Lamont, 2000, pp. 196–197). I find an affinity between the French anti-racists' equality orientation in the 1990s and that of the ethnic Norwegian workers in the 2010s, when the latter expressed that society had to integrate immigrants in the labour market by acknowledging them as a resource on an equal footing with everyone else. Among both those groups who in different ways were sceptical of immigrants and those who were not, there was a preoccupation with integration into the labour force and society.

In previous studies, we identified equality and solidarity as central values of Norwegian middle-class culture; a social justice we classified as an ideal type – *the socially responsible* (Sakslind & Skarpenes, 2014; Skarpenes, Sakslind, & Hestholm, 2016). Social responsibility is also an important value in working-class culture (Skarpenes, n.d.). My interpretation is that this was expressed by the preoccupation with integrating immigrants into the labour force. This is strengthened by the answers we received when we explicitly asked how work-related immigration affected their own work and salaries. Few turned this into a conflict between the ethnic Norwegian working class and immigrants. Most described immigrants as great employees, and in a construction business (a branch employing many immigrants) one individual said it was soon going to be impossible to find skilled Norwegian workers. Patronising statements were made as well, including one logger who felt his career was turning into a 'Polack job'. But many informants were concerned with the struggle against social dumping as a political issue that had to be fought collectively, while several others pointed out that it was not the immigrants' fault. On the contrary, politicians, the EU and 'the system' were blamed. They wanted to fight so that working-class jobs would not lose their prestige, and that salary and working conditions would improve (or at least not worsen). There were also those who felt work-related immigration would eventually reduce salaries and general working conditions. We found this economic-rational argument among construction workers and women employed in the healthcare sector.

A clear wish to integrate immigrants into the labour force was identified in the interviews, and I interpret this as an expression of values, including equality and civic responsibility, as being important to working-class culture. Moreover, in an egalitarian society, there can be an understanding that drawing boundaries against vulnerable groups is wrong. Having worked with this material for a long time, I have realised that boundaries against immigrants and people taking advantage of welfare benefits were somewhat stronger than I had first comprehended. Yet the Norwegian pattern still appears to differ from what has been observed in the United States and France by the presence of this expressed civic responsibility. When boundaries against immigrants and the poor became stronger in France and the United States, Lamont interpreted this change as a consequence of greater economic disparity, de-industrialisation and loss of status for many working-class people (Cherlin, 2014; Evans & Sewell, 2013; Lamont & Duvoux, 2014). Political reforms have also widened the divide between insiders (with rights to the country's welfare schemes) and outsiders (who have no access to these services). Moreover, France's anti-immigrant Front National party has been

getting increased support from voters. Lamont and Duvoux' point is that symbolic boundaries create polarisation between the ethnic French and immigrants as well. There have also been changes in Norway's labour force, welfare state and politics. Additionally, there is potential for a polarisation between the majority and minority populations, both by focussing on how increased labour immigration (a 'freer' flow of labour) can influence the labour force and the Norwegian collective bargaining system (Brox, 2005) and how increasing immigration can be a problem for a welfare state that provides universal schemes (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2010; NOU 2017: 2, 2017). Anti-immigrant feeling in Norway is linked to the growth of the right-wing Progress Party (FrP) (see Olstad, 1991, pp. 167–170).[7]

However, these sentiments appear not to have the same hold on Norwegian working-class culture as in France and the United States. For instance, Hellevik and Hellevik (2017) show that an increasing number of people have had a positive attitude to immigrants and immigration since 1993. They suggest that support for idealistic values has increased because a larger number of immigrants have started living in local communities, and because the overall population has completed higher education. Similarly, Brekke and Mohn (2018) have not found any increase in anti-immigration feeling. Our data show that among groups with a low level of education – compared with other countries – dislike of immigrants has not gained a large following in Norway. Lamont (2018, p. 18) argues that when values such as 'self-reliance, competitiveness and socio-economic success' become more important in a society, this results in stronger boundaries against the poor and immigrants, leading the society in turn to experience greater problems in recognising certain vulnerable groups. Yet even if boundaries are drawn against vulnerable groups in Norway, these boundaries are weaker than elsewhere. In short, the economic, political and social changes that have characterised French and American society are less pervasive in Norway. I also believe that nationally embedded values such as equality and social responsibility make drawing boundaries towards vulnerable groups still taboo for many in the working class (Skarpenes, n.d.).

Working-Class Boundaries Towards the Wealthy and Politicians

Lamont (2018, p. 15) believes there is an increasing gap between what workers themselves feel is their legitimate social value and the lower status they feel that society assigns them. This disparity has created *a recognition gap* that has in turn generated a great deal of anger and resentment among the working class. Lamont is referring here to Hochschild's (2016) study of the American working class, who feel like foreigners in their own country. In another article from

[7]The working class changed parties to a certain degree. In the most recent Statistics Norway survey from 2013, 64% of the workers voted for conservative parties (Bjørklund, 2018).

our own project (Skarpenes & Sakslind, 2019), we have also pointed out a mismatch between the way in which working-class Norwegians ranked professions and the manner in which they felt that 'society in general' ranked these same professions. However, they felt this was a problem rather than passively accepting it, and this discrepancy appeared to have other implications for Norwegian society than in the countries about which Lamont writes. While the Norwegian working class were also resigned and frustrated, especially women in the healthcare and service sectors (Skarpenes & Sakslind, 2019), their reflections were more politically motivated. One of Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) points is that when people criticise perceptions of others or justify their own, collective categories come into play. In order for these arguments to be persuasive, they must be attached to something that is in the community's interest. So, when our informants challenged the professional hierarchy, they consciously used collective arguments, referring to problematic aspects of labour and economic policy, educational reforms, social dumping, gender equality policy, etc. Of course, there were exceptions, but the study found an enduring sense of collective and political self-confidence among the Norwegian working class. They did not express any strong desire for social mobility (as is the case in the United States, see Lamont, 2000), they did not hate the educational system (as do their counterparts in France, see Lamont, 2000), and they were not ashamed or felt servile on an individual level (unlike women in England, Skeggs, 1997). The Norwegian working class remains quite proud. They wanted to be who they were, but they were worried about society no longer valuing their work and were anxious about not getting any future 'boost' of recognition. It was therefore not mobility they wanted, but rather a reduction of the social hierarchies – or, at the very least, no further increase of these hierarchies. They were carrying on a struggle to be recognised for their work, and this struggle is primarily not being fought with weak groups.

Only one individual said there is too much socialism in Norway, while a few were irritated with all politicians, and others were critical of those on the right-wing. Some examples of this included:

I: It's the politicians who don't really know what they're talking about, either. They're always promising this and that
R: And then nothing happens… Is it certain politicians, or what?
I: No, in general, but especially the ones who are in Parliament now (Conservative/Progress Party). I lean more the other way. Everything's so simple, if we could just prioritise differently. But then again, there isn't always anything to prioritise. (Woman, Licensed Practical Nurse, age 50–60)
I: Politicians.
R: Yeah. Politicians. From both sides of…?
I: Yeah, that's it, because I think that the politicians that are here today, they don't have any life experience, they don't have any grass… I mean nobody who's in government today is from the grass roots. Who's been there, who knows what it's like to live, sort of. (Man, unskilled brewery worker, age 40–50)

This scepticism towards politicians stood out in the material and was often connected to those who were judged not to look out for workers' issues. The Norwegian working-class also illustrated the classic divide between capital and work. There were some (not without reason, see Ljunggren, 2017) who used the east-west divide in Oslo in order to distinguish between the moderately wealthy and the non-wealthy, and allowed this division to be their starting point for creating boundaries. A young man who was born, raised and lived on the east side of Oslo, but worked on the west side, did hesitate to set boundaries against others. Yet in the end, it was the wealthy white west end boys, and not immigrants, against whom boundaries were drawn:

> I: No, I just maybe think that these people who are born with a silver spoon in their mouths aren't very cute.
> R: Spoiled brats?
> I: Spoiled brats, who've always gotten whatever they've wanted. (Man, chef, age 30-40, Oslo)

A young woman who worked as a store clerk and had been born and raised on Oslo's east side, before moving to a smaller city in eastern Norway, was very critical of wealthy and condescending customers who would complain about her store's selection of items and compare it with the selection in a similar store on Oslo's westside. In addition to setting explicit boundaries against the wealthy, she also brought in the east-west dimension:

> I really remember when I attended folk high school, when we had these small cabins, and I was so negative when I read the list and saw who I'd be living with, because the girl who was going to be my roommate, she was from central part of Norway, that was all right. And the two boys who were going to live in the cabin were from western Norway, that was okay, and then there were the two girls from Oslo's west side. "This'll be a 'wonderful' year!", I thought, because I'd already decided that those girls would be super lame. (Woman, shop employee, age 20–30, Oslo)

Other informants complained about the managers in Telenor (a Norwegian majority state-owned multinational telecommunications company) who were awarded bonuses, or wealthy men's clubs having members like grocery chain kings and Norwegian multimillionaires like Olav Thon and Christian Ringnes. They expressed a general 'scepticism of the wealthy'. As was revealed during the interview with a male electrician and a female retailer, top salaries were a source of irritation:

> I: Well, it can of course be top bosses who sit there together with their employee buddies who they've maybe gone to school with and who give each other higher and higher salaries. And otherwise… I actually try not to let myself get irritated over it, really. (Man, electrician on Oslo's railway tracks, age 30–40)

> I: No, is that it? The people who think they're great and just want more. A lot wants more, really. Like for example top bosses, you know, who get millions in salary or stocks and then the workers out on the floor have to tighten their belts, and then the stockholders get just as much, no matter what. Those kinds of things. (Woman, retailer & shop manager, age 30–40, Oslo)

Another young woman who worked as a store clerk also said that she got irritated at people who thought they were better than others because they had money. Others named people who spent money lavishly and conspicuously, people who drove company cars and wore white Oxford shirts, overpaid soccer players, highly paid real estate agents. Encounters with rich customers who wanted to bargain, brought out irritation in this tile layer:

> I: There's something or other they want to haggle over, in a way. And you can bet that the rich want to haggle. They just want to get something. They want to know that they've gotten something, like. It's going to be taken out on me, because they'd rather go out and buy an expensive plate warmer for NOK 40,000, and yet they're going to haggle over the price with me. That's the way it is. So, then they can get some status by the fact that they've bought that plate warmer and show other people. No, so it's them I don't like very much, they're so very arrogant, like. It's okay that they have money, but they don't have to be so f-ing rotten. (Man, tile layer, age 40–50, Oslo)

A tinsmith in Bergen was angered by those who came into large inheritances:

> I: You know, it might be that deep inside myself, I think that inheriting loads of money, um, it shouldn't be legal. I think it's completely… insane when people can inherit five to ten million Norwegian kroner. It's crazy. And then they complain that they have to pay inheritance taxes. (Man, tinsmith, age 50–60, Bergen)

The boundary that the working class drew (as it appears in our data) was between work (regular working people) and capital (economic and political elites).[8]

[8]A compilation of different statements used by the informants: 'Rich people, stockbrokers, top bosses, bonuses, spoiled brats, conservatives, people who inherit, people who have enough money to buy NOK 40,000 plate warmers, rich men's clubs, salaries in the millions, rich Bergen wives and spoiled girls from the west-end'.

This conflict has long given working-class culture values and norms, arguments, forms of criticism and the power to act.[9] It is this culture and its values (and institutions) that sociologists believe are currently being threatened in similar (but most certainly not identical) ways by great social changes in different countries. It is clear that the economic and social changes which in many other countries have made living conditions more difficult for the working class have not had equally significant consequences for Norwegian workers, protected as they are by the Nordic model.

Working Class and Identity

It is unclear why working-class cultures in various countries have developed distinctive values and attitudes. In societies characterised by a fast-growing divide between workers and the increasingly wealthy, one might expect (at least from a Marxist point of view) a more obvious class conflict. Paradoxically, in some places frustration is directed at weaker and more vulnerable groups (in addition to resistance towards political elites). These disparities are less obvious in Norway. The Nordic model still provides low unemployment, comparatively good labour conditions and salary levels, as well as a wealthy and generous welfare state. Thus, the structural preconditions for significant polarisation between the working class and wealthier groups are not present in the same way they are in the countries on which Lamont reports. In these conditions ('the social welfare state as opium for the people' to rephrase Marx' famous quote), a more harmonious value culture and lack of antagonism towards groups higher up in the hierarchy might be expected. However, the interviews revealed strong boundaries towards the wealthy, and weaker boundaries towards the people who fall outside society, as well as immigrants. One of the reasons that boundaries were drawn upwards rather than downwards may be because equality and social responsibility are such core values in Norwegian culture. Perhaps it is also possible that Norway's working class does not feel that immigrant groups threaten these values? In a study of immigrant roles in Norwegian industry, Friberg and Midtbøen (2018) show that immigrants fill workplaces that the ethnic Norwegian working class has left, either to pursue higher education or to take jobs with higher status. The jobs that immigrants take are often physically demanding, poorly paid and have low status. These are jobs that most ethnic Norwegians in general do not want, and those who do are not hired. According to Friberg and Midtbøen, the employers' argument for this rejection is that there must be something wrong with any ethnic Norwegians who are willing to take jobs with such low status (Friberg & Midtbøen, 2018, p. 16).[10]

[9]The conflict is the most important in the western world, where an elite class of wealthy and super-wealthy are coming to own more and more (Piketty, 2014). We are also seeing similar patterns of growing economic disparity (due to inheritance) in Norway.

[10]Seen from this perspective, there are certain self-reinforcing mechanisms in these sectors that make ethnic Norwegians with low-status jobs outsiders (Friberg & Midtbøen, 2018, p. 20).

So for many ethnic Norwegian workers, immigrants are seen as complements to the labour market rather than competitors.[11]

Are the boundaries against the wealthy an expression of a common (and conscious) Norwegian working-class identity? In a Marxist sense, we know that the 'class in itself – class for itself' prediction has failed (see for instance Somers, 1997, p. 75) and it is difficult to claim that the Norwegian working class has a collective and conscious identity. There are economic, social and cultural disparities between male oil and shipyard workers in western Norway, female service workers in southern Norway, industrial workers from small industrial communities and male craftsmen and female caregivers in large cities. The heterogeneity among Norwegian workers is so great that it is not possible to speak of *one working class culture with one identity*. However, studying the process of how the working classes draw symbolic boundaries enables us to grasp that important values are in fact shared. As Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue, instead of a strong concept of 'identity' we can use the processual term 'identification' that does not presuppose identifying will necessarily result in internal sameness or bounded groupness. 'Identification – of oneself and of others – is intrinsic to social life; 'identity' in the strong sense is not' (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 15). Through the process of drawing boundaries, the values with which the working class identifies itself are revealed. These values are probably easier to maintain when the groups do not feel that their work situation is threatened by immigration. This may be connected with the Norwegian labour force model. One hypothesis may be that as long as this culture and its institutions are maintained, the struggle for individual recognition of personal work and status will be fought against those who are wealthier – and not vulnerable groups. As long as it is felt that immigrants play an important role in the organically solidarity-based society, it is more natural to direct criticism upwards, as expressed by this dock worker:

> I: But if you say that all bus drivers in Oslo, say, skip work one day, Friday, for example, that's a much more important thing than the business owner, because he gets to work in his car, but all the people who work for him, they won't make it to work. They just won't (Man, loading dock worker, age 50–60, Oslo)

Conclusion

The ethnic Norwegian working class distance themselves from those who take advantage of welfare benefits. However, these boundaries appear to be weaker than in corresponding countries. The interpretation proposed here is that national

[11]This does not apply to those who are actually pushed out, and it also varies from branch to branch. In our data, we have not studied the most at-risk working-class groups.

cultural values, including equality and social responsibility, make boundaries against immigrants and weaker groups in Norway difficult – and barely legitimate. Of course, these values are possibly easier to maintain as long as a large proportion of the working class does not feel that its jobs are threatened by immigration. As it stands now, the working class continues to struggle for recognition within a culture that established itself through the growth of the Nordic model. Within this cultural framework, it makes more sense to draw boundaries against wealthy groups rather than weaker groups. The argument that has been developed here is that the Nordic model is *being culturally defended by workers themselves* against pressures from global capitalism. As shown above, prominent sociologists have claimed that growing inequality has changed national labour markets, and that this shift may provide a basis for an increased fear of foreigners. While Norway is far from being unaffected by these tendencies, the Nordic model has so far remained robust throughout the social changes. It seems to put the brakes on increased hostility among the working class towards immigrants, and it appears to be the same groups which, through their struggle to retain recognition of their own societal significance, are simultaneously maintaining a culture for the retention of this cooperative model. In this way the working-class boundary-drawing practice against the wealthy, and the struggle for recognition of its own work, helps ward off anti-solidarity attitudes towards weaker groups and immigrants.

Appendix

I would like to thank Rune Sakslind and Roger Hestholm for our many great discussions and for their useful comments. Thanks also to Ole Johnny Olsen and all the participants of the research seminar at the Department of Sociology, University of Bergen, 1 November 2017 and to the participants in the group on cultural sociology at the Winter Seminar in Sociology, 2018, and especially to Tore Rafoss for his prepared comments. Thanks to two anonymous peers for their useful input and to Arnfinn Haagensen Midtbøen and Amanda Machin for constructive comments

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Chapter 9

Identity and Brexit: Five Readings of the Referendum

Benjamin Abrams, Sebastian Büttner and Amanda Machin

Abstract

On 23 June 2016, 51.9% of those who voted in the UK referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) opted to leave. The impact of this result upon both British and European politics has been profoundly disruptive and divisive. It not only marks a 'seismic moment in post-war British politics' (McGowan, 2018, p. 4) but has also disrupted expectations for the European project; no Member State had previously left the Union. Political institutions have been thrown into disarray, many citizens remain in a situation of existential uncertainty, and the political realm is cleaving. What has come to be known as 'Brexit' seemingly marks a crisis; a tear or a wrench in the very fabric of European politics, or perhaps a knot in which different socio-political tendencies have become entangled. In this chapter, the authors are interested not so much in diagnosing the factors that led to Brexit as they are the different interpretations that the 'Brexit crisis' is now being given. The authors map out five readings of 'the Brexit crisis' and contend that any attempt to grasp the meaning of Brexit demands drawing on all of them.

Keywords: Brexit; Europe; referendum; interpretations; inequality; protest

Introduction

On 23 June 2016, 51.9% of those who voted in the UK referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) opted to leave. The impact of the referendum and its result upon British and European politics has been profoundly disruptive and divisive. What has come to be known as 'Brexit' not only marks

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 147–160
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211015

a 'seismic moment in post war British politics' (McGowan, 2018, p. 4) but has also disrupted expectations for the European project; no Member State has left the Union before and the process of Britain doing so raises questions about the future of the EU and the possibilities of a shared European identity. Political institutions have been thrown into disarray, many citizens and denizens remain in a situation of existential uncertainty,[1] and politics is becoming more antagonistic. As Kalypso Nicoladis writes: 'From wherever you are watching, you may have called this political drama a bewildering mess' (2019, p. vi). Brexit seemingly marks a crisis; a fissure in the very fabric of European politics, a fading hope of finding a vision around which people across Europe could unite. Moving on from this crisis entails navigating this fissure and finding a new vision, but before it is possible to do so we must somehow make sense of the different narratives that compete to define the 'real' meaning of Brexit.

To a significant degree, Brexit has become a battle of narratives. As we seek to understand its meaning and implications, many different versions of the Brexit story arise. All resonate, some more than others. William Outhwaite (2017) contends that Brexit can be viewed in essentially three ways: *warning, virus* and *source of reinforcement*, while Nicoladis (2019) proposes three mythical themes through which the meaning of Brexit can be told: *exodus, reckoning* and *sacrifice*. Following this tactic, we do not try to pin down 'the' single meaning of Brexit and in fact reject the idea that it has one 'correct' meaning, one narrative or frame through which it will all make sense. Conversely, we start from the observation that 'the Brexit crisis' can be interpreted in different ways, and specify not three but five different 'readings' of Brexit that are in general circulation both in public and scientific discourses: *anomaly, disorder, symptom, protest* and *opportunity*.

It might be that Brexit is simply a uniquely British phenomenon, peculiar to a nation that has never fully identified itself with the EU project and is simply an *anomaly* in European politics. For many, however, Brexit indicates a more general degenerative tendency around the world, a throwback towards national borders, a *disorder* (Bhambra, 2017; Calhoun, 2017; Crouch, 2018). It certainly seems that we are witnessing a surge of ethno-majoritarianism, anti-immigration sentiment and right-wing populism. Some may see this tendency as largely the result of a manipulative polemic spouted by political and media elites, but why does it have such salience? Why are the general population susceptible to such sentiments? We strongly contend, therefore, that Brexit can also be read as a *symptom* of larger and deeper societal distortions. These distortions are certainly not exclusive to Britain. On the contrary, we witness growing socio-economic decay and growing societal polarisation in many areas of the world, not least in former highly industrialised regions. Hence, Brexit can also be read as an indication of deep socio-economic inequality and atomism within British society. It may be, however, that the 'Leave vote' was not simply an expression of alienation and a lack of identification with Europe, but a more deliberate *protest* against (neo)liberal ideals and institutions; a retort against the European project (Krastev, 2017). Finally, there

[1]See Tan, this volume.

is another reading of Brexit: as a crisis from which emerges the *opportunity* for the realignment of European and British politics alike and the chance to rethink the possibilities of political identification with and in Europe. In this chapter we map out these five readings of 'the Brexit crisis'. We do not try to judge which of these five readings is dominant, nor with whom it particularly resonates, we simply contend that any attempt to grasp the meaning of Brexit demands drawing on all of them.

Brexit as Anomaly?

Perhaps Brexit is much more about Britain than it is about anywhere else? It might be that the peculiar constellation of various actors and factors in the United Kingdom – its Euroscepticism, its political parties, its tabloid press – are all ultimately responsible for both the referendum and its outcome. In fact, Sara B. Hobolt claims that when we consider the background to the referendum, the result was perhaps not all that surprising (2016, p. 1259). The British public are notoriously Eurosceptic, and many British politicians have been reluctant and even hostile towards the prospect of stronger European integration. The very reason for holding the referendum in the first place was to honour a pledge in the Conservative Party 2015 General Election manifesto, made to appease Eurosceptics within the party and to hold off the threat from the UK Independence Party (UKIP). This decision by the former Prime Minister David Cameron can therefore be situated within a much longer history of Euroscepticism in British politics. Martin Westlake emphasises that British politicians have always been resistant to the idea of integration with the European continent – as he points out: '"Europe" was seen as something "over there"' (Westlake, 2017, p. 15). Indeed, during the past four decades of EU membership, the possibility of leaving the European project has often been brought up in political debates. Perhaps, then, Britain's fate has long been distinctively aligned with an exit from the EU.

If we read Brexit as a distinctively British anomaly, its political configurations offer a compelling source of evidence. It might in fact be argued that Brexit is in large part a consequence of the huge influence of the elite and Eurosceptic community around the Conservative Party, above and beyond its leadership. Such a view is espoused by William Outhwaite, who soberly intones that the very emergence of the referendum

> can be explained in the short term as an attempt to fix an internal problem in the ruling Conservative Party and the challenge faced from the right and from the poisonous racial politics that affect the UK. (2017, pp. viii)

Pressure came not only from Conservative politicians but also from a wider array of other actors: wealthy businesspeople, right-wing news editors and client journalists who were affiliated to the party through a variety of formal and informal social networks. These networks around the periphery of the party not only possess a great amount of resources and a substantial mobilising capacity

that can be deployed to influence intra-party struggles, but are simultaneously unbound by party loyalty or the constraints of party discipline. Unlike party insiders, those on the periphery were able to reach out not only to Tory party members but also to those in UKIP and the Eurosceptic wings of the Labour party in order to build a coalition around their ideological projects. The UK's right-wing media, for example, is widely considered to hold the power to influence British politics and public opinion, and has also been regarded as having played a key role in the Brexit vote, with some scholars remarking that the 'largely Eurosceptic press' was integral in shaping public attitudes during the referendum (McGowan, 2018, p. 3).

The sentiments of a British *Sonderweg* often go hand in hand, moreover, with nostalgia for Britain's imperial past (Bhambra, 2017; Holmwood, 2017). Leading Conservative politicians, not least current Prime Minister Boris Johnson, evoke Britain's global history and its previous global significance. Many powerful figures within the business and political elites have long entertained the desire to 'restore greatness to Britain'. This imperial nostalgia is arguably quintessentially British. For Danny Dorling and Sally Tomlinson, the 'inherited empire mentality' that remained as part of 'the British psyche' was the main reason for the referendum's Leave result. As they put it:

> A small number of people in Britain have a dangerous, imperialist misconception of our standing in the world, and that this above all else was the catalyst for the process leading up to Brexit. (Dorling & Tomlinson, 2019, p. 2)

Virdee and McGeevor also diagnose a 'deep nostalgia for empire' (2018, p. 1803) and 'longstanding racialized structures of feeling' (2018, p. 1804) which they say is conflated with English nationalism: 'Englishness has been reasserted through a racializing, insular nationalism, and it found its voice in the course of Brexit' (2018, p. 1804).

Perhaps, then, Brexit is a very *British* story. Yet we think – as perhaps we are bound to as social scientists – that the story exceeds British exceptionalism and that this reading should be juxtaposed with others. As Hobolt points out: 'the sentiments that led a majority of voters to opt for Brexit are gaining strength across the continent' (2016, p. 1273).

Brexit as Disorder?

Contrary to the narrative of Brexit as a particularly British anomaly, Brexit might otherwise be read as part of a wider tendency – not just in Europe but around the world – of what we term an 'ethno-majoritarian' impulse, which has found expression in the form of anti-immigration sentiment and right-wing populism (Calhoun, 2017; Crouch, 2018). 'Ethno-majoritarianism' can be defined as the idea that the majority ethnicity within a given country desires social, economic and political control over that country (and thus also control over its borders). Whereas nationalism can take various forms and varies insofar as it may be

inclusive or repressive (Machin, 2015), ethno-majoritarianism does not assert the unity of a nation per se. Rather it represents an ethnic majority's aspiration to take (back) control over the state in which it resides, notwithstanding any potential cost to collective wellbeing or respect for differences. Such reassertion of control might entail devolved powers for majority ethnic regions, restrictions on migration, ethnic economic protectionism or redistribution, or, as in the case of Brexit, withdrawal from global treaties, international courts and supranational organisations.

One might argue that the presence of an ethno-majoritarian impulse is certainly not new and has in fact been latent in many societies around the world for a very long time. Nonetheless, this impulse has certainly begun to resonate more broadly within societies as of late. The rise of *Alternative für Deutschland* in Germany, *Vox* in Spain and *Jobbik* in Hungary are all underpinned to some degree by the same impulse that this reading attributes to Brexit.[2] The same can be said about the rise of the *Freedom Party* in Austria and *Front National* in France, although these parties have a much longer history.[3] Even further afield, we can point to the surprising popularity of politicians such as Donald Trump in the United States and Pauline Hanson in Australia. In all these cases – as with Brexit – this ethno-majoritarian impulse might be said to have become powerful through a combination of populist campaigning, anti-immigration rhetoric and 'post-truth politics' (Koller, Kopf, & Miglbauer, 2019, p. 3).

Gurminder Bhambra has contended that the UK referendum 'was less a debate on the pros and cons of [EU] membership than a proxy for discussions about race and migration' (2017, p. 91). Hostility to ethnic diversity, multiculturalism and immigration was undoubtedly one important factor in the run-up to the vote (and in the popular interpretation of its result). Numerous xenophobic attacks and open discrimination were reported both during the Brexit campaign and in its immediate aftermath, as documented by report published by the UK Government Home Office (O'Neill, 2017). Bhambra attributes this to racialised discourses that reinforced ideas of who 'belongs' and who 'we' are (Bhambra, 2017, p. 92). Such discourses have long been used to define British citizenship and identity, situated within dominant accounts of British history. However, the increasing visibility of anti-immigration sentiment is not only a British problem, but a tendency that we see in many European countries as part of this ethno-majoritarian trend, especially since the culmination of the refugee crisis in 2015.

Reading Brexit as *disorder* is to say that it constitutes yet one more manifestation of rising ethno-majoritarian sentiments, increasingly stoked by right-wing populists and fuelled by the media. Understanding Brexit through this lens is useful in uncovering this more general trend that affects many societies around the world. But why has this state of such profound disease arisen? Why would it be the case that people around the world have become so unwilling to embrace those

[2]See Kucharzewski & Nicola, this volume; Bartoszewicz, this volume.

[3]For a deeper explanation of the rise of the support for *Front National* in the formerly left-wing working class in France, see Eribon (2018).

of different ethnicities, and have come to desire so much more ethnic majority control over their societies? Might the interpretation of Brexit as the straightforward outcome of enduring prejudice and xenophobic tendencies miss other factors that interplay with them? Our next reading of Brexit speaks to precisely this question.

Brexit as Symptom?

To depict Brexit purely in terms of reactionary and racist ideologies is to miss the underlying socio-economic causes for such disorder. Our third reading of Brexit points to the outcome of decades of neoliberal economics and austerity politics that have resulted in sharp economic inequality, social polarisation and precarity – all further spurred by the post-2007 economic downturn. New vulnerabilities and fears of losing ground have grown especially among the strata of society usually regarded as the backbone of democratic capitalism: the middle class. Read in this way, Brexit is not simply a disorder but a *symptom* of a much larger and deeper crisis that extends beyond Europe: the crisis of post-industrial capitalism. In the past few years, numerous economists and social scientists have stressed that the success story of democratic capitalism, which has fostered unprecedented social inclusion, relatively widespread wealth and social security, increasingly lost its credence in many Western societies during the post-war period (Crouch, 2004, 2018; Krastev, 2017; Piketty, 2014; Streeck, 2014; Ther, 2016) .

In his monograph *Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism* (2014), the political economist Wolfgang Streeck dates the structural and persistent crisis of contemporary capitalism to the early 1970s, when the success story of industrial capitalism and its promises of increasing wealth, full employment and social participation through mass consumption received its first serious setback, leading to the oil shock and the breakdown of the Bretton–Woods system. Since then, according to Streeck, Western capitalist societies have experienced a period of drastic de-industrialisation in many core areas of their economies that has significantly shaken up the established social order. The economic changes wrought by de-industrialisation have produced an array of new winners and a much wider set of losers. This has been accompanied by rising socio-economic polarisation between booming post-industrial centres and decaying industrial areas. As Streeck and others emphasise, along with these structural changes, governments have significantly shifted their policies in order to safeguard the economy and overcome structural economic deficits: first, through a massive downsizing of state intervention and through excessive privatisation of formerly state-controlled business sectors; second, by liberalising and deregulating economic activities, especially financial industries and markets; and third, by increasing the financialisation of state debts, which led to the banking crisis in 2007/2008 and the fiscal crisis in many European countries in its aftermath.

These paradigmatic changes in economic policy were mainly driven forward by a neoliberal economic agenda, in which the EU played more than a minor role (Streeck, 2014, pp. 97ff). With the implementation of the Common Market in 1992 and the establishment of the Euro as the EU's official currency in 1999, the

EU strongly fostered the liberalisation of national economies and pushed forward privatisation, deregulation and liberal policies for the sake of common European economic goals (Münch, 2010). Since then, the EU has been subject to criticism and protest against current economic policies. From at least the time of the financial crisis, the European project has become much more contested and politised in many EU member states (Rauh & Zürn, 2014 ; Ruser, 2015).

Post-industrial capitalism has brought about a new global division of labour, new hierarchies of work and economic value-creation, and a new economic geography with more clear-cut centre-periphery distinctions and increasing polarisation between prospering and declining regions (Sassen, 2001, 2008). While social inequalities between countries are in aggregate slightly decreasing, post-industrial capitalism has instead fostered social inequalities within societies and growing social polarisation between the highest and lowest percentiles of society (Baccaro & Howell, 2017; Milanovic, 2018; Piketty, 2014).

In addition to the role played by de-industrialisation, Europe has also experienced a growing dismantling of the welfare state since the 1970s (Pierson, 1994). Indeed, the very meaning of social security has changed from de-commodification to market-based principles, such as 'employability', 'flexicurity' and 'life-long learning' (Lessenich, 2008; Miller & Rose, 2008, pp. 84ff). Furthermore, many countries have been hit by a severe regime of fiscal austerity, limiting the room for effective public policy manoeuvres, and tightly restricting the financial leeway of municipalities and local communities in many areas around the globe, including formerly industrial and more remote areas in Britain. Thiemo Fetzer goes as far as asserting a direct connection between the austerity measures that varied widely across Britain – 'with the sharpest reductions in the poorest areas' (2019, p. 3850) – and support for the Leave campaign (2019).

The economic transformations of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have had fundamental repercussions for the fabric of contemporary societies. According to Bauman (2000, 2001) and others (such as Miller & Rose, 2008; Münch, 2011), post-industrial capitalism increasingly dismantles cultural institutions, ties and activities that in times past sustained intergenerational and cross-ethnic bonds in society and a sense of identity and belonging. This is not to say that social cohesion has decreased *per se*, but rather that it has transformed, and is now characterised by new forms of socialising and new cultural traits. Trade unions, religious institutions, community associations and amateur sporting clubs have long played an important role in integrating individuals into a broader community. It is not only in America that community bonds have weakened steadily, that the amount of truly 'free' time outside of the work-day has dwindled, that past avenues of social interaction have been eclipsed primarily by those which are decidedly more 'profitable' and 'productive', and that 'we have been pulled apart from one another' (Putnam, 2000, p. 27).[4]

[4]A similar argument to the one made by Putnam is made by Richard Sennett in *Corrosion of Character* (1999). Of course, employing such a critique is no reason to essentialise a now winnowed 'British culture', or idealise a past epoch of a stronger 'social cohesion'.

Brexit can therefore be seen as a consequence of neoliberal capitalism having undermined what Durkheim (1893) once described as 'mechanical solidarity' (see also Münch, 2011). The vocational, cultural and local associations that once provided common ground among people subject to relatively homogenous conditions have been replaced by highly individualised patterns of commercial and media consumption that do not draw masses of people into regular contact with one another. Durkheim believed that the ebbing-away of mechanical solidarity under advanced capitalism would give rise to new 'organic' forms of solidarity grounded in broader experiences of socio-economic interdependence. The phenomenon of Brexit would imply (according to this reading) that this did not occur uniformly in modern Britain, and that – far from springing up organically – solidarity and identity are not given but are rather contingent upon socio-economic conditions.

Though reading Brexit as a symptom of broader problems allows for a deeper analysis of the sources of British discontent, this interpretation neglects to explain how a general state of discontent was channelled into political opposition to the EU. Why would socio-economic inequality and related political cleavages ultimately manifest themselves in the form of a vote to leave the EU? Why also would they become entangled, at least in part, with the reactionary and exclusionary tendencies that accompanied Brexit? Is it possible that the Leave campaign galvanised the dissent arising from Britain's broader problems by offering a means to protest against them?

Brexit as Protest?

If Brexit is a symptom of growing inequality and the shattering of community by unfettered neoliberalism and severe austerity, then is it not also indicative of a rising clamour against it? Perhaps Brexit can be seen as a backlash against unfavourable socio-economic developments and general discontent about the loss of securities and certainties, and as 'giving voice to the predicament of the national sense of alienation' (Delanty, 2017, p. 118). A further reading of Brexit interprets it as an act of protest – either against the EU in particular or the status quo in general. According to this reading, the Brexit referendum gave British citizens the chance to show their disillusionment with the liberal consensus, and the Leave vote was a demonstration of resentment and growing scepticism about liberal ideas and so-called 'liberal elites' (Krastev, 2017).

Interpreting Brexit through the lens of protest suggests that the referendum can be seen as mobilising those who were frustrated by the prevailing regime. On the one hand, this includes highly politically engaged campaigners, for example 'Lexiteers' who saw the EU as reinforcing neoliberal institutions and values and called for radical change in the direction of democratic socialism (Blakeley, 2019). On the other hand, it also includes those who felt detached, perhaps even alienated, from politics. As far as many in the UK were concerned, they had received all of the disadvantages of a globalised economy and international cooperation yet were being told now to vote in favour of it by those who had reaped all the rewards. Hobolt, for example, observes 'a growing divide, both economically and

culturally, between those who feel left behind by the forces of globalisation and those who feel they have benefitted from it' (2016, p. 1272). Such divisions, she claims, have been mobilised by populist parties. Yet for others such as Virdee and McGeever 'it is too simplistic to suggest that Brexit constituted the revolt of the 'left behind'' (2018, p. 1803) since, as they point out, only 24% of the Leave vote came from the lowest two social classes.

Demographic data on the Brexit poll certainly supports the interpretation that it was the losers of globalisation who voted to leave (see The Guardian, 2016). Inhabitants of the well-off inner districts of London and of the larger British cities, the academic elites in university towns, and the young and educated middle class generally voted to remain in the EU. The greatest support for Brexit showed up in the most outlying districts of London, such as Havering and Bexley, and, above all, in more remote and rural areas of East and Central England. The socio-economic and socio-demographic pattern seems quite clear, at least for England: the older the voters were and the more a voting district had been hit by the economic downturn, the higher the support for Brexit. And yet demographics cannot give us the full picture: they do not explain why the population in Scotland and Northern Ireland were much more EU-friendly than their fellow citizens in England. Moreover, this apparent socio-economic pattern is belied by many Brexit supporters who are relatively well-off, such as members of the British upper class and Conservative elites who were and still are in favour of Brexit.

One important factor that must be mentioned here is the highly volatile and contingent nature of plebiscites. Experience of these mechanisms in many countries has shown that they do not necessarily represent 'the vote of the people', but that they often overrepresent the mobilisation of protest voters and those who are particularly involved with and emotionally attached to the issue of the plebiscite. Moreover, since referendums allow for an easy binary yes/no vote, they are also often used by protest voters as a general settlement with 'the government', 'the ruling party', the 'prime minister', or just 'ruling elites'. It is not only in the UK that people have used referendums and elections to vent their frustrations by voting for populist parties offering an alternative (Krastev, 2017, pp. 85ff; McGowan, 2018, p. 3).

Indeed, in a political landscape where the differences between mainstream parties have withered away, right-wing populists are often perceived to represent those who want something different: 'right wing demagogues' says Chantal Mouffe, are sometimes able to offer 'an alternative to the stifling consensus' (Mouffe, 2005, p. 66). Accordingly, Lee McGowan understands the Brexit vote as 'a backlash against the establishment and the liberal elites from many voters who felt disadvantaged and let down' (2018, p. 3). Gerard Delanty has likewise diagnosed the emergence of a growing cleavage between 'cosmopolitans' and 'nationals', which has come to dominate public discussion (2017, p. 116).

Linked with the rise of right-wing populist movements and anti-liberal resentment, then, is a growing discomfort with alleged 'liberal' and 'cosmopolitan elites' and with the complexities and peculiarities of inter- and trans-national policy coordination. It is, of course, no coincidence that Brexit campaigners put forward 'alternative truths' in the form of images of a 'parasitic' and 'self-serving'

European technocracy. The slogan 'take back control' was proclaimed against the image of an 'alien' and 'adverse' European bureaucracy that was only interested in British taxpayers' money. Similarly important were the construction of migrants as racialised 'others' (Bhambra, 2017) and as 'scapegoats'.[5] Furthermore, most of the rules, regulations, and principles of the EU were portrayed as hostile to Britain's sovereignty and the interests of British citizens – Leave campaigner Michael Gove, for example, stated that voting to remain in the EU was equivalent to 'voting to be hostages' (Day, 2016). Hence, a substantial part of the Brexit vote can be read as a protest against the EU as an exemplar of globalisation, neoliberalism and the demand for sovereignty on the one hand, and against immigration on the other hand.

Brexit as Opportunity?

Is it possible to give Brexit a more positive reading? Could it be that this crisis can provide the possibility for both Britain and Europe to reinvent themselves and offer an opportunity for new collective identifications to emerge?

It is indubitable that there is today a very strong far-right movement across Europe and many other world regions. For the first time since the first half of the twentieth century, far-right parties are gaining ground and building transnational coalitions. The EU has become a familiar whipping-boy for such parties, who assign to it all manner of distasteful traits, with radically varying levels of veracity. In order to sustain its reputation, the EU has allocated vast sums in the form of economic aid and subsidies (Gebrekidan, Apuzzo, & Novak, 2019) but has received little loyalty in return. By recruiting financial mechanisms to address popular discontent, Brussels has in effect doubled down on the narrative of the EU as a set of mutually beneficial economic arrangements enshrined by a series of treaties. This is despite the fact that many of those unhappy with the EU cite political exclusion as a core motivating factor, rather than economic matters (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016).

Selling the European project as a mutually beneficial economic arrangement and a set of treaties may have once been useful to policymakers, but this is a radically unstable and woefully inadequate form of justification for a political union. Economic downturns and shocks can easily undermine the benefits of such arrangements, particularly if new partners appear to be offering a better deal. Alternatively, substantive political objections to the EU remain unaddressed by such a narrative. If it does not change tack, it is quite possible that the Union in its current form will eventually fail. Although economic benefits remain a useful incentive, is it possible that a more substantial vision of Europe could be advanced? A vision that resonates across the continent and challenges the narratives of 'us' and 'them' asserted by the far-right? Could it be that, if nothing else, Brexit has drawn attention to the fact that preserving the current structure of the EU is in many ways contrary to the European project? Perhaps the Brexit process actually opens up the possibility of fomenting a public sphere that can draw

[5]See Fotou, this volume.

together citizens, build a stronger identification with the EU, and permit the building of political alliances across existing divides that would sustain trust in EU institutions, underpin democratic processes and ultimately safeguard the European project.

The EU might be well served by investing its resources in a social and political programme of entrenchment: precisely the kind of programme which British politicians have opposed, and even sought special exemption from. Many of the European project's notable weaknesses could be addressed using the opportunity provided by Brexit, which has rid the EU of a powerful opponent to European integration. With the most effective Eurosceptic gone, those who seek to strengthen the EU might now take the steps to reform and reconstruct the Union, granting the European project a fighting chance once more. Though there exists an array of smaller public 'sphericules' inhabited by communities of intellectuals, businesspeople and other elite segments of European publics (Adam, 2015), it cannot be said that a public sphere has emerged at a European level with a sizeable proportion of citizens engaged in shared public affairs (Eriksen, 2005; Ferrari, 2017). To resolve such a problem from the top down, EU funding for film, TV and radio might be stepped up considerably, while an independent EU news service could be founded. Legislators could also take steps to create direct links between local political bodies and the EU itself, ensuring that European outreach connects to communities without being diverted by the intermediary of national governments. The EU could likewise initiate and support projects that bring together regions across national borders on shared issues that are inadequately addressed by national governments, using citizens' assemblies or other shared institutions. Issues ripe for such projects include climate change, migration, security, corruption and even the EU itself. These discussions may encourage the construction of new alliances that challenge prevailing constructions of a national 'us' versus a supranational 'them'. Such discussions might even provoke a renewed grassroots engagement in the question of what and who is 'European', in a plurality of public spheres, around a diversity of concerns, through a series of democratic 'multilogues' (Tully, 2007, p. 75).

There are arguably also opportunities afforded by Brexit to Britain. Though the much-touted economic benefits of leaving the EU are unlikely to manifest on the scale promised by their leading advocates (Busch & Matthes, 2016), it does afford a considerable degree of political freedom to ruling elites. The regional government in Scotland has used the European issue to make a renewed push for independence, while socialist-leaning 'Lexiteers' have made much of potential post-Brexit opportunities to turn Britain into a more egalitarian society, noting forthcoming freedom from European hostility to socialist industrial strategy, procurement schemes, and to policy platforms such as public ownership of 'energy, transport, postal services, telecommunications, education, and health' (Guinan & Hanna, 2017). Meanwhile, those within the governing Conservative Party have claimed that the Brexit process amounts to an 'unleashing' of Britain's social, economic and political potential, allowing the UK government to 'take a fresh look at many areas of policy, from fishing and farming to science funding and regional regeneration' (Lightfoot, 2017).

What is certainly true – regardless of one's political colours – is that Brexit grants future governments an enormous amount of political license, which could be used to reshape democratic institutions, alter the justice system, regulate or deregulate economic activity, and to invest public money in unforeseen opportunities. Likewise, when combined with the withdrawal from EU institutions, the UK's quite notable absence of legislative oversight for international treaties provides political leaders with the scope to totally alter UK law on a great many controversial matters well beyond the scope of mere trade (Barrett, Bjorge, Smith, & Lang, 2020). Brexit thus heralds many opportunities for Britain's leaders, though it will be the agenda its leaders choose to pursue that will determine the opportunities for its people. At the same time, unpopular decisions can no longer be blamed on Brussels as has been all too often the case in the past. Will the UK government be made more accountable to its citizens? Does this allow citizens to challenge some of the institutions that might have led them to vote to leave the EU in the first place? Could Brexit provide the opportunity for Britain to reinvent its own identity as well as its relationship with and in Europe?

Conclusion

If the EU project was already in crisis, this crisis was deepened when Europeans woke up on 24 June 2016 to the news that Britain had voted to leave. In contrast to what seem now to be outdated expectations of a trajectory towards European unification and the emergence of a robust sense of European belonging and identification, it seems that we are witnessing a fragmentation and polarisation of the European public sphere(s). It may be that by making this more apparent, Brexit offers an opportunity for reinventing Europe. But the difficultly in seizing this opportunity, we contend, is that it is hard to get a grip on the meaning of Brexit, since different interpretations or 'readings' vie for dominance as the 'truth'.

Our aim, therefore, has been to map out five different readings of Brexit, none of which can be disregarded and each of which highlights an important issue for sociological analysis and practical politics. It may well be the case that certain readings resonate with individuals and groups who identify in a particular way. Moving beyond Brexit and coping with the challenges it poses, we contend, demands precisely the contestation of dominant demarcations of 'us' and 'them', the renewed negotiation of what it means to be European, and a better understanding of the processes, actors, problems and contexts that led 17,410,742 citizens of Europe to vote to leave it.

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Chapter 10

Identity and Representation: Representative Bureaucracy in the European Union

Promise and Pitfalls?

Maximilian Nagel and B. Guy Peters

Abstract

Much analysis considering the putative political challenges of the European Union (EU) has focussed on the (lack of) participation and identifications of European citizens. But what about the bureaucrats working on their behalf? This contribution will address the issue of representative bureaucracy and identification in the EU, specifically in the European Commission. While the literature on representativeness of public administration has focussed on issues of social class, ethnicity and gender, it is also important to consider geographical representativeness. This is particularly important when region (in this case of the EU nations) is relevant. As the authors point out, this question is all the more relevant given the assumption that individuals who join the Commission will identify with Europe more than their home country. Yet, at a time of ongoing discussions about a crisis of the EU and in the midst of populist governments, such an assumption is at least questionable. While it is difficult to assess the extent to which decision-making may be influenced by nationality, at least understanding patterns of representation can be important for understanding how passive – if not active – representation functions. The formal emphasis on representative bureaucracy within the EU raises several potential conflicts with other important principles of public management. It also creates a conflict with the fundamental commitment to creating transnational personnel who eschew strong attachments to nation states.

Keywords: Representative bureaucracy; administrative culture; European Commission; national identity; transnational personnel; geographical representation

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 161–178
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211016

Introduction

It has become a cliché to say that the EU is a political system unlike any other. Whether best described as an international organisation, a proto-state or a de facto federal union, the uniqueness of the Union is undeniable. That said, it faces the same problems as any other political system including questions of representation and legitimacy. The 'compound' nature of this political system (Fabbrini, 2007) means that, like any federal system, it has member units (nation states in this case) that have some sovereignty in their own right, and to which citizens may have continuing loyalties. Consequently, this issue is reflected by the citizens of the EU. They might be German, French or Polish, but share the European identity.[1]

Federal or compound states often face the question of how to represent the interests of their component units. In a unitary state, this is not so much of an issue, but in the EU, with component units having centuries of history as independent, sovereign powers, there is a genuine issue of how the interests of the 27 members should be represented. Thus, policymaking in such a multi-level setting is difficult and challenging. The European Council is one major venue for representation of national interests while the European Parliament is another for citizens.

An additional locus for representation is the Commission, the executive branch of the EU. Given the power of the Commission both in initiating policy and in monitoring implementation, this may be an especially important institution in which to consider representation. Against the background that most scholars usually focus either on the European Parliament or on the European Council, this contribution sheds light on the representativeness of the European Commission. It is among the most important European institutions, yet very little is known about aspects of representation. How does the composition of the Commission compare with that of the EU as a whole? And are particular Directorate-Generals (departments) more or less representative than others? And does any over-representation reflect the power of the Member States in policy domains, for example the British in financial services before Brexit.

This contribution will address the issue of representative bureaucracy in the EU specifically in the European Commission (see Stevens, 2009). While the literature on representativeness of public administration has focussed on issues of social class (e.g. Kennedy, 2014), ethnicity (e.g. Hong, 2016) and gender, it is also important to consider geographical representativeness especially when region (in this case nation) is relevant. As we will point out below, the question is all the more relevant given the assumption that individuals who join the Commission will identify with Europe ahead of their home nation. While it is difficult to assess the extent to which decision-making may be influenced by nationality, at least understanding patterns of representation can be important for learning how passive – if not active – representation functions (Selden, 1997). Within the representative

[1]See Tan, this volume.

bureaucracy literature there is an important distinction made between active and passive representation. The latter is easier to identify and to quantify. The rather simple question here is whether or not the demographic composition of public employment reflects the society as a whole. Active representation, on the other hand, assumes that those members of the previously excluded ethnic or gender groups will act on the basis of their demographic characteristics. Representation ceases to be just an enumeration of who is in the organisation and begins to be a decision premise. Overall, values of EU staff members matter, because their socialisation is crucial for successful European integration (Kassim, 2018).

It is also important to note that representativeness of the European Commission should be considered in light of the degree of identification that its members have with the EU. This is to some extent an analogy with the idea of 'active representation' in the representative bureaucracy literature (Selden, 1997). That is, it may matter little if members of the Commission come from one country or another if they all are committed to the European project and identify with Europe as much as, or more than, their home nation.

This contribution is going to portray the European Commission and its main characteristics as a bureaucracy. Afterwards it sheds light on questions of the loyalty of its public servants. Against this background, the contribution introduces the concept of administrative culture as its analytical perspective. Based on the well-established literature on administrative culture, it develops three ideal types of bureaucrats of the European Commission, which it links with the ideas of representative bureaucracy. This book discusses a possible crisis of the European community and the identification of its citizens. Some argue there is a crisis in representation. Do bureaucrats of the European Commission identify with the European project? In the following, this contribution elaborates this question.

The European Commission as a Bureaucracy

As noted, this contribution will focus on the role of the European Commission as the executive, and especially as the locus of public administration for the EU. This institution is in many ways a bureaucracy like any other (Wille, 2013), but in other ways it is a distinctive organisation (Kassim, 2018). That distinctiveness may be important for its capacity to legitimate the EU and to perform the tasks usually associated with a public bureaucracy, and with the executive branch of government more generally. There are several important features that distinguish the Commission from the executive in other governments.

First, the Commissioners, the rough equivalent of ministers in a national government, are appointed on the suggestion of national governments, and approved by the European Parliament for a fixed period. This level of the executive is representative in a sense, with each Member State having at least one Commissioner, although this does give disproportionate representation to smaller Member States. There has tended to be some specialisation among the countries with, for example, the Northern European countries frequently having responsibility for the environment and social issues, while France and Spain have dominated agriculture.

Second, a very large proportion of the staff of the Commission are on secondment from national governments. Thus, rather than having its own staff the Commission is heavily influenced by temporary employees who are presumably good Europeans while in Brussels (or at one of the various European agencies scattered around the Union) but also expect to return to their national bureaucracies. Because their career paths may be more determined by officials at the national level, they may be loath to become too much creatures of Brussels (Trondal, Murdoch, & Geys, 2015). But again, they may have been interested in coming to Brussels because of their commitment to Europe.

Third, unlike most bureaucracies, the European Commission actually does very little implementation. European regulations and directives are implemented through the national governments, with the Commission assuming a monitoring role, rather than performing the implementation themselves. The Commission is therefore relatively small when compared to national public administrations (Ritter, 2006) (some 33,000 employee – many of whom are translators – compared to some 200,000 in Belgium's national public administration). This may not affect its representativeness *per se*, but it does mean that there are continuing close connections between Brussels officials and those in the Member States – including the original states of the Brussels officials.

Consequently, the bureaucracy of the European Commission can easily be distinguished from the bureaucracies of its Member States. Mission statements of each EU institution stress the importance of a European identity; however these factors may combine to make the Commission less European than might be expected from the formal emphasis on eschewing nationality in favour of a European identity. That said, survey evidence does indicate that a significant majority of the members of the Commission join that organisation because of a commitment to Europe (Kassim et al., 2013, pp. 55–57). However, much of that commitment exists prior to joining the Commission, rather than as a function of socialisation after joining. Thus, there may be some tensions between the assumed commitment to Europe and the nature of the tasks on the job, given the impact that decisions taken in Brussels may have on their home country.

These characteristics of the European Commission to some extent present a paradox of representation and identity. On the one hand, the members of the Commission come from a national context and many will return to their national governments after a time in Brussels. On the other hand, they often identify as Europeans perhaps more than as citizens of a member country, and their joining the Commission means they are obliged to forego national allegiance in favour of Europe. Maintaining this dual commitment may put these officials in a difficult position when performing their tasks.

Loyalty in the European Commission

The question of loyalty of civil servants in the Commission is crucial. Loyalty may be created by socialisation on the job in the Commission (Mayntz, 1985). A second argument might be that civil servants who come into the EU bureaucracy are already more European than the average national public servant.

The Commission recruits applicants based on their national backgrounds, yet their national background need not play any role as soon as they come into the EU bureaucracy. Their loyalty is solely to the Commission. This is especially important at a time when various EU Member States have nationalist governments.

For many years, it was expected that civil servants working for the European Commissions would be pro-European almost by definition. Yet, several articles (cf. Hooghe, 1999; Trondal, 2001; Bauer, 2012) show that this assumption is questionable. One school of thought argues that pre-recruitment experiences, including previous work in national governments, matter in shaping values and attitudes (Hooghe, 2002). Another group of scholars states that it is rather the post-recruitment experience gained while working in the Commission that has a higher impact on loyalties (Trondal, 2001). Some argue that self-interests and cost-benefit calculations are also crucial (Bauer 2012). It becomes obvious that we must take into account the values, attitudes and work-related role understandings of EU Commission bureaucrats. Against this background, we approach this topic by looking closer into the well-established literature on administrative culture, especially as it relates to the European Commission.

Administrative Culture

Understanding the behaviour of European public servants requires knowledge of how they see their roles as well as their values and attitudes. Moreover, their socialisation within European organisations is crucial for their behaviour. Following the well-established literature on administrative culture, we introduce an ideal typology of European Commission bureaucrats. The typology is based on the seminal 'comparative elite study' by Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981) on administrative elites in various western bureaucracies. Before describing our ideal images, we should look briefly at the concept of administrative culture and culture in general.

> In many ways, culture is to the organisation what personality is to the individual – a hidden, yet unifying theme that provides meaning, direction, and mobilisation. (Kilmann, Saxton, & Serpa, 1985, p. 97)

First, Schröter (2013) stresses that organisational culture may be interpreted in many different ways. Kluckhohn (1951) discusses culture as 'patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artefacts' (p. 86). Furthermore, two main approaches towards culture can be identified (Kluckhohn & Kelly, 1972); the explanatory and the descriptive (Schröter, 2013). The observable behaviour is directly linked to descriptive concepts of culture. On the other hand, explanatory approaches focus on values, attitudes as well as role understanding that cannot be observed directly. Descriptive concepts of culture are well-used in the field of anthropological research. The seminal work of Mary Douglas (1982) labelled cultural theory as one of the

major contributions to this field. Douglas introduced a two-by-two table, which is based on the two dimensions group and grid. In her work, she discusses measures of sociality. The group dimension gives information on the level of bond between a group of people. A low level indicates that there is a weak feeling of unity, if any at all; individuals are rather separated from each other. A high level on the other hand signals a high sense of unity.

The second dimension of Douglas's typology grid represents the interdependence of the group. Heterogeneity indicates that people within a group do not depend on each other, while homogeneity highlights the dependency of people within a group. Societies that rank high in both dimensions are home to individuals that have 'little option to shape their own lives, politically or socially' (Peters, 2018, p. 50). Based on the intersections of these two dimensions, Douglas (1982) introduced four ideal social patterns: fatalism, collectivism, individualism, and egalitarianism. Protagonists of descriptive approaches, especially in the anthropological context, understand culture as 'not a variable at all, but as a root metaphor for conceptualising organisations' (Smircich, 1983, p. 339). By the same token, culture incorporates the directly observable behaviour of individuals. Christopher Hood (1998) followed Douglas's work and made the two-by-two table relevant for new public management research (Peters, 2018). Hood discusses the four different cultures in the context of public management. Still, this contribution argues that culture is not always observable and therefore follows an explanatory approach. This allows us to look closer at the relevance of values, attitudes and work-related role understandings. This contribution defines culture as one aspect of an organisation, and as one of many influences on the behaviour of organisational members.

As a corollary, we base our work on Kroeber and Parsons, who claimed:

> that it is useful to define the concept of culture for most usages more narrowly than has been generally the case in the American anthropological tradition, restricting its reference to transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas (…) as factors in the shaping of human behaviour and the artefacts produced through behaviour. (Kroeber & Parsons, 1958, p. 583)

In 1965, Almond and Verba published their seminal work on the relationship between the political culture of a country and the stability of its political system. Within their Civic Culture Study, the authors define culture and 'stress that we employ the concept of culture in only one of its many meanings: that of psychological orientation toward societal objects' (Almond & Verba, 1965, p. 12).

For this reason, culture is understood as the 'software of the mind' (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010, p. 5) or may be defined as a mental program (Hofstede et al., 2010). Yet, from an explanatory perspective one cannot predict a certain behavioural outcome solely based on cultural variables. By the same token, culture is considered a mental disposition which makes certain behaviours more likely than others (Elkins & Simeon, 1979). Hofstede et al. (2010) argue that organisational culture is the 'collective programming of the mind that

distinguishes members of one group or category of people from others' (p. 6). In the 1960s, Hofstede (1980) analysed the values and attitudes of more than 100,000 workers at computer hardware company IBM, gaining data from more than 40 different IBM headquarters. Within his analysis, Hofstede discussed different management cultures and introduced five dimensions, each characteristic of the national management culture. Against the background of questions of loyalty and the relevance of national backgrounds, the relevance of the Values Survey Modules (Hofstede's research was made popular under this term) is high. The five dimensions include the Power Distance Index, the Masculinity Index, the Individualist Index and the Uncertainty Avoidance Index. (The fifth index was introduced after Hofstede conducted his survey in China and is known as the Chinese Value Survey.)

Member States of the European Union differ in their positions and therefore indicate differences in values of EU bureaucrats. Even though the study offers an interesting and useful perspective, it does not discuss job-related role understandings and does not differentiate between bureaucrats from different Member States. Following this line of argument would mean neglecting possible differences within bureaucrats who come from the same Member State.

When we look at administrative culture, we assume that it is defined as a pattern of beliefs, attitudes and job-related role understandings that exist among members of the public sector (Schröter & Röber, 1997). Against this background, we follow Rokeach (1973) who defines attitudes as an 'enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence' (p. 5). Orientations are considered to play a major role in shaping human behaviour, yet they only make a certain behavioural outcome more likely. Nevertheless, orientations are characterised as relatively impervious to short-term influences, because they were developed throughout an entire process of socialisation. For this reason, structure may be changed easier than an organisation's culture.

In attempting to shed light on the administrative cultures of the European Commission, we make use of several concepts. In particular, the typology of bureaucrats established by Aberbach et al. (1981) in their comparative study of administrative elites in western bureaucracies is especially relevant for our work and serves as a starting point for our own ideal images. The four images are characterised by 'the assumption that the degree of a bureaucracy's responsiveness to its social and political environment depends largely on the beliefs and understandings of the bureaucrats themselves' (Schröter & Röber, 1997, p. 111).

Image one represents a classical bureaucrat from the second half of the nineteenth century, who executes decisions made by politicians. There is a dichotomy between political and administrative spheres as described by Woodrow Wilson (1887), because bureaucrats do not trust political institutions. Image two describes the model of a Weberian bureaucrat and an expert bureaucracy. In contrast to the first image, this one contributes to the political decision-making process. Given their role as experts, bureaucrats bring in their knowledge, whereas politicians contribute with their interest. According to the authors (Aberbach et al., 1981), image two can be predominantly found in the first half of the

twentieth century. Image three represents a political bureaucrat. Aberbach et al. (1981) argue that:

> both bureaucrats and politicians engage in policymaking, and both are concerned with politics. The real distinction between them is this: whereas politicians articulate broad, diffuse interests of unorganised individuals, bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of organised clienteles. (p. 16)

In this context, bureaucrats appear as mediators of political interest, yet they may have their own agenda. Image three can be found in the second half of the twentieth century. Image four represents a hybrid and is characterised by the complete overlap of the political and the bureaucratic sphere, resulting in a single entity.

From this starting point, we advance further by adding a new focus on EU bureaucrats in the Commission and possible conflicting identities as well as loyalties when it comes to the role of national backgrounds. For this reason, we discuss our images through the lenses offered by representative bureaucracy and administrative culture and introduce three ideal images in the next section. Similar to the work of Aberbach et al. (1981), our images are not meant to serve as theories or models, moreover they represent ideal-type images and offer room for interpretation.

These aspects of administrative culture help to understand how European public servants perform their tasks and how they can relate their national backgrounds to their positions in the Brussels bureaucracy. In particular, the constraints represented by group and grid can be seen to structure the behaviour of these public employees. Working within a bureaucracy involves substantial controls through rules, and group controls can be seen as commitment to either the European project or the home nation. However, there may be some internal conflicts over which sets of controls to follow. Questions of identity are crucial and might affect the behaviour of the bureaucrats of the European Commission more than we know (see Risse, 2005). Do they solely identify with their national government or are they both national and European? They plan an active role in policymaking, yet the decision-making process is a black box (Fuhse, 2005). Certainly, bureaucrats co-operate, but frictions are likely, especially when identities and loyalties clash (Christensen, 1997). With the rise of populist governments across Europe (Peters & Pierre, 2019), we need to address this issue not only on a national but also on a European level. Consequently, if there is a crisis of the European community driven by contemporary populist governments, there is a need to shed light on the bureaucrats of the European Commission.

Ideal Images of Bureaucrats of the European Commission

As pointed out above, the role of national background in recruitment to the Commission presents a paradox. Bureaucrats are recruited because of their national background and therefore fulfil passive characteristics of a representative

bureaucracy, yet as soon as they start their career in the Commission, they are expected to be loyal solely to the Commission. Yet, we argue that public servants have to balance their loyalties and their multiple goals. For this reason, we assume that there are three ideal images of public servants in the Commission: the Purely Professional, the Europeanist and the Nationalist.

Image One – the Purely Professional

This ideal type of a public servant is geared to foster values that are in line with traditional Weberian bureaucratic values (Mayntz, 1985). For this reason, the image promotes objectivity, fairness, impersonality and reliability. The Purely Professional image is shaped by its neutrality and equal treatment before the law. It derives its legitimacy from political support and because of its own professional expertise. Questions of national backgrounds or loyalty do not play any role at all, because public servants in image one are solely loyal to their bureaucratic organisation. Questions of representation do not matter, for they would call their expertise into question. Accordingly, the balance of goals and loyalties is not a factor, because image one acts on an input-oriented steering. There is no conflict between professional loyalties and any further political loyalties. The Purely Professional is typical for early images of international public servants, characterised by neutrality and a strong belief of the public service as well as strong public service ethos.

Image Two –The Europeanist

When subscribing to this ideal-typical image, public servants are expected to put high emphasis on their job-related role understanding. They are hired because of their expertise but compared to image one have to balance their European versus their professional loyalty. Image two comes into the EU bureaucracy because he or she is already more European than average public servants. The Europeanist is highly committed to the ideas of the EU, thus he or she becomes socialised with EU-friendly values as soon as he or she starts the job. For this reason, there is potential for a conflict of interests when it comes to the balance of professional and political loyalties. For many years, the Europeanist was believed to be the typical European Commission public servant (Kassim, 2018), while there is now more scepticism about the generality of this role.

Image Three – The Nationalist

This ideal-type image features values that promote the relevance of the national background. Image three public servants act on behalf of their national background. They are passive as well as active representatives of their national backgrounds. Moreover, they are loyal to their home country. Europe is witnessing a trend of hyper-nationalist movements: Italy and Austria in western Europe, along with Hungary and Poland in central and eastern Europe. Thus conflicts may arise, when image three bureaucrats come from a populist anti-European

Member State and have to balance professional and political values. The Nationalist public servant might even act against his own organisation. Pre-recruitment experiences in national governments play an important role. This is crucial when it comes to more senior positions that require a high level of skills and longer working experience. In addition, populist nationalists are anti-bureaucracy in general. They would work against the EU and therefore work against the rationale of bureaucracy. Max Weber's description of an ideal type of bureaucracy is characterised by values such as objectivity, fairness, and non-partisan neutrality (Weber, 1978).

As a corollary, if the European community is in crisis, then image three bureaucrats would welcome this development and might even try to help sabotage the European project. Image two bureaucrats are pro-European by definition and defenders of European ideals. Image three bureaucrats are instead implementers of political goals and follow a professional, Weberian approach. Conflicts are likely when these images collide within the European Commission, especially when image one and two bureaucrats need to work together.

The three visions of the nature of public administrators in the EU are related to the four images of the 'executive order' within the European Commission developed by Jarle Trondal (2010). These orders are intended to capture something broader than just the nature of the bureaucracy but are still applicable to that bureaucracy which is the focus of our study. These four images of the executive are:

- Intergovernmental
- Supranational
- Departmental
- Epistemic.

The first two of those images are very similar to our classifications of Europeanist and Nationalist, with the Intergovernmental image arguing for an executive order in which individuals remain essentially representative of their home nations, while in the Supranational image they become 'good Europeans'. The latter two categories are more concerned with the managerial and even political roles played by members of the executive. In the Departmental view, the member of the Commission is defending and representing his/her own Directorates-General (DG) in the usual policy battles of governing (see Peters, 1992). The last of these characterisations of the executive order within the EU, the Epistemic, represents the relationships which members of the executive have with actors within society, and their role as gatherers and sorters of information.

These four images of the executive order, as well as the three advanced above, may not be descriptive of an individual member of the Commission for all times and in all situations. Rather, they may be invoked (consciously or unconsciously) as situations demand, and as various stimuli activate one or another pattern of behaviour. In addition, many behaviours of an individual member of the bureaucracy may be hybrid, for example, he or she may be more willing to accept information and advice from an individual or interest group from their own country

than from others, hence playing the Epistemic role and the Intergovernmental role simultaneously.

The departmental perspective mentioned by Trondal can also be seen operating at several levels. Above we described this as operating at the level of the DG, and that is perhaps the most common locus for identification of the individuals involved. On the other hand, they could identify with the Commission as an institution and think of their role as maintaining the powers of that institution against possible rivals, for example the European Parliament. That type of institutional politics is far from uncommon, so the analyst needs to be careful in terms of identifying the locus of that organisational view.

In the following, this contribution bridges the concept of administrative culture with the theory of representative bureaucracy. Representative bureaucracy is crucial to understanding how active and passive notions of European identity matter within the European Commission, and how those general identities affect bureaucratic identities and possibly bureaucratic behaviour.

Representative Bureaucracy

The term 'representative bureaucracy' was coined by J. Donald Kingsley (1944) to address questions of the class composition of a British civil service faced with implementing the likely reforms of a Labour government following World War II. The question was whether a civil service composed largely of upper and middle-class civil servants would implement the nationalisation of major industries and the creation of the National Health Service.[2] Although there were broader questions of democracy behind this analysis, the immediate impetus for raising the question was very practical.

Although issues of class remain of some concern in studies of representative bureaucracy, issues of ethnicity and gender have become the dominant concerns. Not surprisingly, most studies find that the upper levels of the civil service in most societies are dominated by males of the dominant ethnic groups. The further down the civil service ranks one goes, the more representative employment becomes, but at the presumed 'decision-making' levels these systems continue to be rather unrepresentative.

In addition to the obvious questions of democratic representation, we should care about these patterns of employment for several reasons. One is that it can be assumed to affect decision-making. If individual members of a public bureaucracy have a certain background and continue to identify at least in part with that Member State, this will affect their decisions. The effect may be unconscious, but there may still be an effect. This may be true even given the pledge of loyalty to the EU taken by employees.

Second, the pattern of representativeness in the bureaucracy is assumed to affect how a public administration interacts with its clients. While this may be

[2]In the event, the implementation happened without opposition or delay on the part of the civil service.

less of an issue for the EU than in the Member States, given that much of its implementation activity is conducted nationally, it may still matter for the way in which the Commission interacts with the members, and how it works with interest groups when bargaining over policy and implementation (Grande, 1996).

Perhaps most importantly, the representativeness of the EU bureaucracy may affect the legitimacy of the entire project. If the administrative system, and the political system in general, is seen to be overwhelmingly from a few Member States then citizens from other states may feel disadvantaged and believe that their interests are not being served by the EU. This may be especially true because a good deal of Euroscepticism is driven by the bureaucratic and remote nature of the Brussels system, at least in the imagery promoted by populist and nationalist political parties that question the efficacy of EU membership.

The legitimation argument for the EU also points to the importance of symbolism for the composition of the European bureaucracy. Governments in general have some obligation to be 'model employers' and to apply standards of fairness and equality in their hiring practices. This is certainly true for hiring women and members of minority groups, but for the European Commission relatively equal hiring across the Member States is also an important symbol of inclusiveness, especially for accession members. If citizens of the Member States believe that they have an equal opportunity to become a part of the governing apparatus of Europe they are almost certainly more likely to consider that political system more favourably.[3]

The representativeness issues within the EU are more complex than for most bureaucracies given that the familiar issues of gender and ethnicity are present at the same time as issues of nationality. They can be even more complex when there are territorial political issues within a Member State, for example between Catalonia and the government in Madrid. Thus, any member of the Commission may be torn in a number of different directions if they are seeking to actively represent their identities through their membership of the European bureaucracy.

We should note that the EU is not the only bureacracy in which geographical representation, whether aligned with ethnicity or not, has been considered important. For example, the Italian bureaucracy has long been dominated by recruits from the *southern half of the country*, while the dominance of candidates raised and educated in Paris in the higher French bureaucracy has been noted numerous times. As well as issues of democratic representation, this also has raised questions about patterns of decision-making. Similar patterns can be found in Northern America. The Canadian bureaucracy for example has a larger share of recruits from Quebec and the Maritimes than might be expected.

The issue of representativeness can be related to the ideas of a European executive order mentioned above. No matter how passively representative of national backgrounds the administrators within the Commission may be, if they choose

[3]There is limited direct evidence for this point, although there is a good deal of evidence that perceptions of fairness for governments are associated with building trust in the political system (see Rothstein, 2011).

to act in a more intergovernmental manner then active representation may also come into play. If, however, they act more as European supra-nationalists, then those national interests will be less represented. Likewise, to the extent that they become creatures of the Commission and their DGs (the departmental view), then the representativeness of the bureaucracy, at least in active terms, will also be diminished. Adopting an epistemic view on the role of the bureaucrat could go either way, depending on how the administrators choose to consult and interact with society.

Evidence on Representativeness

There is some evidence on the extent to which the European Union, and more exactly the Commission, represents the population of the Union as a whole. As noted, representativeness can be assessed through a number of characteristics such as gender, nationality and ethnicity. First, on the nationality dimension which is central to our concerns in this contribution, the evidence is that the smaller Member States do better than the larger ones. For example, Kassim et al. (2013, p. 45) found that in 2012 Britain, Italy, France and Germany were under-represented significantly, while Belgium, Greece, Finland and Hungary were significantly over-represented.

The apparent bias in employment is perhaps understandable, given that there is a need to have native speakers of the numerous languages used within the EU. And for some small countries even having a very few members of the Commission may lead to an apparent disproportionate level of employment. By contrast the large population of Germany may make it appear to dominate employment even if it receives a proportionate number of positions.

Several major studies have been done on the representativeness of the European Commission. In addition to those by Kassim et al. (2013) that have contained extensive evidence about the nature of Commission personnel, Gravier and Roth (2016), as well as Christensen, van den Bekerom, and van der Voet (2017) have published reports discussing the level of representativeness within the Commission. Both papers demonstrate that although there have been formal and informal attempts to make the Commission representative, some political factors – as well as lower levels of suitable personnel – may inhibit the Commission becoming as representative of nationalities as it might be expected to be. Although not central to our analysis, representativeness by gender continues to be somewhat weaker than in many national bureaucracies, especially in powerful posts such as cabinets.

Problems in Representative Bureaucracy in the European Commission

Although representative bureaucracy is in general a positive contribution to both performance of a bureaucracy and the legitimacy of the political system in which that bureaucracy is embedded, we should consider carefully the impacts of emphasising representativeness in the recruitment and retention of members

of the Commission. Bringing social groups into an organisation may lead to that organisation becoming captured by the group, and therefore the nominal purposes of the organisation may be subverted (Nagel & Peters, 2018; O'Toole, 2004).

We should note here that the role of national background in recruitment to the Commission presents something of a paradox. On the one hand, there is a good deal of emphasis on equality of opportunity, and equality of outcomes for potential recruits from the Member States. While the level of representativeness is far from perfect (see above) it is still a consideration when hiring personnel. On the other hand, national backgrounds are meant to be meaningless once in a position within the Commission, given the assumption of an over-arching loyalty to the European project. Thus, in terms of the representative bureaucracy literature (Bradbury & Kellough, 2011; Meier, 1975; von Maravić, Peters & Schröter, 2015), the representation is intended to be more passive than active. The bureaucracy is representative in geographical terms, but not in behavioural terms.

The politics of geographical representativeness in the EU may also be made more difficult because of the extreme variations in size and influence of its Member States. For example, Estonia has fewer than two million inhabitants while Germany has more than 80 million. The economic differences between Germany or France and some of the poorer countries are as marked. Even direct proportionality of representation may therefore not produce much real opportunity for Estonia or Bulgaria to influence the course of EU policymaking.

These conflicts become evident when we look at the role of cabinets, which function as private offices for each European Commissioner. They are supposed to support and provide their Commissioners with information and political guidance. For many years these cabinets served as so-called national enclaves (Kassim, 2018). As European Commissioners tended to engage employees from their home states, the links with their own national government increased (Kassim, 2018). Consequently, their reputations worsened, and 'they were frequently suspected of promoting the interests of their home state' (McDonald, 1997, p. 51, as cited in Kassim, 2018, p. 786). That means, public servants of the cabinets were constantly considered to be undermining the ideals of the European Commission.

The case of the cabinets can be linked to our ideal images and the four images of the 'executive order'. Thus, when we look at the arguments held against public servants of the cabinets, we can identify the image of the Nationalist public servant and the Intergovernmental image. Their behaviour often follows national interests, which are not necessarily congruent with the goals of the European Commission.

As a result of various conflicts and frictions between cabinets and the Commission's administration, reforms were introduced by the former Prodi (1999) and Barroso (2004) Commissions with the clear goal of dissolving cabinets as national enclaves (Egeberg & Heskestad, 2010). The reforms included a new maximum size (six public servants per cabinet) for cabinets, and a maximum number of three members of the same nationality as the Commissioner. However, cabinets and public servants of the Commission still 'live in different worlds' (Kassim, 2018, p. 787). The attempts to make the system more representative are clear, but there

are pressures from national capitals with mainly national preferences on their agenda.

Conclusion

Against this background, we argue that the European Commission is a mirror of the many identities we can find in the EU and the tensions that arise from those conflicts. The European Commission and its administrators (in the cabinets as well as general ones) are supposed to serve the interests of the EU. Making the European Commission more representative might bring along unintended consequences, such as bringing in pressures from national capitals. Similarly, tensions like those between cabinets and general public servants in the Commission exemplify possible conflicts. The administrative culture of the EU poses several choices of controls and of identities for the members of the Commission. Consequently, conflicts between bureaucrats are likely, especially between those subscribed to European ideals and those who advocate their national interests. Identity matters, not only when it comes to politicians or citizens. Max Weber's famous bureaucratic ideal type (Mayntz, 1985) with its genuine character described by the Latin phrase *sine ira et studio* cannot be found in the real world. Bureaucrats have identities too, and they have always been key players in the policymaking process. When we discuss if the European community is in crisis, we need to take into consideration those who are crucial for European politics. The management of administrative culture is a challenge for the European Commission and the project of the EU. Especially in times of change and crisis, basic values matter and need to be addressed.

This contribution highlights the relevance of further research that needs to be conducted. It needs to shed light on the values, attitudes and work-related role understandings of EU administrators. Surveys and interviews are promising approaches for a better understanding of them. However, as long as there are public servants whose goals are not congruent with the EU, and who are serving their national capitals and following an intergovernmental agenda instead, there is cause for interest, if not concern.

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Conclusion: Politics, Processes and Passions of Identification in Europe

Amanda Machin and Nadine Meidert

> A major component in European culture is… the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. (Said, 2003, p. 7)
>
> More than ever before, we should continue to stick firmly to this project of European enlightenment. It is the only thing that will allow us to change the contours of that which appears possible or doable. (Zizek, 2015)

On most maps of the world, Europe is in a prime position. This, of course, is a matter of design and not of chance. As critical cartographers point out, maps are expressions both of power and desire, and no projection of the globe presents the true, unbiased picture. In the Mercator projection, the map drawn by a Flemish cartographer that has become the standard depiction of the world, the global north is significantly magnified and Europe is placed at the centre (Firth, 2015). The rest of the world is constructed as relative and 'other' to that centre, geographically but also politically. This projection is but one example of the way that the idea of 'Europe' is constructed and reified. Borrowing from Edward Said, we might say that Europe is given a 'positional superiority' through which it strengthens an identity by placing itself against and above non-European peoples and cultures (Said, 2003, p. 7).

Europe, as much as the Orient, is an invention that merits scrutiny (Delanty, 1995, p. vii). But it is difficult to demarcate the boundaries of Europe precisely, even on a map (Jacobs & Maier, 1998, p. 13). The meaning of 'Europe' has always been contested (Delanty, 1995, p. 1; Schmidt-Gleim & Wiesner, 2014, p. 4.) and in the contemporary context of shifting geopolitical relations, in which Europe is more frequently acknowledged as 'other' itself, it is harder to maintain any suggestion of a substantive 'European identity'. Narratives of European identity often centre on the idea of peace; one common claim in discussions of European integration is that 'European identity has served as an antidote to war' (Hansen, 2002, p. 488). Others promote the idea of an essentially European tradition rooted in humanism and democracy (Delanty, 1995, p. 2). And yet even

Political Identification in Europe: Community in Crisis?, 179–183
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doi:10.1108/978-1-83982-124-020211017

if valid, it is questionable whether these narratives are able to underpin a strong identification with Europe.

Certainly, the vision of 'a wider and deeper community' described by Robert Schuman in his famous 1950 declaration (Schuman, 1950), as well as more recent predictions of 'European cosmopolitanism', have been belied by the rise of right-wing populist parties, the apparent triumphs of Eurosceptic nationalism, the entrenchment of borders and the uneven distribution of austerity measures across the continent. Europe is seemingly characterised not by identity and unity but by division and conflict. So what, then, does it mean to belong in Europe today? Which collective identifications are most salient and how do they fit alongside each other? How do these identifications affect European politics? Are they able to frame the response to various 'crises', or are they themselves in crisis?

This book has grappled with these questions, considered the various dimensions of collective identification in Europe and traced the dynamics of identification as an affect, source and focus of crisis. Each chapter has addressed a specific concern, drawing on an appropriate methodology or theory and expressing its author's particular research interests and disciplines. The juxtaposition of these different pieces has revealed, we believe, important points that merit further investigation in future research on political identification. We expand briefly here on three of them.

First, in contrast to scholarship that claims European identity can be taken as given (Wintle, 2011), the book as a whole fits alongside research that suggests European identity is better understood not as a finished product but instead as an on-going process of identification (Martinelli, 2017; Stråth, 2010; Sassatelli, 2009). Yannis Stavrakakis emphasises in the preface that collective identity can no longer be regarded as 'determined by a rigid social topography' (p. xiii). Part of the legacy of European modernity is to unveil the 'social processes of construction and sedimentation' that produce identity (p. xiii). If all collective identities are a matter of construction then some are more robust than others, and European identification seems particularly best described in 'a language of becoming' (Sassatelli, 2009, p. 14) or, as Myriam Fotou writes in her chapter, 'an open-ended project, undecidable and in flux' (p. 23). Identification with Europe is rather weak in parts of the world and can actually be seen in decline (Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016). As Neil Fligstein points out: 'Europeans are a small part of Europe's population' (2008, p. viii).

Although many of the authors agree that European identification is a process, they disagree on how it is best understood. William Outhwaite suggests it is an uneven process that can either be encouraged or interrupted by crisis. For example, as Benjamin Abrams, Sebastian Büttner and Amanda Machin suggest in their chapter, the Brexit crisis can be interpreted as an opportunity for the European project to reform and reconstruct European identity (p. 148). Evrim Tan considers the possible role played by EU citizenship in facilitating a European identity, emphasising particularly the role of citizenship rights and civic virtues. Nora Schröder also focuses on European citizenship, but she argues that citizenship itself is an identification process that 'comes into existence only through its enactment' (p. 72), for example through protests against the proposed

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement between the EU and the United States.

Schröder highlights the integral role of democratic conflict in the process of European identification (Stråth, 2010, p. 16). It is through conflict that distinctiveness between identities is both revealed and constituted. Identification involves the demarcation of an 'us' or an 'in-group' from a 'them' or an 'out-group' (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Connolly, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Some of the chapters therefore deal with the way that European identification is constituted through the construction of the 'other', or what Ove Skarpenes refers to in his chapter as 'symbolic boundaries'. How these boundaries are drawn, and who or what is 'othered' beyond them, is not predetermined, and therefore we need to deepen Said's analysis of Europe's 'othering'. Focussing on the significance of migration for European identity, Fotou explains in her chapter that immigrants are commonly constructed by European security discourses as an 'inimical, hence constitutive threat to European identity' (p. 22). Paradoxically, Fotou argues, the hostile treatment of immigrants and refugees threatens actually to undermine European values and identity. Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, whose chapter also analyses security and identity, agrees that it is often the migrant who becomes 'other' in the construction of identity. But as Skarpenes importantly shows, the foreigner is not inevitably 'othered' in a time of crisis and growing inequality; in his analysis into the working-class in Norway he finds that 'for many ethnic Norwegian workers, immigrants are seen as complements to the labour market rather than competitors' (p. 142) and that symbolic borders are drawn 'upwards' against elites, not 'downwards' against immigrants.

Second, what many – if not all – of the chapters make clear is the persistence of national identity. The chapters by Outhwaite, Tan and Maximillian Nagel and B. Guy Peters all consider the tension between national and European identification, although they disagree about what it entails. Outhwaite questions any necessary opposition between the two although he points out that the coronavirus pandemic has revealed 'the national default' (p. 16). Focussing particularly on the interests of mobile or active citizens who 'carry out different and diverse belongings', Tan believes that it is possible for citizens to 'accommodate national and supranational identities at the same time' (p. 54). Nagel and Peters are less convinced. They ponder the problems that national identification poses for representation in the European Commission; if the bureaucrats, chosen because of their national background, identify with their home nation more than the EU, they ask, then can they truly work in the interests of Europe? Do potential conflicts between national and European identification possibly undermine political legitimacy of the Commission?

Such differences aside, what these chapters all share is the recognition that although the meaning of national identity is contested, nations remain a highly salient identity category in Europe. This raises the question of how this continued salience can be explained: what accounts for this persistence? Part of the answer is that identities are not solely a result of rational interests but also of emotional connections (Machin, 2015). This is the third point we wish to highlight. In line with an expanding strand of research on political emotions

(Hoggett & Thompson, 2012), several of the chapters pick up on the passionate or affective dimensions of collective identification. In their chapters, Fani Gianoussi and Bartoszewicz both explicitly consider the role of emotions or affects in relation to populism. Bartoszewicz explains how the 'emotion-invoking narratives' of populism create a sense of ontological security (p. 98) while Gianoussi focuses particularly on resentment in the discourses around the Greek crisis, and how this emotion 'was crucial to forging new identities or reinforcing old ones' (p. 122). This is confirmed in the chapter by Tim Kucharzewski and Silvia Nicola, who explain the irrelevance of rational arguments in discussions with far-right populists. They report, however, that although the political opinions of populists were not rational, nor were those of their opponents who when confronted with far-right opinions 'embraced European identity even more passionately' (p. 89). It is important to consider the role of passions in the formation of political identities (Mouffe, 2018, p. 74). As Gianoussi illustrates, there is an interplay between discourse and affects. The rational argument that Europe is important for prosperity and peace will not provoke a collective identification without any passionate attachment.

Some contend that precisely because of sharpening interconnected socio-ecological crises, a strong identification with Europe is important. It may be that a robust sense of European belonging may allow for political co-ordination as well as coherent and legitimate policy-making. But perhaps political identification is not only a prerequisite for crisis but also its product. If crises, as we explain in the introduction, can be seen as moments of transformation, then they are chances to create new identities or to strengthen existing ones. For us, then, European identification is an open-ended, contested and passionate process that works in tension with other collective identifications and is transformed through periods of crisis.

For George Steiner, 'Europe is made up of coffee houses, of cafés… So long as there are coffee houses, the 'idea of Europe' will have content' (Steiner, 2015). Coffee houses are renowned as the settings for conspiracy, discussion and disagreement. We might say, then, that part of 'being European' involves the impassioned and unceasing debate over what 'being European' actually means'. For now, Europe remains in the middle of the hegemonic world-map, but its position and its content are inevitably contested and always changing. This is why it demands the analysis from multiple disciplines and from numerous locations that this project hopes to provide.

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